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Abstract
Over the last few years, incidents of network based intrusions have rapidly increased,

due to the increase and popularity of various attack tools easily available for download
from the Internet. Due to this increase in intrusions, the concept of a network defence

known as Honeypots developed. These honeypots are designed to ensnare attackers

and monitor their activities. Honeypots use the principles of deception such as
masking, mimicry, decoying, inventing, repackaging and dazzling to deceive

attackers.

Deception exists in various fonns. It is a tactic to survive and defeat the motives of

attackers. Due to its presence in the nature, deception has been widely used during

wars and now in lnfomiation Systems.

This thesis considers the current state of honeypot technology as well as describes the
framework ofhow to improve the effectiveness ofhoneypots through the effective use

of deception. In this research, a legitimate corporate deceptive network is created
using Honeyd (a type of honeypot) which is attacked and improved using empirical

learning approach. The data collected during the attacking exercise were analysed,

using various measures, to detennine the effectiveness of the deception in the
honcypot network created using honeyd. The results indicate that the attackers were

deceived into believing the honcynet was a real network which instead was a
deceptive network.
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1. Introduction
In the last few years, the networking revolution has finally come ofage. The Internet

is purported to provide limitless possibilities and opportunities but on the other side

also increases the risks of malicious intrusions by hackers or malicious attackers

community (Sundaram, 2001). In the rest ofthe thesis, the tenn 'hackers' will be used

to refer to malicious attackers.

It is very important to understand, design and implement some fonn of security

mechanism to prevent or detect unauthorised users. These intrusions can be detected.

Due to the increased attempts of intrusion into systems, the concept of 'honeypot'

systems was developed (Spitzner, 2002). Honeypots are used to trap and decode
attack methods used by the hackers (Brenton, n.d; Klug, 2000; Spitzner, 2002).

Honeypots can provide a deceptive defence mechanism in which the attackers are
deceived into believing they are intruding into a real production system. The correct

deployment, monitoring and analysis of honeypots help in increasing our

understanding ofattackers' modes ofoperations and tools in details.

Deception can be referred as the state ofbeing deceived or misled (Webster's Revised

Unabridged Dictionary, 1998). It can be considered as creation of false environment

to fool or deceive people. Honeypot systems are meant to create a false computing

environment in order to keep away the attackers from the real network environment

dnd entrap them in a false system. Honeypots are designed to audit the activity of

intruder, save log files and record events like processes started, changes or deletion of
files and key strokes.

The significance of this research is to improve the defensive capability of Honeynet
networks. This research is significant to universities, government organisations,

educational institutions who will be able to use the data generated from this research
as a platfonn to continue with further research into computer and network security.

Private organisations or individuals can use this research for deploying this or similar

network architecture into their networks with the aim ofmaking it more secure. The

outcomes of this research will allow the organisations and individuals to understand
9

and learn about various, unfamiliar attacks which may be captured on the
implemented honeynet.

The purpose of this research is to improve the level of deception presented to

attackers in a honeypot design. To achieve a higher level of deception the designed
deception should be regularly improved or updated with new deceptive services. This

can be achieved by hardening the deceptive honeypots and testing the effectiveness of

the deception using empirical learning approach. The empirical learning approach ',
means by testing the systems in a cyclic manner where results of each tests depends
on the other. This will help us in improving the ability of the deceptive honeypots to
gather attack intelligence while the network is being probed or attacked.

Following are the two mam research questions outlined to achieve the desired

purpose of the research:

1. What factors af fect the effectiveness of deception in network environments
when using honeypot systems?

2. How can these factors be enhanced to perfonn a more effective level of
deception?

This thesis starts with a detailed literature review in chapter 2. This literature review

includes the concepts of deception in everyday life to cyberspace, detailed description
about TCP/IP and its security issues and the concept ofhoneypots. Chapter 3 presents

the detailed methodology adopted by the researcher. Chapter 4 discusses various tools

used for data collection and analysis purpose. Operating system fingerprinting results
are discussed in chapter 5.

The honeypot implementation is explained in chapter 6. Chapter 7-9 discusses the

analysis of results obtained in first, second and third testing respectively. Chapter 10

presents the final discussion and conclusions. The included CD with the thesis

contains the charts generated by Analyst Notebook 6 from using the data from honeyd
log files.
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Denial and Deception
This section of the chapter discusses the role of denial and deception in various fonns.
Section 2. 1 . 1 defines the tenns "denial" and "deception". Section 2.1.2 describes the
process of deception used for implementing a successful deception. Section 2. l.3
discusses the structure of deception. Section 2.1.4 describes how deception exists in

various fom1s in nature. Section 2.1.5 describes the role of deception in military.
Finally, section 2.l.6 describes the role of deception in infomrntion sy5tems or
computers.

2.1.1 Definitions
There are many different ways by which "denial" can be defined. According to
Shulsky (Godson & Wirtz, 2002, p 15), "denial" refers to the attempt to block all
infonnation channels by which an enemy could learn some truth, thus preventing him
or her from reacting in a timely manner. For our purposes, it can be referred as
safeguarding the infonnation (digital infonnation) from an adversary.
"Deception" by contrast is defined as the deliberate alteration of data or a situation's
context to promote a desired outcome (Hutchinson & Warren, 2002). It is an attempt
to cause the person to believe something which is not true.
As reported by Gerwehr and Glenn (2000), Whaley (1 969) has defined deception as
"infonnation designed to manipulate the behaviour of others by inducing them to
accept a false or distorted presentation of their environment - physical, social or
political." Deception exists not only among humans but also in animals and plants. In
the animal and plant kingdoms, deception is among the most effective and widespread
tools for survival. For example, when confronted by a predator, the Sepiola squid
inserts a cloud of ink, which is colored and shaped just like the squid, between itself
and the predator. The squid then changes color and darts away, leaving a confused
predator in its wake (Gerwehr & Glenn, 2000).

11

Deception is a tactic to survive and lo defeat the motives of attackers. Cohen, et al.

(2001) quotes from Sun Tzu lhal ""A/1 wmfare is based 011 deception", which means
that all warfare should be based on deception. Deception is not new to warfare. Even

the great epics describe deception having been used in wars. Mythology talks about it

every time. From the death of Hercules to the defeat of the Spanish Armada to World

War II to Operation Desert Stonn, deception has been used widely.

2.1.2 The Process of Deception
The process of deception is in many ways, like a chess game. If the person doing the

deceiving is more skilled (or simply docs a better job) than the person being deceived,
then the deception will be successful. In deception, Uust as in chess), some encounters

will end in "stalemate" ..... in that the person being deceived did not get enough
information to really determine that a deception had occurred.

The actual deception process requires 3 main elements as defined by Gerwehr &

Glenn (2000):

• Objective

• Target

• Story

Initially to have a successful deception, the objective to create that deception should

be very clear in mind. This could range from simple survival to gaining strategic
surprise. The next step should be to have an idea of what the deceiver wants the
enemy to do in order to achieve that objective. This could be us simple as gelling the

enemy to focus on location A instead of location B. For instance, in a Honeypol

(Spitzner, 2003) environment the objective of the deceiver is to create a deceptive
network so that the malicious attacker is kept away from the main produclion

network.

Aller identifying the objective for creating the deception, the next step is to identify

the target of the deception. Aller the target is identified, the deceiver parlays

intelligence about the target into a profile of that person's beliefs, intentions and

12

capabilities. A wel\-conslrucled deception is built around that intelligence and
exploits it. In a Honeypot environment, the network should resemble a nonnal
corporate network with some common vulnerabilities in order to attract the malicious
attackers. The objective of implementing a honeypot is to identify the intentions of the
malicious attackers for example, what they intend lo do once having an access to the
network. Also it helps in understanding what their capabilities are, in tenns of
accessing and attacking the networks or hosts on the network, what type of attacks
they are capable of pcrfonning such as, denial of service attacks or password cracking
ctc (Spitzner, 2003).
Knowing the objective and the target of deception, the deceiver should fonnulate a
stOIJ' that must be told to the target to produce some misperceptions. The

story is told

through means of deception, such as camouDage or disinfomrntion. In a Honeypot,
deceptive services and operating systems arc implemented to create the misperception
in the mind of the attacker and keep him or her busy in the deceptive network to
safeguard the main production network (Spitzncr, 2003). This network may be
equipped with various hosts running multiple operating systems with some open
vulnerabilities and services to attract auackcrs. Such deceptions need to be carefully
designed so that the total deception created to attract auackers does not look
suspicious. If the attackers become suspicious then lhcy may leave the honeypol
immediately and this may not resolve the purpose of the research. The complete
Deception planning process is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below:

Deception planning process

•
••
Objective •: Target

Story

Means ofDeecption
• Camouflage/Concealment/cover
• Demonstration/feint/divrrsion
• Display/decoy/dummy
• Mimicry/spoofing
• Dazzling/sensory saturation
• Disinformation/ruse

Figure 2.1 : The Deception Planning Process
(Adopted from C.,rwehr & Glenn, 2000, p. 28)
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The actual execution ofthe deception planning process moves in the reverse direction:

infomrntional elements being manipulated are transmitted, creating the story, in the

mind oftarget, to achieve the objective.

2.1.3 Structure of Deception
Deception can be categorised in two types: hiding the real and showing the false

(Bowyer, 1 982). Hiding can be further divided into masking, repackaging and

dazzling. Showing can be further divided into mimicking, inventing and decoying.
The figure 2.2 below illustrates the structure ofdeception:

DECEPTION

•

•

MASKING

HIDING

•
•

REPACKAGING

•

DAZZLING

SHOWING

•

MIMICKING

•

INVENTING

•

DECOYING

Figure 2.2: Structure of Deception

(Adopted from Bowyer, 1982)

Masking occurs when the real is hidden by blending with a background, integrating

itself with surroundings. It is a type of camouflage: battleships painted grey to blend

with the ocean. Steganography is a good example of masking in relation to computer
and network security. Messages are embedded and hidden inside an image and it is
very hard to identify if the image is encrypted with some hidden message.

Repackaging occurs when the real is hidden by a new wrapping. The concept of
repackaging does exist over the web (Hutchinson and Warren, 2002). Users are

mislead to believe which is not true. For example, most ofthe computer viruses are
packaged into emails which appears to be genuine or with desirable contents. Like I
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LOVE YOU virus which spread using the address book ofthe affected computer with

a false love letter along with

it.

Such disinfonnation can be very destructive as

Internet has become the important part of the corporate networks. Therefore it is very

important to be aware and be prepared to avoid such deceptions in a network

environment.

Dazzling occurs when an object can neither"blend in the background by some fonn of

masking nor be repackaged effectively then the qualities ofthe object may be changed

in such a way as to mystify. All military and diplomatic codes and ciphers are a fonn

ofdazzling (Bowyer, 1982). Dazzling over the internet can be co-related with causing
denial of service attack over a network. The victims' network resources are mainly

used in coping with the attack rather than its nonnal operation. Dazzling can also be

used for sending Trojans while causing a dazzling DoS attack.

Mimicking involves creation ofa replica ofreality with one or more characteristics of

the real. It is similar to masking but nothing is hidden,just to hide the reality ofwhat

is there. The most famous example of mimicking occurred in Canada when an
illiterate pensioner died in Toronto several years ago. His family cut off his thumb

and preserved it in formaldehyde, and settled down to some years ofmonthly checks
endorsed as usual with his thumb print. In inventing, false is displayed by creating an
alternative reality. A false document appears real but it is not. Decoying openly shows

something, which is not true. For example, dummy tanks used successfully by the

Serbs in the recent Balkans' conflict to confuse the attack aircraft. (Bowyer, 1982;

Hutchinson and Warren, 2002). All the above three, mimicking, inventing and

decoying, can be extensively used in honeypots/Honeynets. As in Honeynets, a

replica of real network is created and a false network environment is created which

looks very real to the intruder. This network emulates various services and operating
systems which resembles to the real services and operating systems.

Deception has been in existence not only among humans but also in plants and
animals. In order to understand the phenomenon of deception among the Infonnation

Systems or computers, it is important to understand the origin of deception from

nature which is adopted into the military and computer systems deception.
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2.1.4 Deception in Nature
Every species' in the environment has its predators and its prey. They all use
deception in one form or another, either to protect themselves from the predator or in
search of their prey for their living. According to Bowyer (1 982), deceptive behaviour
and physical distortion in various species are determined by physical structure and

genetic makeup that has emerged from a process of selection over the course of
evolution or possibly a single moment of mutation.
Many types of deception are employed in nature such as masking, repackaging,
dazzling, mimicking, inventing and decoying as illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Biological Examples of deception in nature
Masking
Certain animals have characteristic to blend in the surrounding to 'hide' them. As in
case o f polar bear, whose fur creates an illusion to appear white, due to the nature of
reflection, to masks its presence by blending with its surrounding environment, snow
(Polar Bear International, 2002)

Repackaging
Hiding from real by repackaging can be perceived in various ways and can be either
dangerous or harmless. Chameleons have characteristic of changing colours of their
skin surface according to the surrounding background (Carthy, 1972).
Dazzling
There are situations when masking and repackaging does not help the victims to hide
themselves from the predator.

In such situations, dazzling is a mode of deception

which protects the victim from the attacker or predator. A good example of dazzling
could be when a predator attacks an octopus. Under attack the octopus shoots out ink
that dazzles the attacker and the octopus's withdraws to safety. Since the blue ink is
not venomous, it temporarily impairs the smell senses of the attacker while the
octopus flees to safety (Haveeru Daily, 2003).
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Mimicking

Mimicking is used by animals not only to hide them but also for their own advantages

as well. For example, an anglerfish looks like a rock except for a long filament

waving before its mouth. The prey may lure close to the fish to investigate about the

.filament and assume that there is nothing but a piece of rock (Bowyer, 1982, p51).

The cuckoo bird abandons its eggs in the nests of other birds. These eggs are small in
size and mimic the colour of the nested bird. Therefore, the cuckoo bird's eggs are

fledged by the nesting bird rather than the real biological parent and the host is

deceived.

Inventing

Inventing is used by animals when mimicking is not sufficient to protect them or hide
them. Further from the previous example, anglerfish also invents a new reality. Other

than having a body like rock and a long filament, anglerfish simulates a small fish
from a long appendage on the forehead of the female anglerfish acting as bait,

motioning back and forth, and glowing from the reflection of millions of light

producing bacteria (Bowyer, 1982; Doran, 2000; Monterey Bay Aquarium, 2003).
Decoying

A decoyed deception is used to distract predators from the discovered real. For

example, when a bird fears for her brood, she confuses by fluttering away or decoying

by looking left and running towards right, misdirecting the predator away from the

nest. Once the decoy is successful in distracting the predator away from the siblings,

the mother bird takes flight leaving predator away from the siblings.

2.1.5 Military Deception
Like animals, humans do need to make decisions to survive. In the realm of conflict

and war, deception is both applicable and valuable. It supports in developing decoys
to deflect the enemy attention away from major attacks. Military deception aims to

deliberately induce misperception in another for tactical, operational, or strategic
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advantage (Gerwehr & Glen, 2000). According to Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 1 16 mentioned in Cohen (2001):

"Historically, military deception has proven to be of considerable value in the
attainment of national security objectives, and a fundamental consideration in the
development and implementation ofmilitary strategy and tactics. Deception has been
used to enhance, exaggerate, minimize, or distort capabilities and intentions,· to mask
deficiencies; and to otherwise cause desired appreciations where conventional
military activities and security measures were unable to achieve the desired result.
The development of a deception organization and the exploitation of deception
opportunities are considered to be vital to national security. To develop deception
capabilities, including procedures and techniques for deception staffcomponents, it is
essential that deception receives continuous command emphasis in military exercises,
command post exercises, and in training operations. "
Deception is used to adversely affect an opponent's decision-making process. It can

be employed against an entire enemy anny or alternatively could be applied against
anyone at aII unfriendly to the deceiver.

There are many collections of information on deception in war. As mentioned by

Cohen (2001) the work of Whaley ( 1969), which includes details of 67 military

deception operations between 1914 and 1 968. Dunnigan and Nofi (1995) also
reviewed the history of deception in warfare and categorised them as concealment,
camouflage, false and planted infonnation, ruses, displays, demonstrations, feints,

lies, and insight.

According to Fowler and Nesbitt (1995), there are six general principles for effective

tactical deception in warfare (Rowe & Rothstein, 2003):
1 . Deception should reinforce enemy expectations.

2. Deception should have realistic timing and duration.
3. Deception should be integrated with operations

4. Deception should be coordinated with concealment of true intentions
5. Deception realism should be tailored to needs ofthe settings.
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6. Deception should be imaginative and creative.
Applying these principles to infonnation systems:
Principle 1: In infonnation systems, systems should be designed in a controlled

manner with collecting intelligence about information resources and propagating the

attacks to neighbouring systems. The deception should be designed in order to pretend

to aid the attackers.

In infonnation systems, honeypots are deployed to deceive the attackers and keep

them busy in honeypot (Spitzner, 2003). Therefore, honeypots should be able to
provide the attacker with the necessary services and features which could reflect to

them as a legitimate network and thus they are able to attack this network successfully

without getting suspicious.

Principle 2: Deceptions should not be too slow or too fast in compare to the activities

they are suppose to stimulate. For example, in honeypots there could be some delay in

data transfer from one system to another in a network environment but it should not
take too much time too so that an attacker becomes suspicious or gets discouraged in

accessing the system.

Principle 3: This principle states that deception should be integrated with operations.

When deploying honeypots, the main operation in this context is to gather infonnation

regarding the hackers (ibid, 2003). Therefore, honeypots should not serve to nonnal

genuine users but malicious attackers by encouraging them to log in and divert their

resources. Recording such activities could provide intelligence about attack methods.

Principle 4: Deception should be coordinated in a careful manner. It should not give

the attacker any suspicion that he or she has been deceived. For example, if from the
honeypot the attacker downloads any file then all the properties of file download
should be maintained in the complete file system such as directoryMlisting utility, file

editors, file backup routines, web browser and execution monitor. This will reduce the

chances of attacker getting suspicious and thus honeypot will be able to serve its
purpose.
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Pril,ciple 5: It is always not necessary to create or develop a complete detailed

deception. For example, most of the attackers may just be interested in downloading
their programs or scripts used for attacking systems and installing them, therefore it

will be important to have a deceptive file-download utility such as FTP. But it may be
unlikely for an attacker to archive his or her files so the archive utility need not be
deceptive in nature. This may provide the simplicity to the honeypots without

crowding them with unnecessary services and features. Such simplistic honeypots are
also easy to maintain.

Pri11ciple 6: This principle is not very easy to implement in infonnation systems as

responses to most of the techniques used in infonnation systems are predictable.

Methods from artificial intelligence may suggest few ways to produce convincing

simulated activity in creative ways.

The layers ofdeception are implemented with careful consideration of the adversary.

Different adversaries penetrate and fall prey to deceptions in numerous ways
depending upon their knowledge, experience, capabilities, detennination, and
resources (Gerwehr & Anderson, 2000).

2.1.6 Computer Deception
Since early 90's the use of deception in infonnation systems have come to the main

stream. Following are the few studies conducted during that period are (Cohen, 2001):

• In 1 991 , paper published by researchers of AT&T about creation of 'Jail' to
track an attacker to observe their actions (Cheswick, n.d).

• An approach to using deceptions for defence by customizing every system to
defeat automated attacks was published in 1992 (Cohen, 1 992);

• Descriptions ofInternet Lightning Rods in 1996. (Cohen, 1996)
Since then deception has increasingly been explored as a key technology area for

innovation in information protection. There has been some follow-on-studies,
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technologies and increasing adoption of technical deceptions for defence of
information systems. This includes:

• Commercial and Rion-commercial Deception Products: Development of
various deception products like Deception Tool Kit (DTK), Honeyd, Mantrap and
Spector.

• The HoneyNet Project: The Honeynet Project (Anonymous, 2002b, Spitzner,
2002) is a non-profit research organization of security professionals dedicated to

information security. Its goal is to learn the tools, tactics, and motives of the

blackhat community and share these lessons learned.

• The RIDLR: The Re-configurable Intrusion Detection Laboratory Research

(RIDLR) is a project launched from Naval Post Graduate School designed to test

out the value of deception for detecting and defending against attacks on military
information systems

• RAND studies: In 1999, RAND completed an initial survey of deceptions in an
attempt to understand the issues underlying deceptions for information protection.

Computers are automated machines created by humans and cannot really be called
'aware' in the sense of people. Therefore, when deception is used against computers,

it is actually used against the skills of human(s) that design, program and use the

computer. Computers are better in detecting the deception than people because they
posses extraordinary analysis capability and the logical processes used by computers

are normally quite different than the processes used by people. This provides some

level ofredundancy into the system.

Cohen (2001) model of computer deception is based on Cohen's "Structure of

Intrusion and Intrusion Detection" (Cohen, 2000b). In this model, a computer system

and its vulnerabilities are described in terms of intrusions at the hardware, device

driver, protocol, operating system, library and support function, application, recursive
language and meaning vs. content levels. The levels are all able to interact, but they

usually interact hierarchically with each level interacting with the ones just above and

below it.
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This model is based on the notion that at every level of the computer's cognitive
hierarchy signals can either be induced or inhibited. Deception detection and response
capabilities are key issues in the ability to defend against deceptions.

Hardware Level Deceptions

The hardware of the system can be easily altered which may result in arbitrarily
different behaviour than expected. Intrusion detection systems can be used to

determine the improper modifications to hardware which are primarily based on built
in self-test mechanisms such as the power on self test (POST) routine in a typical

personal computer. These mechanisms are designed to detect fault types in hardware

not the malicious alterations. Thus deception of these mechanisms is easy to do

without altering their value in detection fault type.

Intrusions can also be the result ofthe interaction ofhardware ofdifferent sorts rather
than the specific use of a particular type of hardware. Hardware-level deceptions
designed to induce desired observables are relatively easy to create and hard to detect.

The problem with using hardware level deception for defence against serious threat
types is that it requires physical access to the target system or logical access with
capabilities to alter hardware level functions.

Driver Level Deceptions

Drivers who usually have unlimited hardware access and can be installed from or by

applications are nonnally ignored by intrusion detection and other security systems. A

driver level of deception is capable of causing the driver to process items of interest

without passing any information to other parts ofthe operating environment (Cohen,
2001).

From a defensive point ofview, drivers are good targets. For example, a driver may
be required to be installed to gain access to defended sites. Applications like

RealAudio, QuickTime, HotBar require their individual drivers to be installed before

anyone can access these programs. Once the target loads the required driver, hardware

access is gained and exploits can be launched. This technique is offensive in nature.
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Protocol Level Deceptions

Various flaws in the IP protocol and in cryptographic protocols can be exploited for
intrusion purposes. For example, TCP/IP protocol is widely used for data
communication therefore is most prone for attack. It carries data from one host to

another so an intruder may try to exploit the vulnerabilities associated with this

protocol which may give access to the victims machine or alter the data. Other than
few known flaws that are part of active exploitations, most current intrusion detection
systems do not detect such vulnerabilities. Therefore, the more feasible approach is to

differentiate between protocols that are allowed and those that are not. This can be
further improved by differentiating based on location, time, protocol type, packet size
and makeup and other protocol level information. There are also interactions between

hardware and protocols, therefore an exploit in hardware device may result in

arbitrary behaviour of a particular protocol.

Defensive protocol level deceptions are easy to develop and hard to defeat. Deception

Tool Kit (DTK) (http://www.all.net/dtk) and D-WALL both use protocol level of

deceptions to great effect and are simple to implement. Most intelligence gathering
starts at protocol level.

Operating System Level Deceptions

Since operating systems protection can be circumvented in a number of ways,

therefore there are various intrusions possible at operating system (OS) level.

Operating systems can have complex interactions with other operating systems in the
network or environment as well as with different programs operating within OS. It

may also have some complex interactions with protocols with hardware conditions,

and these interactions are extremely complex to analyse. Thus deceptions based on

mixed levels including the OS are likely to be undetected as deceptions (ibid, 2001 ).

Operating systems are the most common point of attack against systems today as they

possess tremendous amount of cover and capability. They have unlimited access

within the system and the ability to control the hardware so as to yield arbitrary
external effects and observables. For example, with the knowledge of the operating

system type and version, it becomes an easy target for the attacker to attack the

machines using the exploits associated with that type of operating system. If an
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attacker knows that the victim machine is running on Windows operating system, he

or she can narrow down their attacks which are only associated with windows based

machines. To have a defensive deception at the target's operating system level

requires offensive action on the part of the deceiver. Thus other level of deceptions

needs to be exploited to have a defensive deception on OS.
Library and Support Function Level Deception

Libraries and support functions are often embedded within a system and are largely

hidden from the programmer so that their role is not as apparent as either operating

system calls or application level programs. For example, programs written in C

language has embedded sets of functions that automate various other functions. The

high level of interaction oflibraries is a symptom of the general intrusion detection
problem. Many current operating systems have the ability of loading libraries as

device drivers which may provide hardware controls.

Libraries functions as defensive deceptions can be ofbig help but due to the limitation

of libraries in tenns of their effectiveness they may not be able to provide a secure
level ofdefensive deception.

Application Level Deceptions

Applications provide many new opportunities for deceptions. They always trust the
data they receive so false content can be easily generated. Known attack detection

tools and anomaly detection have been applied at the application level with limited

success (ibid, 2001).

The interaction ofan application level with any library level may allow remote user to
cause any unexpected malicious behaviour within the system. It is common for many
programmers to miss the error detection and implementations at system and library

call level. This may result in unexpected halt of the application or may pass wrong

values to another application. Therefore, application level defensive deceptions are
major area of interest because applications tend to directly influence the decision
processes made by attackers. An Application level deception might be used to cause a

system that is overrun to act on the wrong data.
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While "denial" and "deception" are separate terms that can be distinguished
conceptually they are however closely intertwined in practice. For a successful
deception to occur, it must include denial. To make an enemy believe in the cover
story placed infront of him or her, infonnation that would reveal the truth must be
denied to him or her. It is may be impossible to imagine a deception effort that does
not involve denial (Godson & Wirtz, 2002).
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2.2 Overview of Network Models and Protocols
This section of the chapter discusses the structure of TCP/IP protocol and how the

TCP/IP connection and termination is implemented. Also it discusses various
vulnerabilities associated with the TCP/IP protocol.

2.2.1 ISO 7 Layer Network Model
The standard model for networking protocols and distributed applications is the
International Standard Organization's Open ��'stem Interconnect (ISO/OSI) model.

The model is generic and applies to all network types, not just TCP/ IP, and all media
types, not just Ethernet. It defines seven network layers as shown below.
7

Application

6

Presentation

5

Session

4

Transport

3

Network

2

Data Link
Physical

Figure 2.3: The ISO 7-Layer Reference Model for Protocol Software

(Parker, 2000; Comer, 1995)

Layer 1 Physical
w

Physical layer defines the cable or physical medium itself, e.g., Thinnet,

Thicknet, unshielded twisted pairs (UTP). All media arc functionally

equivalent. The main difference is in convenience and cost ofinstallation and

maintenance. Converters from one media to another operate at this level.

26

Layer 2 - Data Link

Data Link layer defines the fonnat of data on the network. A network data
frame, aka packet, includes checksum, source and destination address, and

data. The largest packet that can be sent through a data link layer defines the
Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). The data link layer handles the physical

and logical connections to the packet's destination, using a network interface.

A host connected to an Ethernet would have an Ethernet interface to handle

connections to the outside world, and a Joopback interface to send packets to
itself.

Layer 3 - Network
It provides a means for communicating open systems to establish, maintain

and tcnninate network connections. The IP protocol lives at this layer, and so

do some routing protocols such as Address Resolution Protocol (ARP). ARP
is used to map the IP address to its hardware address. All the routers in a

network arc operating at this layer. IP is responsible for routing packets from

one network to another. Network layer may have to break large packets, which

arc larger then their MTU, into smaller packets and the host receiving the

packets may have to reassemble the fragmented packet (Comer, 1995; Parker,

2000).

Layer 4 - Transport
The transport layer is responsible for the end-to-end integrity oftransmissions.

Unlike the Data Link Layer, the transport layer is capable of providing this
function beyond the local LAN segment. It can detect packets that are

discarded by routers and automatically generate a retransmit request (Comer,
1995; Rodriguez, 2001).

Transport layer is also capable of re-sequencing of packets that may have
arrived out of order. This can happen for a variety of reasons. For examples,

the packets may have taken different paths through the network, or some may
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have been damaged in transit. In any case, the transport layer is capable of
identifying the original sequence of packets, and must put them back into that
sequence before passing their contents up to the Session Layer (Comer, 1995).

Layer 5 - Session
It provides for two communicating presentation entities to exchange data with

each other. Another service that is offered as a part of the Session Layer might

include data synchronization. Checksums may also be included at the Session
Layer as a part ofdata synchronization

Layer 6 - Presentation

This is where application data is packed or unpacked, ready for use by the
running application. Protocol conversions, encryption/ decryption and

graphics expansion all takes place here.
Layer 7 - Application

Application Layer provides the interface between those applications and the

network's services. This layer can be thought of as the reason for initiating the

communications session. For example, an email client might generate a

request to retrieve new messages from the email server. This client application

automatically generates a request to the appropriate Layer 7 protocol(s) and
launches a communications session to get the needed files (Comer, 1995,

Parker, 2000).

2.2.2 TCP/IP Internet Layering Model
Like most networking software, TCP/IP is modelled in layers. This layered

representation leads to the tenn protocol stack, which refers to the stack of layers in
the protocol suite. (Rodriguez, 2001)
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By dividing the communication software into layers, the protocol stack allows for

division of labour, ease of implementation and code testing, and the ability to develop
alternative layer implementations. Layers communicate with those above and below
via concise interfaces. In this regard, a layer provides a service for the layer directly

above it and makes use of services provided by the layer directly below it. For

example, the IP layer provides the ability to transfer data from one host to another

without any guarantee to reliable delivery or duplicate suppression. Transport

protocols such as TCP make use of this service to provide applications with reliable,

in-order, data stream delivery. The below figure 2.4 shows how TCP/IP protocols are

modelled in four layers (Rodriguez, 2001):

Applications
Transport
Internetwork
Network Interface
and
Harchvare

.......

Applications

. . . . .. .

.......
.......

TCP/UDP
IP

� i.

ICMP
ARP/RAAP

Network Interface
and Hardware

Figure 2.4: TCP/IP Protocol Stack
Application Layer

(Rodriguez, 200 I)

The application layer is provided by the program that uses TCP/IP for

communication. An application interacts with one of the transport level

protocols to send or receive data. Each application program chooses a style of

transport needed, which can be either a sequence of individual messages or a

continuous stream of bytes. The application program passes data in the
required fonn to the transport level for delivery (ibid, 2001).
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Transport Layer

The primary duty of transport layer is to provide communication from one
application program to another. Such communication is often called end-to

end. The transport layer may regulate flow of infonnation. It may also provide
reliable transport, ensuring that data arrives without error and in sequence.

Multiple applications can be supported simultaneously. The transport layer

must accept data from several user programs and send

it

to the next lower

layer. Therefore, it adds additional information to each packet, including codes

that identify which application program sent it and which application program
should receive it, as well as a checksum (ibid, 2001).

Internetwork Layer

The internet layer handles communication from one machine to another. It

accepts a request to send a packet fonn the transport layer along with an
identification of the machine to which the packet should be sent.

It

also

handles incoming datagrams, checking their validity, and uses the routing

algorithm to decide whether the datagram should be processed locally or
forwarded. Finally the internet layer sends ICMP error and control messages
as needed and handles all incoming ICMP messages (ibid, 2001).

Network Interface Layer

The network interface layer, also called the link layer or the data- l ink layer, is

the interface to the actual network hardware. This interface may or may not

provide reliable delivery, and may be packet or stream oriented. In fact,

TCP/IP does not specify any protocol here, but can use almost any network
interface available, which illustrates the flexibility of the IP layer (ibid, 2001).
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2.2.3 IP: Internet Protocol
IP is the protocol that hides the underlying physical network by creating a virtual
network view. It is an unreliable, best-effort, and connectionless packet delivery

protocol. There is no guarantee that an IP packet successfully gets to its destination.

IP is considered as best effort service because when something goes wrong, IP has a

simple error handling algorithm which throws away the packet and try to send an

ICMP message back to source (Steven, 1994).

IP does not maintain any state information about successive packets. Each packet is

handled independently from all other packets. The delivery of packets may not be in

order.

2.2.3.1

IP Header

The IP packet header consists of 20 bytes of data. An option exists within the header
which allows further optional bytes to be added, but this is not nonnally used. The full

header is shown below:
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0

15 16
4-bit hcade
length

8-bit type or service
(TOS)

16-bit total length (in bytes)
3-bit
flags

16-bit identification
8-bit time to live
(TTL)

8-bit protocol
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13-bit fragment offset
16-bit header checksum

20

ytes

32-bit source IP address
32-bit destination IP address
Options (ifany)

data

Figure 2.5: IP Header Structure

(Steven, 1994, p34)

The following paragraph explains the structure ofIP Header as explained by Steven

(1994). The header length is the number of32 bit words in the header, including any

options. Since it is a 4-bit field, it limits the header to 60 bytes. The type of service
field (TOS) is composed of a 3-bit precedence field, 4 TOS bits are unused bit that

must be 0. The 4 TOS bits are: minimize delay, maximize throughput, maximize
reliability and minimize monetary cost. Only 1 ofthese 4 bits can be turned on. If all

4 bits are O it implies normal service.

The total length field is the total length ofthe IP packet in bytes. Using this field and
the header length field, we know where the data portion of the IP packet starts and its

length. Since this is a 16-bit field, the maximum size ofan IP packet is 65535 bytes.

This field also changes when the packet is fragmentised.

The identification field uniquely identifies each packet sent by a host. It normally

increments by one each time a packet is sent. It is also used during reassembly of
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fragmented packets. The flag field is composed of a sequence of 3 flags used to

control whether routers are allowed to fragment a packet and to indicate the parts of a

packet to the receiver. The 1 3-bitfragmelll offse t consist ofa byte count from the start
ofthe original sent packet, set by any router which performs IP router fragmentation

(Steven, 1994; Comer, 1999; Parker, 2000).

The time-to-live field, or TTL, sets an upper limit on the number of routers through
which a packet can pass. It limits the lifetime of the packet. It is initialised by the

sender to some value and decremented by one by every router that handles the packet.

When this field reaches 0, the packet is dropped and the sender is notified with an

ICMP message.

Theprotocol identifies which protocol gave the data for IP to send.
The header checksum is calculated over the IP header only. It does not cover any data
that follows the header. A 2's complement checksum inserted by the sender and

updated whenever the packet header is modified by a router. Used to detect

processing errors introduced into the packet inside a router or bridge where the packet
is not protected by a link layer cyclic redundancy check. Packets with an invalid

checksum are discarded by all nodes in an IP network (Steven, 1994; Comer, 1999)
Every IP packet contains the source IP address and the destination IP address.

2.2.3.2 IP Routing
An important function of the IP layer is IP routing. An internet is composed of

multiple physical networks interconnected by computers called routers. Each router
has direct connections to two or more networks. A host computer usually connects

directly to one physical network. The router only has infonnation about four kinds of

destinations:

• Hosts that are directly attached to one of the physical networks to which the
router is attached.
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- -- - --------

• Hosts or networks for which the router has been given explicit definitions.

• Hosts or networks for which the router has received an ICMP redirect

message.

• A default for all other destinations.

(Steven, 1994)

Ifthe destination is directly connected to the host or on a shared network then the IP
packet is sent directly to the destination. Otherwise the host sends the packet to a

default router to deliver the packet to the destination.
Direct and Indirect Routing

IP routing can be divided into two fonns: Direct routing and Indirect routing
(Rodriguez, 2001). In direct routing, packets are transmitted between two machines

which are on a single physical network and also do not involve routers. The sender

encapsulates the packet in a physical frame, binds the destination IP address to a
physical hardware address, and sends the resulting frame directly to the destination.

Indirect routing occurs when the destination host is not connected to a network

directly attached to the source host.

Indirect routing is more difficult than direct routing because the sender must identify a

router to which the packet can be sent. When one host tries to send an IP packet to

other host, it encapsulates the packet and sends it to the nearest router. Once reaching

to the router, the IP software selects the next router along the path towards the

destination. The packet is again passed on to the next physical network and the

process continues until the packet reaches its destination.
IP routing table

The IP layer has a routing table in memory that it searches each time it receives a
packet to send. It consists of a list oflocal networks and indirect routes. Three types
ofmappings are found in this table (Rodriguez, 2001):

1. The direct routes describing locally attached networks.

2. The indirect routes describing networks reachable via one or more gateways.
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3. The default route which contains the (direct or indirect) route used when the
destination IP network is not found in the mappings oftype 1 and 2 above.

When a packet is received from a network interface, IP first checks if the destination

address is one ofits own IP addresses. If so, the packet is delivered to the destination

on the local network. If the packet's destination address is not of this IP layer, it is
forwarded to the destination IP network via one or more gateways else the packet is
forwarded to the default route. If none of the above steps works, the packet is

undeliverable. At this stage, a "host unreachable" or "network unreachable" message
is returned to the source address from where the packet was originated.

2.2.4 TCP: Transmission Control Protocol
TCP is a communication protocol which provides a connection oriented, reliable, byte

stream service. The two machines need to make a TCP connection before exchanging
any data between them. TCP provides reliability by doing the following:

• TCP breaks down big packets into small size packets called segments.

• After sending the segment across the network, it waits for an
acknowledgement. Ifan acknowledgement is not received in time, the segment
is retransmitted.

• Acknowledges the receipt ofpacket from other end.

• Maintains a checksum on its header and data to detect any modification ofthe
data in transit.

• IP packets may not arrive in sequence, so TCP re-sequence them and pass to
the recipient in correct order.

• IP packets may be duplicated, so it discards duplicate data.

• TCP also provides flow control. Each end of TCP connection has a finite
amount ofbuffer space.

(Steven, 1994)
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2.2.4.1

TCP Header

The TCP packet header consists of 20 bytes of data. An option exists within the
header which allows funher optional bytes to be added, but this is not nonnally used.
The full header is shown below:
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Figure 2.6: TCP Header

(Steven, 1994, 225)

Each TCP segment contains the source and destination port number to identify the

sending and receiving application. These two values along with the source and

destination IP address in the IP header uniquely identify each connection. The

sequence number identifies the byte in the stream ofdata from the sending TCP to the

receiving TCP that the first byte ofdata in this segment represents. Since every byte

that is exchanged is numbered, the acknowledgement number contains the next

sequence number that the sender of the acknowledgement expects to receive. This is
therefore, the sequence number plus 1 of the last successfully received byte ofdata.
The header length gives the length of the header in 32-bit words.
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There are six flag bits in the TCP header. One or more can be turned on at the same
time. These flags are briefly described below (Steven, 1994):
• URG The urgent poilller is valid

•

ACK The ,1cknowledg,m1e11t number is valid

• PSH

The receiver should pass this data to the application as soon as

•

RST

Reset the connection

FIN

The sender is finished sending data.

•

•

possible.

SYN Synchronize sequence numbers to initiate a connection.

The 16-bit window size provides flow control in TCP. The checksum covers the TCP
segment. It is a compulsory field that must be calculated and stored by the sender, and

then verified by the receiver. The urgent pointer is valid only if the URG flag is set.

This pointer is a positive offset that must be added to the sequence number field of the
segment to yield the sequence number of the last byte of urgent data. TCP's urgent

mode is a way for the sender to transmit emergency data to the other end.

The most common option field is the maximum segment size option, called the MSS.

Each end of a connection normally specifies this option on the first segment

exchanged. It specifies the maximum sized segment that the sender wants to receive

(ibid, 1994).

2.2.4.2

Connection and Termination

A successful TCP connection involves a three-way handshake. The figure 2.7 shows
the proceeding of handshake.
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Events At Site 1

Network Messages

Events At Site 2

Send SYN seq:K
Receive SVN segment
Send SYN seq=y, ACK x+1
Receive SYN + ACK segment I --
Send ACK y+1
Receive ACK segment

Figure 2.7: TCP Connection

(Comer, 1995, p216)

To establish a TCP connection:

• The requesting host sends a SYN segment specifying the port number of the

server that the client wants to connect to, and the client's initial sequence

number.

• The server responds with its own SYN segment containing the server's initial
sequence number. The server also acknowledges the client's SYN by sending
its acknowledgement, ACK, which is clients initial sequence number plus one.

• The client must acknowledge this SYN from the server by sending its ACK,
which is server's initial sequence number plus one.

This 3-way handshake completes the connection establishment.

(ibid, 1995)

It is a four segment process to terminate an established TCP connection. Since TCP is

a full duplex (that is, data can be flowing in each direction independently ofthe other

direction.), each direction must be shut down independently. The termination process
of a TCP connection between server and client is shown below:
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Send FIN saq:I(
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{11ppllcallon closes connection)
Send FIN seq=y, ACK x+l

Receive FIN + ACK segment rSend ACK y
+

- Receive ACK segment

Figure 2.8: TCP Connection Termination Process

(Comer, 1995, p218)

Either end can send a FIN when they are done sending data. When TCP receives a

FIN, it must notify the application that the other end has tenninated that direction of

data flow. Sending a FIN nonnally means that application issuing a close. The receipt
of a FIN means that there will be no longer flow of data in that direction. A TCP can
still send data after receiving a FIN. When the server receives the FIN it sends back

an ACK of the received sequence number plus one. At this stage, server's TCP also

delivers an end-of-file to the application. The server then closes its connection,

causing its TCP to send a FIN which the client TCP must ACK by incrementing the

received sequence number by one (ibid, 1995).

2.2.4.3

TCP State Machine

TCP finite state machine is a theoretical model which explains the operation of TCP

at its best. The figure below shows the TCP finite state machine, with circles
representing states and arrows representing transitions between them. The label on

each transition shows what TCP receives to cause the transition and what it sends in
response.
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(Comer, 1995, p220)

The TCP software at each endpoint begins in the CLOSED state. Application

programs can either have an active open (to initiate a connection) or a passive open

(to wait for the connection from other machine). In an active open situation, the

transition changes from CLOSED state to SYN SENT state with the emission of SYN

segment. After receiving a SYN segment, the other end of the connection a segment

with both SYN and ACK and moves the transition to ESTABLISHED state and begins
data transfer (ibid, 1995).

The TIMED WAIT state in the above figure reveals how TCP handles the problems
incurred with unreliable delivery. TCP keeps track ofmaximum segment lifetime, the
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maximum time an old segment can remain alive in the network. When a request of
closing a connection is received, TCP moves to the TJMED WAIT state in order to

avoid any interference between previous connection and the current one. TCP rejects
any duplicate segments received during the time out interval but however accepts the
valid segments and restart the timer. The timer allows TCP to distinguish old

connections from new ones; it prevents TCP from responding with RST (reset) if the

other end retransmits a FIN request (ibid 1995).

2.2.5 Security Issues with TCP/IP
This section gives an overview of some of the most common attacks on TCP stack

level and also their defences (Bellovin, n.d; NORMAN, 2003).

2.2.5.1

TCP Sequence Number Prediction

A TCP connection establishment requires a 3-way handshake. As described in section
4.4.2, the client transmits an initial sequence number !SN C, the server acknowledges

it and sends its own sequence number !SN S and the client acknowledges. Once this 3

way handshake completes, the data transmission begins. This exchange may be shown

schematically as follows:

C -> S:SYN(ISN C)
S-> C:SYN(JSN S), ACK(ISN C)

C-> S:ACK(ISN S)

C-> S:data

And I or

S-> C:data
Many TCP connections use predictable ISNs for the above purpose. As a result, the

malicious attacker could guess the server's ISN used during the connection

establishment procedure and trick the server into believing that itself is the client or

the trusted machine. JSNs are easy to guess because they are incremented by a
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constant amount each second or halfthat amount each time a connection is initiated.
This may be shown schematically as follows:
X -> S:SYN(ISN X), SRC = T
S -> T:SYN(ISN S), ACK(ISN X)
X -> S:ACK(ISN S), SRC = T
X -> S:ACK(ISN S), SRC = T, nasty - data

Even the message S -> T does not go to }(, X was able to know its contents, and hence

could send the data.
Defence

According to Bellovin (n.d), the best way to prevent such attacks is to make the ISNs

more difficult to predict. Making use of cryptographic algorithms such as DES for

random ISN generation can make the ISNs hard to guess.

2.2.5.2

ICMP attack

The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is the basic management tool of the

TCP/IP protocol suite. It is an error reporting protocol. There are various security

holes in ICMP which may be exploited (Low, 2001).

Firstly, is the ICMP Redirect Message which is used to advice hosts for better routes

on a network. The redirect message can be used to create false routes to a trusted host
through a compromised router or gateway. Suppose an intruder setup a false route to a

trusted host from a compromised gateway. The following sequence of events may
occur. Send a false TCP open packet to the target host, claiming to be from a trusted

host T. The target will respond with its own open packet, routing it through the secure
primary gateway. While this packet is on its way to trusted host, a false redirect may

be sent claiming to be from the primary gateway but referring to the false connection.
Since the packet will be assumed to be coming from a legitimate source, the routing

change will be readily accepted as hosts do not perform enough validity checks on
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ICMP redirect messages. As a result, the intruder may be able to establish a

connection and spoof the trusted host T (Bellovin, n.d; Low, 2001).

ICMP may also be used lo carry out Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by resetting

connections using error messages such as Destination Unreachable or Time-to-Live
(TTL) exceeded (Low, 2001).

Defences

Strict validity checks need to be done on ICMP packets thereby preventing forging of

connections. The ICMP redirect messages can also be restricted to a connection rather

than to the global routing table.

2.2.5.3

SMURF Attack

The Smurf attack is not intended to halt a computer but a network of computers. This
is a type of network security breach in which a network connected to the Internet is

swamped with replies to ICMP echo (PING) requests.

broadcast echo

storm
of

IChOtl

source addrtH checks

Figure 2.10: Smurf Attack

(Low, 2001)
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A smurfattack is illustrated below (Low, 2001):

Step 1 . Attacker finds some intennediary network that will respond to the network's

broadcast address.

Step 2. Attacker spoofs the IP address ofthe victim host and sends a great number of

ICMP echo request packets to the broadcast address of the above intennediary

networks.

Step 3. Now all the hosts on that network will respond to that ICMP echo request with

a corresponding ICMP reply request back to the spoofed IP address (the victim).

Step 4. This will send a large amount of ICMP echo replies to the victim and its
network thus causing network degradation or a total denial ofservice.
Defences

Following defensive measures can be used to protect a network from smurf attacks

(Hirani, et. al, n.d):

• Disabling broadcast messages

• Upstream firewalls should be configured to either filter ICMP echo responses
or limit echo traffic.

• In order for these attacks to take place a router must be configured to allow
packets to exit the network with a source address that does not originate from
the internal address. It is possible to configure your router to enable network

egress filtering.

Network egressing is when a router is configured to filter out packets that do not
originate from the internal network.

ISPs can also employ network ingress filtering to drop packets that do not
originate from a known range of IP address, which is effective not only for
preventing local origination of SMURF attacks but also for ease in tracking

attacks.
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2.2.6 TCP/IP Fingerprinting
To attack any system, it is very important to gather infonnation about the target

machine. There can be various ways which can be used to gather information about

the target machine. One of the most important pieces of information that an attacker

or hacker would like to know about the target machine is the type and version of

Operating System (OS) running on it. Knowing the version and type of OS can help

an attacker to gather infonnation regarding the vulnerabilities related to that OS.

There are various tools available on the Internet which can help in detennining the
operating system of a host by examining details in the way the TCP/IP stack was

implemented within that operating system. This method i s called TCP/IP
fingerprinting (Fyodor, 1998).

2.2.6.1

Classical Methods

The easiest method to identify the operating system is to contact i t by its open port.

Most telnet, FTP and web servers will not only identify themselves but will also give
information about the operating system running on them. For example (ibid, 1998):

root%> telnet hpux. u -aizu . a c . j p
Trying 163 . 1 4 3 , 103 , 12 ...

Connected to hpux .u-aizu.ac . j p

Escape character is • A ] '

HP-UX hpux 8 . 10 . 01 A 9000/715 (ttyp2)

Login:

In the above example, the machine itself explains what it is running. Such methods

are sometime enough to determine information about the operating system running on
the target machines.
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Another classic technique for identifying the operating systems includes port sweeps
and grabbing email headers. Port sweeps identify open ports, and on a system that has

not been hardened, this list of open ports is often enough to identify most operating

systems. E-mail headers can identify mail user agents, the user's operating system, the

mail senrer and sometimes even the firewall that the mail passed through.

2.2.6.2

TCP/IP Fingerprinting with Nmap v 3.0

Utilities such as Nmap are designed to allow system administrators and curious
individuals to scan large networks to detennine which hosts are up and what services
they are offering. Nmap supports a large number of scanning techniques such as:

UDP, TCP connect(), TCP SYN (half open), ftp proxy (bounce attack), Reverse-ident,

ICMP (ping sweep), FIN, ACK sweep, SYN sweep 1P protocol and Null scan. These

techniques are briefly described below (Fyodor, 1 998; Glaser, 2000):

•!• UDP and TCP connectO: This type of scan method involves opening a full

connection to a remote host using a typical three-way TCP/1P handshake. For
example,

Client -> SYN

Server -> SYNIACK

Client -> ACK

The above example shows a port answering our initial connection request with a

SYN\ACK. Therefore the port is in the open state. Once the full handshake is

taken place, the connection will be tenninated by the client. If the port is in the
closed state then the response will be:
Client -> SYN

Server -> RSTIACK

Client -> RST

The RSTIACK flags returned by the server shows that the port is not in the
listening state thus is closed.

•:• Half open scan: The tenn 'half open' applies to the way the client tenninates the
connection before the three-way handshake is completed. This scan method often
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goes unlogged by IDS and also returns fairly positive results (Fyodor, 1998;

Glaser, 2000).

•!• FTP server bounce attack: Under this attack, a host is able to determine the status

of a port by issuing an IP and port as arbitrary parameters to connect to. If a

connection is established as a means of active data transfer processing, the client

knows a port is open otherwise a 425 error message will be generated (Fyodor,
1998).

•!• Reverse-Iden!: This technique involves issuing a response to the idnet/auth server,

usually port l l 3 to query the service for the owner of the running process. Ident

could release miscellaneous private information such as(Ibid, 1998):
• user info
• entities
• objects

• processes
•:• ICMP ping sweep: An ICMP ping sweep is a basic network scanning technique
used to determine which of a range of IP addresses map to live hosts (computers).

Whereas a single ping will tell you whether one specified host computer exists on
the network, a ping sweep consists of ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol)
ECHO requests sent to multiple hosts. If a given address is live, it will return an

ICMP ECHO reply (Anonymous, n.d).

•!• FIN scanning: The FIN scan method uses inverse mapping to discover closed
ports. Once a Flli' flagged packet is sent, a closed port will respond with an RST

bit. Open ports will not send a packet back (Fyodor, 1998).

•!• ACK scanning: This technique is used to identify open TCP ports by sending
probe TCP packets with the flag ACK set, and then analysing the header

information of the RST packets received from the target host. This technique
exploits vulnerabilities within the BSD derived TCP/JP stack, and is therefore
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only effective against certain operating systems and platforms. There are two main
ACK scanning methods (ibid, 1998):
• Assessment ofthe TTL field
• Analysing the Window field

•:• Null Scan: The Null scan unsets ALL flags available in the TCP header. ACK,

FIN, RST, SYN, URG, PSH all become unassigned. If the port is open then the

incoming packet is dropped otherwise an RST packet will be returned if a closed
port has been reached.

Nmap also offers a number of advanced features such as remote OS detection via

TCP/IP fingerprinting, stealth scanning, dynamic delay and retransmission

calculations, parallel scanning, detection of down hosts via parallel pings, decoy

scanning, port filtering detection, direct (non-port mapper) RPC scanning,

fragmentation scanning and flexible target and port specification.

Every operating system has different TCP/IP stack's in compare to other operating

systems; therefore each one has a different response in a TCP/IP conversation. This is

because each TCP/IP stack has different sequencing of the packet and will have

different flags set due to implementation. Nmap interrogates the target machine's
TCP/IP stack by sending it eight different packets and observing the response. Nmap

interrogates the target machine's TCP/IP stack by sending it eight different packets

and observing the response. The packets are

"Tseq is the TCP se.quenceability test
TI is a SYN packet with a bunch ofTCP options to open port
T2 is a NULL packet w/options to open port
T3 i s a SYNIFINIURGIPSH packet w/options to open port
T4 i s an ACK to open port w/options
T5 is a SYN to closed port w/options
T6 is an ACK to closed port w/options
T7 is a FINIPSH]URG to a closed port w/options
PU is a UDP packet to a closed port" (Fyodor, 1998)

The test is specifically crafted to put the target machine in a position where there is a
high probability that two things will happen. Firstly that the target operating system's
TCP/IP stack will respond unique in comparison to another operating system's
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TCP/IP stack. Secondly that the target operating system's TCP/IP stack will respond
in a consistent manner.

The granularity of this is reasonably high for example here are 2 fingerprints both of

NT4 machines talce from the NMAP fingerprint files ofvarying Service Pack Levels
Fingerprint Windows NT 4 SP3

TSeq(Class=TDIRI%gcd=<I 8%SI=<2AOODA&>6B73)
Tl(DF=Y%W=7FFF12017%ACK=S++%Flags=AS%0ps=MIMNWNNT)
T2(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=O%ACK=S%Flags=AR%0ps:::)
T3(Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=7FFF12017%ACK=S++JO%Flags=ASIA%0ps=MjNNT)
T4(DF=N%W=O%ACK=OIS%Flags=R%0ps"')
T5(DF=N%W=O%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%0ps=)
T6(DF=N%W=O%ACK=OIS++%Flags=R%0ps=)
T7(DF=N%W=O%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%0ps=)
PU(TOS=O%IPLEN=38%RIPTL=148%RID=E%RIPCK=E%UCK=E%ULEN= l34%DAT=E
)

Fingerprint Windows NT 4.0 SP 6a + botfixes
TSeq(Class"'RI%gcd=<6%SI=<40132&>290%IPID=BIIRPI%TS=U)
Tl(DF=Y%W=2017%ACK"'S++%Flags=AS%0ps=M)
T2(Resp=Y%DF=N%W=O%ACK=S%Flags=AR%0ps=)
T3(Resp=Y%DF=Y%W=2017%ACK=S++%Flags=AS%0ps=M)
T4(DF=N%W=0%ACK=O%Flags=R%0ps=)
T5(DF=N%W=C00[800%ACK=S++%Flags=AR%0ps=WNMETL)
T6(DF=N%W=O%ACK=O%Flags=R%0ps=WNMETL)
T7(DF=N%W=O%ACK=O%Flags=R%0ps:::WNMETL)
PU(Resp=NIY)

This attack intelligence allows an attacker to quickly narrow the choices of attack
dependent upon the information that NMAP reports back. This attack intelligence

gives an attacker several advantages. Firstly, they can use a few attacks or probes on
the system as they now have a reasonable idea of installed operating system.

Secondly, as a result of having knowledge of the operating system by using a few
attacks may reduce the probability ofdetection by defensive systems.
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2.3 Honeypots

This section of the chapter initially defines what are honeypots and honeynet. Later it

outlines various advantages and disadvantages of honeypots. Section 2.3.3 outlines

various types of honeypots available. Section 2.3.4 explains the architecture of

honeyd - an open source honeypot. Section 2.3.5 discusses the various methods of
deploying the honeypots.

2.3.1 What are Honeypots and Honeynet?
According to Spitzner (2003), "A honeypot is a security resource whose value lies in

being probed, attacked or compromised." These systems are specially designed to
attract attackers. Their purpose is to capture all activities and any changes made in the
system by attackers' who would have gained unauthorised access. Honeypots are seen

as research tools which allow learning from attackers' skills and knowledge. They can

be used for attack intelligence gathering about various attacks and exploits explored

by attackers. Honeypots can be used to achieve various goals. They can be used to

deter attacks, to detect attacks and also to capture and analyse attacks. They can be

used as a learning tool to l�am and understand about various attacks and attacking
tools used by attackers. (Brenton, n.d; Klug, 2000; Spitzner, 2002). Various network
services are emulated on the honeypot network which is attractive targets for the

attackers. Services like http (port 80), provides access to the web-based systems such
as web servers which may be the prime target for attacking any network. If the web

server is compromised, the attacker is capable of posting their own web pages or any

web related exploits on the network such as any back doors or Trojans. Also services

like ftp (port 21), if compromised may allow the attackers to upload their own

malware programs and utilities which may be used for compromising the whole

network.

Example of Honeypot

To understand the concept of a honeypot and how they work let us consider an

example. Assume that an organisation is interested in upgrading their old servers such

as mail server, web servers etc. which have been currently in use. Before upgrading,

these main production systems were used for providing services to the organisation.
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These old servers can be readily utilised as a honeypot servers which can be left

within the organisation's DMZ (Demilitarised Zone) (Figure 2.1 1, p50). Any
connections made to the old server machines, now honeypots, could be reasonably
assumed to be suspicious in nature. This possibly means that someone is trying to

probe or attack the servers or the organisation as a whole.

Ifit is found that connections are from the honeypot to the main internal network that

would indicate the honeypot is compromised.
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Web se1ver

Internal

network
Figure 2.11: Network diagram of a boneypot deployed on a DMZ to detect
attacks

(Spitzner, 2003, p63)

According to Spitzner (2003), a honeynet is a high interaction honeypot designed

particularly for research, to gather information on the attackers. It is a network of

multiple honeypots which are probed and attacked by attackers. This could be a

complete separate network segment within the network architecture of any

organisation. In a honeynet, there can be various types of systems such as Windows,
Linux, etc . . . which can be configured as honeypots. This creates a network

environment that has a more realistic approach to it for the attacker. All systems
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placed within the Honeynet are the mirror images of the standard systems placed

within the internal network of any organisation (Anonymous, 2002a). Therefore,

honeynet are high interaction honeypots designed to gather infonnation about
attackers.

According to the Deception planning process, as discussed in section 2.2 (p. 12), the

objective of deploying the honeynet is to create a deceptive network to deceive the

attackers and deterring them from causing hann to the real production systems.

Another important objective of the honeynet is to gather attack intelligence about
various attacks carried out by attackers (targets). To attract these targets, a deceptive

network is created with various hosts with number of operating systems and services
configured over them. These systems are configured with some known vulnerabilities

e

to attract the attackers.
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Figure 2.12: The Honeynet

(Spitzner, 2003, p266)

2.3.2 Value of Honeypots
Honeypots can be of great value for an organisation as they may help in protecting an

organisation b y preventing, detecting or responding to an attack. Honeypots can be
used for prevention purposes in various ways. They can be used against the automated

attacks such as auto-rooter or wonns. These are programs or algorithms that search
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for vulnerable systems over the computer network and replicate it and usually perform
malicious actions, such as using up the computer's resources and possibly shutting the
system down (Anonymous, n.d(c)). Honeypots can be of help in defending against
such attacks by slowing down attackers' access to the systems, i.e. by taking extra
time in processing attackers' requests or also by completely shutting down the system.
The idea here is to distract or fool the attacker to make him or her wastes their
resources and time while interacting with honeypots. This provides deterrence which
may prevent attacks on production systems.
The second level of security is detection. The purpose of detection is to identify
failures and unauthorised activities within the honeypot. If someone has to secure
their house, the detection would be possible by installing burglar alatms or motion
detectors. Similarly there are various technologies which can be used for detection in
a network environment. For example, Network Intrusion Detection Systems which are
developed to monitor networks and identify malicious activity. There are also
programs that monitor system logs and identify any unauthorised activity. But these
technologies have their own limitations. They generate large amounts of data such as
false positives and false negatives. Honeypots can be very efficient in overcoming
these limitations of the traditional method of detections. They can reduce false
positives by capturing small data sets of high value which may contain new attacks or
rootkits or encrypted packets. Since honeypots are meant to be probed and attacked,
so any traffic is suspicious in nature therefore there are very less chances of having
any false positives. Honeypots are also very effective in capturing new exploits as
they can detect the attacks according to system activity, not signatures. This helps in
reducing the false negatives by honeypots (Anonymous, 2002(a); Spitzner, 2003).
Once the organisation has detected any attack, now they need to respond to it. Before
responding to any attack, it is essential for any organisation to collect all the evidence
related to the attack such as who the attacker is, how they entered into the network,
what damage did they caused. It is a challenge to collect all the infonnation related to
the incident from the compromised systems (Spitzner, 2003). For example, production
systems are very critical for any organisation such as their mail server. It will not be
possible for them to take the server offline for conducting forensic analysis. When the
system is brought offline, a major problem of data pollution arises for organisations.
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There are various activities which occur in the system. For example, files written to
the hard drive, processes execution and tennination, user login details etc., then.:fore it
may not be easy to detennine what the everyday activity was and what the attacker
was trying to implement or access in the systems. Honeypots can be of great value in
such situations. They can be easily taken offline without hindering any everyday
activity and can be used for complete forensic analysis. Honeypots can be setup to
only collect unauthorised or malicious activity so this makes data analysis much
easier. In order to respond to an attacker's activity, it is essential to understand about
what they did, how they did and what damage was done.
Any traffic, inbound or outbound, to honeypot is considered to be suspicious by
nature. Because of the design assumptions of honeypots they have certain inherent
advantages and disadvantages (Anonymous, 2000; Sink, 2001; Spitzner, 2002) which
are outlined below:

Advantages
•!• Data Collection: Honeypots collect normally data of very high value. Honeypots
can collect small data sets. These data sets may be tools, rootkits or scripts used
by the attackers. Such forensic evidence provides a lot of useful information on
attacker's movement within the system and their (attackers) interaction with the
system in a consistent format from a variety of sources. Such data is of high value
as it only provides information about the malicious attacks. (Spitzner, 2002).
•!• Allows security researchers and security practioners to study exactly what
attackers are doing to compromise or probe systems. This is attempted to be done
without exposing systems and networks to the additional risk that results from
compromised systems (Anonymous, 2000).
•!• Honeypots provide delay (Sink, 2001). As a result of ruse, camouflage or false
information honeypots consume attackers' time and resources. This helps in
delaying them in attacking the real servers in the network. Methods such as
network delays and response time while establishing any network connection or
causing time delays while an attacker is trying to download may sometime
frustrate an attacker. This may provide enough time to an organisation to detect
such activity and respond to them.
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Disadvantages

•!• They are worthless if no one attacks them. Honeypots are useful when someone

attacks or probe them. They may not be of any use ifnobody interacts with these
systems (Spitzner, 2002).

•!• Honeypots can be used as a launching platform to attack other machines on

different network and hence need sophisticated protection mechanisms and

controls (Sink, 2001; Spitzner, 2002).

2.3.3 Types of Honeypots
There are various types of honeypots available each with their own distinct features.
Some ofthe honeypots are discussed below (Spitzner, 2002; Scottberg, 2002):

2.3.3.1 BackOfficer Friendly (BOF)
BOF is a very simple honeypot developed by Marcus Ranum and his colleagues at

NFR (Network Flight Recorder). It is a low interaction honeypot. BOF is a program

that runs on most Windows based operating system. It can emulate basic services,
such as ftp, http, telnet, mail or BackOrrifce. When someone tries to connect to BOF,
it can log the attempt and an alert is generated. It also provides the feature of sending

''pre-defined replies" as well to attackers to keep them busy. It can only monitor a

limited number of ports, but these ports represent the most commonly scanned and
targeted services. None of the services emulated by BOF are based applications or

version, only the functionality ofthe service is emulated. For example, it can emulate

a web server but it does not emulate specific web server like Apache or Microsoft IIS.

Therefore, it is difficult to use BOF as a prevention tool as it offers very little
interaction with the attacker.

2.3.3.2 Specter
Specter is a commercial honeypot created and supported by NetSec, a network
security company based in Switzerland. It is similar to BOF but has greater
functionality. It is a Windows based honeypot and can emulate various services an

attacker can interact with. Specter does not have any real applications installed on it
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instead some limited emulated functionality so there is not much for attackers to do on

the system. Specter is equipped with seven fully emulated services, six traps and one
customizable trap. This provides enough flexibility to detect attacks on 13 predefined

ports and I configurable port. One ofthe unique features ofSpecter is that it not only

can emulate services but also vulnerabilities as well. An attacker may launch an attack

on Specter and may believe it to be successful but it may not be (Spitzner, 2003). It

supports various logging and alerting mechanisms, which in tum helps in learning the

attacker's moves. Specter also allows information gathering but this is at a very low

level. Some ofthe information gathering is relatively passive, such as Whois or ONS

lookup, which may just provide information about the attackers location and system

but it does not capture or provide information regarding any tools or scripts used by
the attacker.

Specter emulates operating systems only at an application level; there is no emulation
with the underlying IP stack. Therefore, the emulated operating system may not match
with the IP stack may identify the true purpose ofthe honeypot (Anonymous, n.d(e)).

2.3.3.3

Homemade Honeypots

These honeypots are mainly used to capture malicious codes such as worms or viruses
and scanning activities. Homemade honeypots may have variety of possible uses
depending on the developer's requirement and creativity. They can be used for just

detecting port scans or any specific probe thus providing a low level of interaction to

the attackers. They can also be designed and developed to emulate a complete

operating system and allowing attackers to probe and execute their programs. This
will provide greater level of interaction. Some common examples of homemade
honcypots arc (Spitzner, 2003):

• Windows Inetd emulator for Windows NT and Win2000.

• Sendmail Honcypots , used to identify sendmail spammers.

2.3.3.4

Honeyd

Honeyd was created and developed by Nicls Provos of University of Michigan in

April 2002. It is an open source honeypot which runs on UNIX platform and can

emulate over 400 operating systems or network devices. It can potentially simulate
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networks of thousands of computers. Unlike Specter, it emulates the operating system

at IP stack level as well. This means that when an attacker tries to probe or scan the
network or honeypot using network scanning tools, such as Nmap, both the service

and IP stack behave as the emulated operating system.

Honeyd is primarily used for detecting attacks. It works by monitoring IP addresses

that are unused, that have no device assigned to them. Services emulated using

Honeyd can be simple scripts to full interaction on the native operating system via

port redirection that react to predetermined actions. Honeyd can not only dynamically
interact with attackers, but it can detect activity on any port. It detects and logs

connections made to any port, regardless if there is a service listening. It is capable of
emulating different operating systems or network devices at the same time. The

combined capabilities of assuming the identity of non-existent systems, and the ability

to detect activity on any port, give Honeyd incredible value as a tool to detect
unauthorised activity.

2.3.3.5 Mantrap
It is a commercial honeypot produced by Resource Mantrap. Instead of emulating

services, it creates 4 sub-systems called 'jails'. These 'jails' can be configured by
system administrator as they want. It is much more flexible in compare to other

honeypots. It not only detects attacks, port scans but also helps in capturing rootkits,

IRC chat sessions as well. As it is a commercial honeypot and depends on vendor

specification, it has a limited use. At present, it is available on Solaris operating
system only.

The above mentioned types of honeypots can be summarised m the table below

(Adapted from Baumann, 2002):

57

Degree of
Involvement

Specter

High

Low

Low

-

-

-

-

,/

Expandable
Open Source
Freely available
Log file support

-

,/

,/

,/

Notification
mechanisms
Supported services
Configuration
complexity
GUI for Control and
Logging

BOF

ManTrap

,/

,/

Honeyd

Homemade

Middle

Low- high

,/

,/

,/

NIA

,/

NIA

,/
,/

,/

NIA

Unlimited

13

7

Over 400

NIA

High

Low

Low

Medium

NIA

,/

,/

,/

-

NIA

Table 2.1: Summary of Different types of Honeypots
On the basis of the above discussion about various honeypots and their features and
performance, a following graph can be plotted regarding their performance and
complexity in use in a network environment (Developed by researcher):

B - BOF

M

Complexity

S - Specter
M - ManTrap

D - DTK
H - HoneyD
S

D

Performance

Figure 2.13: Complexity vs. Performance Graph of various Honeypots
From the above graph 2.13, it can be interpreted that Honeyd is the only honeypot
which provide high performance with higher complexity. Therefore, it may be noted
that Honeyd may suit best to the researcher's requirement. The detail concept of
honeyd is explained in the below section.
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2.3.4 Concept of Honeyd
Honeyd is a low interaction virtual honeypot. It can simulate arbitrary TCP services

and supports multiple IP addresses. It can adopt different operating system

personalities. Honeyd can read nmap fingerprint file and can fool nmap. It also

supports FIN scan policy. It is fairly portable and can compile and run on BSD, Linux
or Solaris. Honeyd is mainly depended on 2 libraries: libevent and libdnet. Honeyd

never intercepts the network traffic. All the traffic needs to be directed towards
honeyd. With the use of Arpd, honeyd can use IP addresses on the existing network.
Arpd is also capable ofdetennining all the unallocated IP addresses (Provos, 2003).
Router
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Figure 2.14: Traffic to Honeyd and its virtual honeypots

(Proves, 2003)

The address resolution protocol (ARP) is a protocol used by the Internet Protocol (IP)

network layer protocol to map IP network addresses to the hardware addresses used
by a data link protocol. The term address resolution refers to the process of finding an

address ofa computer in a network. Therefore, ARP is provided that will translate the

IP address to the physical address of the destination host. It uses a lookup table or
ARP cache to perfonn this translation. When the address is not found in the ARP

cache, a broadcast is sent out on the network, with a special format called the ARP

request. If one of the machines on the network recognizes its own IP address in the

request, it will send an ARP reply back to the requesting host. The reply will contain

the physical hardware address of the host and source route infonnation (ifthe packet
has crossed bridges on its path). Both this address and the source route infonnation

are stored in the ARP cache of the requesting host. All subsequent packets to this
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destination IP address can now be translated to a physical address, which is used by

the device driver to send out. the packet on the network. (Comer, 1995, p73-81)

Instead of simulating flat networks, honeyd supports the creation of virtual topologies:
route
route
route
route
route
route

entry 10 . 0 . 0 . 1
10 . 0 . 0 . 1 link 10 . 2 . 0 . 0/24
10 . 0 . 0 . 1 add net 10 . 3 . 0 . 0/16 10 . 3 . 0 . 1 latency Sms loss 1 . 5
10 . 3 . 0 . 1 link 10 . 3 . 0 .0/24
10 . 3 . 0 . l add net 10 . 3 . 1 . 0 /24 10 . 3 . 1 . 1 latency 7ms loss 0 . 5
10 . 3 . 1 . 1 link 10 . 3 . 1 . 0/24

With packet delay and Joss it is possible to create network topology that seems real.

2.3.4.1

Honeyd Architecture

This section will give an overview of Honeyd's (Provos, 2003) architecture; see

figure 4.10. The central dispatcher gets all packets which callbacks for TCP, ICMP or

UDP. Other protocols cause packet to be dropped silently. The dispatcher checks the

length of the IP packet and verifies its checksum. The dispatcher queries the

configuration database for a honeypot configuration that corresponds to the
destination IP address. If no such configuration exists, the default template is used.
All output packets passes through the personality engine, where various personalities

are for various operating systems. Packets are adjusted according to configured

personalities. ICMP and UDP handlers are very simple in compare to TCP handler.

The ICMP handler replies to Echo Request only and UDP handler knows closed and
open status. Closed UDP port generates ICMP Port Unreachable message. The TCP

handler requires complete TCP state machine. The State machine tries to be as correct

as possible. Initially ports may be in Listen or Closed state. Listen state causes three

way handshake and all the other required TCP states whereas closed state causes a

TCP Reset to be sent (ibid, 2003).
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Figure 2.15: Honeyd Architecture

(Provos, 2003)
TCP ports may be connected to an arbitrary service:
add template tcp port 80 "sh scripts/web . ah"

Honeyd forks child process to execute service applications. Stdin/out is connected via
socket pair to TCP stream. Stderr is just a pipe and used for service syslog. Libevent

handles incoming and outgoing data. New 1/0 channels just get added without extra

complication for the application. While implementing honeyd, TCP ports may be
proxy connected to another machine

add template tcp port 23 proxy 1 0 . 23 , 1 . 2 : 2 3

This allows the honeyd administrator to simulate services for a given personality via

proxy redirection. In this honeyd opens a regular TCP connection, Stdin/out of that
socket is connected to honeyd TCP stream and Libevent takes care of the rest.

2.3.4.2

Personalities

Every packet generated by honeyd passes through the personality engine which
introduces operating system specific quirks into the packets for nmap identification.

Personalities are defined via nmap fingerprint file (nmap.prints).
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2.3.4.3

Libraries

Honeyd is mainly supported by various libraries (Provos, 2002):
•!• Dug Song's libdnet - dumb network library (Snog, n.d)

Provides a simplified, portable interface to several low-level networking

routines, including network address manipulation, kernel arp(4) cache and

route (4) table lookup and manipulation, network firewall implementation,
network interface lookup and manipulation and raw IP packet and Ethernet
frame transmission.

•!• Libevent - event notifications on file descriptors (Provos, 2002 (a))

The event API provides a mechanism to execute a function when a specific
even on a file descriptor occurs or after at a given time has passed. libevent is

meant to replace the asynchronous event loop found in event driven network
servers. An application just needs to call event_dispatchO and can then add or

remove events dynamically without having to change the event loop.

2.3.5 Methods for deployment of Honeypots
There are four different methods of honeypot deployment. These include Deception

Services, Weakened Systems, Hardened Systems and User Mode Servers. Each of

these methods are described below (Brenton, n.d):

2.3.5.1

Deception Services

Deception Services are specially designed to listen on a IP service port and respond to

inbound network requests. They can be used to emulate common TCP/UDP services

for example, Sendmail an SMTP mailer used primarily on the UNIX platfonn. When

an attacker connects to the honeypot, he or she may receive a banner, a small piece of

infonnation displayed regarding the information of the application, which identifies

the service as being some version of Sendmail. This piece of infonnation could be
about the developer and version of the particular application. If the attacker is fooled

by the deception, he or she may try to gain access to the system. This may allow the

administrator to log the efforts of the attacker and safeguard the real production
systems who may be running Sendmail (Brenton, n.d).
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Deception Services too have some problems. Firstly, it is often difficult to emulate a

service that can consistently fool the attacker. For example, the attacker may try

various control commands to check for expected responses an attacker will often use
lesser known or more esoteric commands to probe systems based on intelligence

gathered by initial scans. Unless the deception service is capable of handling such

testing, the attacker may become aware of deception and never carry out any attack on

the system.

Secondly, deception services can only collect a limited amount of information. It

records the initial attempt of attack, but nothing more than that. It may have been

useful if it could record the successful attack information, such as other systems

compromised using honeypot, or attacker's identity or tools. Since the deception
service should not provide any additional access to the machine, additional forensic

information cannot be collected (ibid, 11.d).

Finally, on a theoretical basis, deception services may have some form of
vulnerability that could give attacker unexpected access to the system. For example, if

the honeypot is compromised, the attacker may be able to remove all the evidence of
their attack such as log files. If the honeypot is compromised it may be used as a

launching pad to attack other machines or networks.

2.3.5.2

Weakened Systems

The weakened system deployment involves installation of an operating system with

some known vulnerabilities. This makes it easier for the attacker to penetrate into the

system and thus helps in collecting data about the attacks carried by the attacker. Logs

are normally saved on a remote system, in case the attacker erases the hard disk

before leaving the system. There are also memory dumps stored on the system. These

memory dumps stores information about the system and applications used. These can

be retrieved and stored remotely by taking a memory dump of the system using some
automated executable scripts (ibid, n.d).
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One of the benefit of this approach is that the actual services may be used which an

attacker may try to exploit. Weakened systems provide a lot ofinfonnation about the

attack as the actual vulnerability is exploited by the attacker. This may provide

information about the attacker or their tools used to exploit the services. Such
information may be used to check the main production servers or systems to
determine the vulnerabilities exploited by the attacker on a weakened system.

Weakened systems require very high maintenance and with very little return (Brenton,

n.d). If the vulnerability has been on the operating system for quite a long time and

the administrator knows about it and its patches, then it is not of much help in data

collection. Also an attacker may become suspicious seeing a very obvious

vulnerability not patched on the network. Hence, weakened systems can be of little
value for data collection and analysis as it is depended on known security exploits and

their patches (ibid, n.d).

2.3.5.3

Hardened Systems

In a hardened system deployment, the base operating system is patched for all of the
known vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are published on various security related

web portals and also alerts are released by various vendors about the vulnerabilities

associated with their products as they are identified. The system is made secure from

the known vulnerabilities and then left for the attackers to attack. If an attacker is able

to compromise such hardened systems then forensic evidence coUected from the

attack may be useful for further improving the systems security and also can be used

for law enforcement purposes. Such method reduces the maintenance time and

increases the data collection from the system. It also is a good method for providing

new attack intelligence on unknown attacks as the system is hardened against known
vulnerabilities (Brenton, n.d).

Such hardened systems do have a weakness. These systems rely on the system

administrator skills. Ifthe attacker possesses greater and more efficient skills than the
system administrator, then it will be easier for him to compromise the system and may

also remove their traces from the systems which could lead to them. The

compromised honeypot may also be used as a launching pad for carrying attacks on
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various other systems within the same network as well other networks over the

Internet.

2.3.5.4

User Mode Servers

User Mode servers are fully functional servers that have been nested within the
application space of the host operating system. When an Internet user transmits a

request to the IP address of one of the user mode servers such as Windows NT, the
host accepts the request and routes it to the proper user mode instance such as word

processor, excel spreadsheet, email program, etc ... For a user on the Internet, user
mode host would appear like a router or firewall. This could fool the attacker as it

would pretend to be a main network of the organisation. User mode servers are not

available for every operating system. To create a user mode server you must start with

a regular operating system and port it so that it can be run as a user application. They

are mainly available for operating systems like Linux and NT, so it limits the choice

of operating system when deploying the honeypot. But Windows NT and Linux are

the most widely used operating systems so this may be an advantage of using User

mode servers for deploying honeypots.

Ro ter

D

Regular Sar'\far

D
User Mod9 Server

D
Unr Moci11 Server

Figure 2.16: User Mode Servers

(Brenton, n.d)
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Figure 2.16 shows a user mode server in a network environment. For any user over

the internet, user mode host will appear as a router or firewall while other user mode
servers will appear to be individual hosts connected on a subnet. This seems to be a

legitimate network structure as it is common that individual hosts are protected by the

firewall or router in a subnet. It is also possible to use proxy ARP to connect user

mode servers with the same logical network segment. This may provide opportunity
to hide the honeypots on a network (ibid, n.d).

2.3.6 How Honeynet is created?
A highly controlled network using appropriate security perimeters such as firewalls,

routers, intrusion detection systems, etc . . . is created. Within this network honeypots

are placed and then the activities of attackers are monitored, captured and analysed.

Any traffic to honeypots is suspicious by nature. Such traffic to honeypots could be
stealthy port scan of a single service or brute force probe of the entire network.

"Creating and maintaining a successful Honeynet depends on two critical elements:
data control and data capture." [Anonymous, 2002a, p20]

2.3.6.1

Data Control

Data Control is the inbound and outbound control of data flowing through a network
to the system. Once the honeypot within the Honeynet is compromised, the
administrators have a responsibility to ensure that the honeypots are not used to

compromise other systems within the network or other outside networks. A firewall
can act as a suitable access control device for data control on a honeypot. A firewall

can be used to separate the Honeynet from rest of the network or Internet (see Figure

2.12). All inbound and outbound data should flow through the firewall. All inbound
and outbound traffic must be controlled in an automated fashion, without the attacker

getting suspicious. Therefore, a transparent firewall can be used.

It is very important that all traffic should go through firewall. The firewall controls
the flow of traffic by defining three main rules (Anonymous, 2002a):
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1. Anyone can initiate a connection from the Internet to the Honeynet. This will
allow the attackers to scan, probe and exploit systems on the Honeynet.

2. The firewall controls how the honeypots can initiate connections to the Internet. If
no outbound traffic is allowed from the compromised Honeypot to the Internet,

the attacker will become suspicious and may leave the network. Therefore, some

limited outbound connections should be allowed. The Honeynet Project found that
five to ten outbound connections within a 24-hour period should be sufficient

(Anonymous, 2002b). This will give enough connections to the attackers to

download their tools, connect to IRC or whatever activity they require to do. This

will give more opportunity to lear- 'Tom attacker's activities but goal should be to

contain the traffic initiated from the Honeynet to the Internet or other networks as

Honeynet can be used as a launching pad for attacks on other networks.

3. The Honeynet and the internal network should not have any direct

communication. The internal network is used for critical data collection for all

data generated by the attacker's activity. If the Honeynet is compromised, it will

prevent to communicate with the internal network and modify or delete any data

collected.

There are other access control systems which can be used for the secure means of data
flow over the network. For example, use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN), Routing

table configuration over the router for data flow can be used to ensure secure data
flow. Therefore, to control and contain data flow to and from the Honeynet, access

control must be wisely used to separate Honeynet from other networks.

2.3.6.2

Data Capture

Data capture is the collecting ofall activity that occurs within the Honeynet, including

both at the network, for example with the use of intrusion detection systems, and
system levels using log files, keystroke loggers, etc.... Data capture is critical for the

success of a project. According to the Honeynet project (Anonymous, 2002b), it is

ideal and useful to capture data in multiple layers within a honeynet design. It is a

challenge to capture the maximum data possible without the attacker getting alerted of

his or her actions. To have an efficient data capture mechanism multiple data capture
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methods should be deployed within the network. Ifa single layer ofdata capture fails,

there is always a backup layer available to alert the administrator about the fact that a

system was compromised. As discussed _in previous section 2.3.6.1 , how firewall can

be used for data control, firewall can also be used to capture data. Firewall can be an

excellent data capture layer as all the network traffic must flow through it. Although
infonnation captured by firewall is very limited as it cannot capture any keystrokes or

packet payloads but it is capable of logging the attack timestamps, source and

destination IP addresses and also source and destination port numbers. Another good

example for capturing data could be the use ofIDS systems. It is always useful to use
multiple layers for capturing data. In case the honeypot is compromised by the

attacker and he or she gain access to one of the data capturing mechanism then there
are always other sources to look back for data analysis purpose (Spitzner, 2003).

It is essential to note that none ofthe captured data is stored on the honeypot locally.

Any infonnation stored locally can potentially be detected by the attacker. All data

captured on the honeypot should be transferred to a secure location on the network

where no other communication is allowed with the Honeynet. Methods such as use of
virtual private networks (VPNs) or IDS systems can be used for remote logging of the

data captured. Ifthe honeypot is detected, data stored locally on the Honeynet can be

modified or destroyed by attackers. This may result in the failure of deploying

Honeynet in a network and may not fulfil the actual purpose of deploying them.
Therefore, securing the stored data is very important in a successful Honeynet.

2.3.7 Conclusion
The chapter outlined the TCP/IP protocol and security weaknesses thereof. It is
important that these principles and protocols are understood so that effective honeypot
design can be undertaken.

Honeypots are unique security tool which are intended to be probed, attacked or

compromised. Their purpose is to protect the main production network against the
attackers. This chapter provided with solid definition ofhoneypot, types ofhoneypots,

their advantages and disadvantages and methods of deployment ofhoneypots.

In the next chapter, the researcher describes the methodology used for the research.
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3. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the overall research framework adopted for this research.
Section 3.2 presents a brief literature review on various research designs. Section 3.3

discusses situations in which laboratory experiments can be an appropriate method of
research. Section 3.4 explains the complete research process adopted by the

researcher detailing each stage of the research. Section 3.5 illustrates various elements

of the laboratory study for the purpose of this research. Section 3.6 justifies why this

particular research method was adopted. Section 3.7 evaluates the overall research

methodologies by presenting the advantages and disadvantages. Finally, section 3.8

concludes the chapter.

3.2 Literature review on research design
There are various issues which need to be discussed before designing a research

methodology:

• What is the Philosophical perspective of the underlying research (e.g., Positivist,
Interpretive and Critical)?

• What methodology or strategy should be adopted to link various research methods
(e.g., experimental research, survey research, ethnography, etc.)?

• What methods - techniques and procedures - should be used (e.g., questionnaire,
interviews, observations, etc.)?

Philosophical perspective of the research
Research is always based on some underlying assumptions about the validity of
research and appropriateness of the research method m:ed. Therefore it is very

important to know these assumptions while conducting or evaluating research. The
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most relevant philosophical assumptions arc those which relate to knowledge and how
it is being obtained, tcnncd as epistemology (Myers, 1 997).

Orilikowski and Baroudi ( 1 991), following Cima (1 986), suggested three categories,

based on the underlying research epistemology: Positivist, Interpretive and Critical.

Positivist takes the fonn of theoretical propositions, which can be stated

mathematically or verbally. Positivist research generally attempts to test theory in an

attempt to increase the predictive understanding or phenomenon. Orlikowski and

Baroudi ( 1 99 1 , p5) classified infom1ation science research as positivist if there was

evidence of fomrnl propositions, quantifiable measures of variables, hypothesis
testing and drawing of inferences about a phenomenon. Positivist also involves

empirical observation and measurement of data for theory verification (Creswell,

2003). Interpretive research helps in understanding human thought and action in

social and organisational context. It attempts to understand phenomena through the

meanings that people assign to them and interpretive methods are aimed at producing

an understanding of the context of the infomrntion science. Interpretive study does not
predefine depended and independent variables but focuses as the research progresses

(Galliers, 1 987). It does not have to be limited by hypothesis testing and tight
experimental control. Instead, the external validity of the actual research question and
its relevance to practice is emphasized, rather than restricting the focus to what is

researchable by rigorous methods. Critical research focuses on the oppositions,

conflicts and contradictions in contemporary society (Myers, 1 997). It denotes a

critical process of inquiry that seeks to achieve emancipatory social change by going

beyond the apparent to reveal hidden agendas, concealed inequalities and tacit
manipulation involved in a complex relationship between IS and their social, political

and organisational contexts. It aim to reveal interests and agendas of privileged

groups and the way they arc supported or prolcctcd by a particular infonnation system

design or use.
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Types of Research Methodologies

Research methodology can be classified in various ways. However, it is common to
classi.�¥ them into qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods.

•
•

Quantitative
Experimental design
Non-experimental designs
e.g., surveys

•
•
•
•
•

Oualitatlve
Narrative
Phenomenology
Ethnography
Grounded theory
Case studies

•
•
•

Mixed Methods
Sequential
Concurrent
Transformative

Table 3.1: Research Methodologies

(Creswell, 2003)

Types of Research Methods of data collection and analysis

•
•
•

Quantitative Research Methods

•

Predetennined
Instrument based questions
Performance data, attitude
data, observational data and
census data
Statistical analysis

•
•

Qualitative Research Methods

•

•

Emerging methods
Open-ended questions
Interview data, observation
data, document data ,nd
audio visual data
Text and image analysis

Table 3.2: Research Methods

•
•

•

•

Mixed Methods
Research Methods
Both prcdetennined and
emerging methods
Doth open- and closedended questions
Multiple forms of data
drawing
on
,n
possibilities
Statistical ,nd text
analvsis

(Creswell, 2003)

Creswell (2003) suggests that the philosophical view, methodologies or strategies and

methods all contribute together to the research approach. On the basis of the above
information, the three research methodologies may be defined as (Gupta, 2003):

• A quantitative approach is one in which the investigator primarily uses
positivist claims for developing research, employs strategies of inquiry such as

experiments and surveys and collects data on predetermined instruments that

yield statistical data.

• A qualitative approach 1s one in which the research oflen makes research

claims based primarily on constructivist perspectives employs strategies of
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inquiry such as ethnographies, grounded theory studies, or case studies and
collects open-ended, emerging data with the primary intent of developing

themes from the data.

• A mixed approach is one in which the researcher tends to base research claims

on pragmatic grounds, employs strategies of researc h that involve collecting
data either simultaneously or sequentially to best understand research

problems and data collection represents both quantitative and qualitative

infomrntion.

For the purpose of this research, the researcher has adopted a mixed-method approach
which was empirical in nature. In a mixed method approach each technique produces

different empirical data which can complement data collected from another technique.

A large amount ofquantitative data (such as total number of alerts, various source and

destination IP addresses, frequency of port numbers probed, etc . . .) was collected

using the laboratory experimental method which was analysed and interpreted using
appropriate qualitative and quantitative methods. Concepts and understanding of the

problem situation was developed from the observations and patterns noticed in the

data collected. Therefore the research is best described as empirical learning approach
using laboratory experiments for observing data patterns.

3.3 When are laboratory experiments used?
Universalistic versus Particularistic research goals

Universalistic research (Kruglanski, 1975, p. 1 05) is used to investigate theoretically
predicted relationships between abstractly specified variables, for example:

pornography and sex crimes. It is important to conduct tests on such hypotheses as

they provide light on the validity of the theory from which the hypothesis was

derived. On the other hand, particularistic research involves various quantitative

questions such as, how much, how often or how many. Such particular questions

presuppose a population, setting and other conditions in regard to the applicability of

the research findings.
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When the research goals are universalistic, since a particular setting and population of

participants are not crucial aspects of the hypothesis under study, a laboratory study
may be appropriate. When the research goals are particularistic a laboratory study is

less suitable as it will be difficult to answer questions about the impact of a program

in a specific setting with specific people unless the research is conducted under those

same conditions.

For the purpose of this research, it can be classified under particularistic research as

similar network architecture was implemented at each iteration of the research and

was tested by various attackers. These attackers were anonymously chosen as

described in later section.

Examining what does happen versus what can happen

Sometimes the goal of the research is to detennine what can happen under such

situations or circumstances (Judd, 1991 ). For example, in theoretical based hypothesis

a set of circumstances are specified and the goal is to create those circumstances in

order to detennine if the predicted phenomenon can be observed. Results for such
hypothesis are already predicted but it is the validity ofsuch predictions that needs to

be proved by constructing such circumstances, which may be possible to do in a
laboratory environment.

With regard to this research, the theory of deception was already applied by various
deceptive techniques and tools. What needed to be detennined was the effectiveness

of the actual deception by using such tools and techniques in a virtual networked

environment. It was not possible to do this network testing in a real world by

connecting it to the external networks for several reasons. Firstly, it was essential to

detennine if the designed network is capable of deceiving attackers. Secondly, if the
designed network is also secure enough to handle the attacks otherwise it could have
been used as a launching pad for carrying out attacks on other networks ifit was done

in an open network or laboratory situation. Therefore, laboratory research method

seemed to be more appropriate as it provided a controlled environment to protect the
external networks and also provided the author with valuable and controlled results.
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3.4 Research Process
The research process has been divided . .-1 various stages where results of each stage
depend on the previous stage. The figure 3.1 below explains each stage ofthe research
process.

Testing ofBaseline
by verifying the
signatures

Questionnaire with
students

scrs

Network Penetration
Tests by 6 students

.............. ............. ... .... ........ ... .
Log File Analysis
using analysis tools

·-·-·-· - ·-·- - ·
System Hardening
based on analysis
results

Using Automated
Tools

Network
Penetration Tests

.

r • • • • ••• - · - · · · - · · ' • • • ' • ••• '

I

'

!
Result comparison
;
• � from previous analysis !
i,_. - . -· - . - · - . -·-·-·-·-·-·-'

-----"'Empirical Cycle

.......................................................,

Figure 3.1: Theoretical Framework: Stages of Research Process

Stage 1 : Verification of Signatures

In the initial stage of the research, a baseline system was created using the Honeyd, an

open source honeypot. Honeyd is provided with the list of TCP/IP signatures of

various operating systems and networking devices (around more than 400) which can
be used for configuring the honeynet. But it was not known that the signatures
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provided with the honeyd can be successfully used. Therefore, before implementing
the honeypot for the data collection it was necessary to verify these signatures using
honeyd. Each individual signature was implemented in the honeyd configuration file
and Nmap (a network scanning tool) was used to test them. All the successful
signatures (nearly 50% of the total signatures) were listed separately and were then
used for baseline the honeypot. Once the baseline signatures were achieved, the
researcher moved to the next stage of the research.
Stage2: Questionnaire
Selected attackers were required to attack the system on which Honeyd was installed,
in order to test its effectiveness. A Questionnaire, a type of survey method, was
chosen for selecting the attackers. A preset questionnaire was prepared with 20
questions related to computer security. The primary aim of this questionnaire was to
select students for network penetration testing. It was conducted among the students
of School of Computer and Information Science (SCIS) of Edith Cowan University,
Perth. These students were chosen primarily because they were easy sample group to
approach within the computer science school and were computer literate. So there was
high possibility among these students having some knowledge o f operating systems
and computer systems which was essential for participating into such exercise.
Students who attempted the questionnaire were not made aware of the real nature of
the project. They were informed only about the hacking exercise. They were told that
the exercise was only to determine their hacking skills. It was purely to preserve the
nature of the project whose main aim was to disguise attackers. The effectiveness of
hackers was unknown until they perfonned the network penetration tests. They were
purely selected on the basis of their performance in computer security literacy test.
Due to the lack of resources and time it was not possible for conducting any such
practical exercise which could help in detennining the effectiveness of the hackers.
This would have been an advantage to the research results but unfortunately was not
possible. The prototype of the computer security literacy test was also approved and
validated by two network consultants. The two network consultants were Craig Valli,
Edith Cowan University, Australia and Andrew Dawson, British Petroleum, London.
None of the students, who attempted the questionnaire, were identified by their names
or anything else that could identify them. They were assigned a subject number in
order to preserve their anonymity.
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The designed questionnaire was attempted by 10 students, from which top 6 were

selected for the next stage of the project i.e. for network penetration exercise. These

students were selected primarily because of their excellent performance in the

questionnaire in which they scored 100%. The total number of students selected was
restricted because of limited resources in terms of availability of computer systems,

availability of appropriate laboratory, and also time constraints.
Stage 3: Network Penetration Tests by selected students

The selected students conducted the network penetration tests for the configured

Honeynet. These tests were conducted to probe the network for exploitable
vulnerabilities. As mentioned earlier, these students were not aware of the actual

Honeynet in the network structure. These students were allowed to bring in their own
laptops and programs required by them for network testing. This provided an

opportunity for the students to use their own desirable tools to do the exercise. Also it

was beneficial for the purpose of research to learn about various attacking tools which
can be used against such network environment. All the results obtained during the

testing were kept completely anonymous. The Network Penetration exercise was

conducted continuous for several days to provide enough time to participants to probe

the network.

There was only one single laboratory available for the purpose of the network

penetration exercise, therefore all the selected students were asked to take their places

within that laboratory. All of them had their own laptops with them so it was not
required to provide them with separate machines. Only a couple of them requested for
access to an extra machine, which was provided to them.

Once the network penetration exercise was completed by the participants, they

voluntarily provided their anonymous reports to the researcher. These reports outlined

their point of views regarding the network architecture and their findings during the

exercise.
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Stage 4: Log files Analysis

Logs generated during the above network penetration exercises were stored securely
on the server and also appropriate backup measures were adopted, such as storage on

zip disks, database backup on remote system. Various analysis tools were used to
carefully analyse these log files. The tools used were:

• ACID (Analysis Console oflntrusion Databases)

ACID was primarily used in conducting statistical analysis of the log files. This

tool helped in classifying the security alerts generated during the network

penetration tests conducted by the participants. ACID allowed the researcher to

analyse the data using options such as most frequent alerts, top 10 source IP

addresses, top 1 0 destination IP addresses, alerts related to individual port

numbers, etc.

• Ethereal and tcpdump

Log analysis also involved study of all malicious packets that came through the

system. Their structure and their potential threats were carefully analysed. The
malicious packets were analysed using Ethereal Packet analysing tool and

tcpdump. Ethereal was mainly used as it has the ability to (Anonymous, n.d(f)):
• Examine data from a live network or from a capture file on disk
• View the reconstructed stream of TCP session
• Can be used for both Windows and Unix machines

• Dissect 280 protocols
• Selectively highlight and colour packet summary infonnation

• Save all our parts of captured network trace to disk

Ethereal allowed the researcher to generate the hierarchical statistic of the

protocols. Using ethereal researcher was able to analyse each individual captured

packet separately.

• Analyst Notebook 6

Analyst Notebook 6 was a commercial analysing tool which helped in generating

visual diagrams of the network traffic captured in the log files. It helped in
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interpreting complex information through visual diagrams, which was not possible

doing manually. The results generated by Analyst were easy to understand and

accessible.

Also some of the log files were analysed manually. During the analysis, frequencies

ofvarious types of attacks and their effects over the network were identified. These
tools were selected because they were easily available as freeware (except Analyst)
over the internet and were also open source programs. This provided enough

flexibility in their configuration according to the research requirement. From the

collective combination ofresults obtained from these analysing tools, various network
configuration weaknesses were identified. These weaknesses were identified by

observing the data patterns within the log files and also by understanding the tools or

programs used by the participants for attacking the network. The information about

these tools or programs was captured within the logs. From the detailed analysis of
the logs and captured packets, it was identified that there were few configuration

problems in mimicking the Honeynet. It was also found that some services, which

were prone for attack, were also not configured properly. Such weaknesses were
identified with the help ofusing various analysing tools described above.
Stage 5: System Hardening

Based on the results obtained m the above analysis stage, system and network

configuration was improved and hardened for further testing and data collection.

System hardening was done by improving the configuration file ofthe honeypot using

more specific signatures and also by improving the configuration files of the services

emulated on various ports.

Stage 6: Network Penetration tests using Tools

Once the hardening of network and system was completed, further network

penetration testing was conducted using some automated security tools available
freely over the internet. These tools were mainly used because they were freeware.

These testings were conducted by the researcher using various hacking tools. This

testing was done to determine if the behaviour of the network has improved after the

system hardening based on the weaknesses identified in previous analysis. After the

completion oftesting, steps in stage 4, 5 and 6 further followed in order to determine
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if the level of deception in the Honeynet has improved or not. Results obtained from

each analysis stage were compared with the previous analysis results. This
comparison of results helped in detennining the level of deception. This was

determined by studying the various successful hacking techniques, identified in the
log files, which were lower in number and less effective then in comparison to the

first analysis conducted after the initial penetration tests. Steps in stage 4, 5 and 6

were empirically continued until it provided minimal opportunity to the attackers to

determine security holes in the network. With the continuous improvement in the
Honeynet, it may be considered that a successful level of deception was achieved

which was effectively able to deceit the attackers.

3.5 Elements of the laboratory experiments
This research is based on the findings during the experiments conducted in a closed

laboratory environment. The uniqueness of laboratory research lies in its flexibility. It

gives the researcher the ability to construct physical settings, tasks, social

environments, and many other factors that influence human behaviour. But also

laboratory research has drawbacks. One of the drawbacks oflaboratory research is its

artificial nature. Laboratory research is artificial in nature as it permits the creation of
settings or tasks and manipulations which assists in achieving the required research

goals. The reliability of the results may depend on various factors, such as sample
size, depending on the type of any research (Judd, 1991; Agassi, 1992; Fujita, 1996).

In this research, the sample size used, in terms of number of participants, was small.

The sample size constraint was difficult to overcome for several reasons. Firstly, it
was difficult to find people with an appropriate amount of computer security

knowledge to participate in this type of research. But this does not imply that the

results obtained in a laboratory research are wrong or incorrect. Those results are
valid under the created situation within the laboratory and from which various

assumptions may be made but it may not be applied to large population due to the
small sample size reducing reliability of results.
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Participants' awareness of the research was very important for the purpose of this
research. In a laboratory research method, it is sometimes difficult to keep people

unaware ofthe fact that they are participating in research. This may sometimes create
problems for the validity ofthe research (Judd, 1991). The participants were selected
for conducting the penetration tests in the laboratory were unaware ofthe true nature

of the research. They were selected through a computer literacy test to conduct the

hacking exercise in a closed laboratory environment. They were not infonned about

the deception implemented in the network and this was the main focus ofthe research.

These participants, while they were conducting penetration tests, were remotely
monitored by the researcher. Their moves, tactics and also their personal expressions

while doing the exercise were monitored by the researcher in the laboratory.

In a laboratory research methodology, one of the main goals of the research is
Control. Control or the minimization ofirrelevant influences on whatever the research

is designed to investigate, is made possible by the laboratory's isolation from external

influences (Judd, 1991). For the purpose of this research, a closed laboratory

environment was adopted, isolated not only physically but also electronically. This
laboratory research was carried out in an isolated network environment with no

communication with any other network. This control environment was beneficial for

the purpose of the research because it prevented from distractions and influences
caused by external sources. B y removing external variables and their impacts by using

the closed laboratory the possibility of participants having their work affected in
direct or indirect manner was greatly reduced. Also having a control isolated network

environment gave a sense ofsecurity while carrying out this research to the attackers.

3.6 Rationale of the Research
This section ofthe chapter provides the justification ofthe research process adopted.

The researcher justifies why he chose Mixed-method positivist approach towards

undertaking a survey method (e.g. Questionnaire) and observational study

respectively.
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Philosophical View - Positivist

This research depends on the tests and statistical conclusions drawn from the tests
conducted within the laboratory. There was no previous data from any other research

which was being interpreted or critically analysed or used in anyway.
Research Methodology - Mixed Method

Both quantitative (e.g. experiments, questionnaire) and qualitative (e.g. observational
study) methods were adopted. Mixed Method approach was mainly used:
• To achieve a higher degree ofvalidity and reliability
• To overcome the deficiencies of single method studies

• To help in explaining the findings of another method.
Research Methods
• Laboratory Experiments

This research was being particularistic in nature as a particular network was

probed and attacked by selected attackers. Also it provided a control and flexible
environment for the purpose ofthe research. According to the researcher, this was

the only possible method to adopt which could have justified the nature of the

underlying research.
• Questionnaire

The Questionnaire was primarily chosen because of following reason:
• Offers greater assurance ofanonymity

• Could be completed at the respondent's convenience
• Questionnaire are stable, consistent and uniform measure, without
variation

• Helps in avoiding bias selection of participants
• Observational Study

According to the researcher, this research was an observatory study. Participants

were not made aware of the deceptive network created by the researcher. They

were just asked to test their hacking skills over a local network. This exercise may

have just a minimal impact over the participants. From the data collected, the
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researcher tried to observe various data patterns and tools and tactics used by

participants.

3.7 Evaluation of research methodology
However the researcher has justified his adopted methodology in the previous section,

but all these methodologies and methods do have some advantages and disadvantages.

These are briefly summarised below:

Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaires
Advantages
Questionnaire is a type of survey method which provides a type and amount of
infonnation that other methods cannot provide. There are various reasons that make

them one of the popular methods used in social science research. Questionnaires are

less expensive than other methods and also produce quick results. They are also very

convenient method as they ca11 be completed at the respondent's convenience and
offers greater assurance of anonymity. They promise a wider coverage of people,

since they can approach respondents more easily than other methods. They also help

in avoiding bias or errors caused by the presence or attitude of the researcher.
(Sarantakos, 1993)

Disadvantages

There are various limitations associated with the nature ofthe questionnaires. They do

now allow probing, prompting and clarification of questions. It is not possible for the
researcher to know whether �he right person has answered the questionnaire also ifthe

respondents have foilowed the right order ofthe questions. Due to lack of supervision,

partial response is quite possible. (Sarantakos, 1993)

Advantages and Disadvantages of Laboratory Experiments
Advantages
The laboratory is a unique setting for research in many ways. It provides a Control
environment which minimizes various external influences which could affect the
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underlying investigation. Manipulation of independent variables is also facilitated by

the laboratory research settings. Laboratory experiments also allow the researcher to

setup various settings which may influence the research participants. The flexibility of

the laboratory research allows the researcher to attain control, implement a

manipulation and construct an appropriate setting in different ways depending on the
nature of the underlying research (Judd, 1991).

Disadvantages

Laboratory experiments also have various limitations which may affect the research.

In

a laboratory settings there are chances of human errors. It is an artificial

environment created by the researcher so it is very prone of errors made by the

researcher. Also the sample used in the experiments too has a limitation. It may not be
a representative of the population (Judd, 1991; Anonymous, n.d.(d)).

Advantages and Disadvantages of Observational Study
Advantages

Observation provides infonnation when other methods are not effective. It offers

infonnation without relying on reports of others. Observation allows the collection of

a wide range of infonnation even when this infonnation is thought to be irrelevant at
the time of study. It is relatively inexpensive mode of study. (Sarantakos, 1 993)

Disadvantages

Observation study too has various limitations. They cannot be applied when large

group are studied. It is also exposed to the observer's bias, selective perception and
selective memory. Observation cannot offer quantitative generalisations on the

results. It is relatively laborious and time consuming method. (Sarantakos, 1 993)

3.8 Conclusion
On the basis of the literature reviewed on research design, the researcher had adopted
mixed�method positivist approach for the research. During the course of the research
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laboratory experiments, questionnaire and observational research method were
conducted.
The nature of the research was evolutionary since the findings of one stage were the
basis of lhc focus of next stage of the research. This provided the higher level of
granularity among the results. Thus a mixed-method approach was more appropriate
as it provided flexibility to him in comparing the results of c;1ch stage, generated in
the experiment, and then designing the focus of next stage accordingly.
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4. Tools for Data Collection and Analysis
There were various tools used for the data collection and analysis purpose. There were
tools which were used for collecting raw data and then with the help of some other

tools generated some meta data for analysis purpose. This can be summarised in the

Figure 4.1 below:
SNORT

ETHEREAL

SYSLOGS

HONEYD

.

MYSQL

TCPDUMP

LOG FILES

HONEYD
LOGS

DATA

ACID

ETHEREAL

MANUAL

ANALYST

META
ANALYSIS

Figure 4.1: Tools for data collection and analysis

4.1

DATA

GENERATORS

Snort

Snort is a freely available intrusion detection system which can be distributed and

modified under the GNU General Public Licence (See Appendix B). It is freely

available from http://www.snort.org. According to the snort website, it is capable of

pcrfom1ing rcal�timc traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. It can
pcrfom1 protocol analysis, content searching/matching and can be used to detect a

variety or attacks and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, COi

attacks, SMB probes, OS fingerprinting attempts, and much more. There are three

main modes in which Snort can be configured (Baumann, 2002; Roesch, n.d):
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RAW

• Sniffer Mode: Snort is used as a packet sniffer and can be configured to show
only IP headers or the IP payload as well.

• Logger Mode: All packets can be logged to a file and inspected later using
various tools.

• Network Intrusion Detection Mode: All packets are compared to the rule type

defined in the configuration files. If any rule matches, the packet is logged and

-

an alert is senl. This is being illustrated in the figure 4.2 below:
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Figure 4.2: Snort Overview

(Baumann, 2002)

Any incoming packet is checked for the rules defined in the snort configuration file

which further checks with the signature database to detennine the type of packet. If
the packet matches with the signature, request is sent to the snort sensor which logs

the details of the packet and generates an alert for the purpose of the administrator.

It has a real time alerting mechanism and can also log all the alerts to syslog or

various types of logging mechanism such as SQL databases. It features allow logging

discrete types of messages on separate log files.

Snort is running as a UNIX daemon and is configured through a common Unix .conf
file (see appendix C.5). It is connected to the MySql database where all the logs and

alerts are stored (see appendix C. 7 for MySql database format). Snort is a core IDS
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engine. It does not contain any analysis tools or remote administration GUis. There
are few available front-ends and analysis tools. One of the best known is ACID

(Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases) (Danyliw, n.d.). It is a web based analysis
tool which is use<l t0 inspect Snort data stored into the database.

Snort is a notable IDS with an extensive list nfavailable signatures. It is easy to install

and also the database support is available. Snort has a fast and robust engine. When
compared to other commercial IDS, Snort is a better choice as it is available for free

and signature file can be updated quickly in compare to commercial IDS as those are

dependent on their vendor's supply (Roesch, 11.d).

4.2 MySQL
MySQL, the most popular Open Source SQL database, is developed and provided by
MySQL AB (Anonymous, n.d(b)). It can be downloaded by anyone from the internet

(http://www.mysql.com) for free. It is freely distributed and modified under GNU
General Public License (see appendix B). MySQL was originally developed to handle

large databases much faster than existing solutions and has been successfully used in

highly demanding production environments for several years. The connectivity,

speed, and security make MySQL highly suited for accessing databases on the
Internet (Anonymous, n.d(b)).

MySQL provides excellent connectivity with Snort IDS and ACID (see section 4.4 for

ACID) for analysis.

Due to its high degree of connectivity with Snort IDS and ACID (Section 4.4) and

also support for SSL connection between MySQL client and server which provides an

encrypted connection while transferring the data, it was an ideal choice to use this
database for this Honeynet project.

87

4.3 Webmin
Webmin is a web-based interface for system administration for UNIX. Using any

browser that supports tables and fonns (and Java for the File Manager module), you

can setup user accounts, Apache, DNS, file sharing as well as other services.

Webmin consists of a simple web server, and a number of CGI programs which

directly update system files like /etc/inetd. conf and /etc/passwd. The web server

and all CGI programs are written in Perl version 5, and use no non-standard Perl
modules.

Webmin is available under the BSD licence. This means that on Linux and other

platforms, Webmin may be freely distributed (http://www.webmin.com) and modified
for commercial and non-commercial use.

Webmin provides a one-to-one graphical interface to nearly every service and action

needed to maintain a UNIX system. It is universally accessible, because it only

requires a web browser. It can potentially be accessed from anywhere in the world via
a network connection. It is simple, ,concise, and consistent in its presentation across a

wide array of differing services, functions, and operating systems. It is predictable, in

that it does not modify files unnecessarily or in incompatible ways. Webmin is an
excellent tool for both novice and experienced system administrators. As a tool for

novices, it can provide a means ofgetting involved in system administration in a very
visual way. All of the options available are presented in a clear and complete fashion.

Webmin proved to be an excellent tool for the purpose ofthis research. It allowed the

researcher to keep a constant watch on the system changes while the honeynet was

probed. It also provided the option ofdisabling any service, such as database, log files
etc., remotely on the system, in case it is being exploited by the attackers. It was a

utility which provided the researcher to keep a constant watch over the data collected

from the honeynet. It also helped the researcher in administrating the systems, after

the honeynet was probed or attacked, for the purpose of tracking file changes and
backups. For screenshot see appendix A.5.
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4.4 ACID (Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases)
Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases (ACID) is an analysis engine to search and

process a database of security events generated by various intrusion detection

systems. The Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases (ACID) is a PHP-based

analysis engine to search and process a database of security events generated by

various IDSes, firewalls, and network monitoring tools. The features currently
include:

• Query-builder and search interface for finding alerts matching on alert meta
infonnation (e.g. signature, detection time) as well as the underlying network

evidence (e.g. source/destination address, ports, payload, or flags).

• Packet viewer (decoder) will graphically display the layer-3 and layer-4
packet information oflogged alerts

• Alert management by providing constructs to logically group alerts to create
incidents (alert groups), deleting the handled alerts or false positives,

exporting to email for collaboration, or archiving of alerts to transfer them

between alert databases.

• Chart and statistics generation based on time, sensor, signature, protocol, IP
address, TCP!UDP ports, or classification

ACID has the ability to analyse a wide variety of events which are post-processed into
its database. Tools exist for the following fonnats:
• using Snort (www.snort.org)
o Snort alerts

o tcpdump binary logs

• using logsnorter ( www.snort.org/downloads/Iogsnorter-0.2.tar.gz)
o ipchains
o iptables
O

ipf\v

Due to its compatibility with Snort and MySql , ACID was an appropriate analysis
utility for the purpose of this research. ACID has a remarkable feature of classifying
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the data collected according to their occurrences, which resulted in better and in-depth
analysis of the data. It also had the compatibility of handling huge volume of data

while analysing and generating graphs and charts. Therefore, it was an ideal utility to
use for the analysis purpose of the data generated during this research. For screenshot
see appendix A. I .

4.5 Syslog-ng
One of the most neglected ru:-eas of UNIX is handling system events. A daily check for

system messages is crucial for the security and health conditions of a computer
system. System logs contain many messages which are of no importance but at the

same time they also contain many important messages which sometime get lost in the
load of messages. Therefore, filtering is not always the best option. The better and

consistent option would be having a logging service during runtime of all applications
(Scheidler, 1999).

Syslog-ng, as the name shows, is a syslogd replacement, but with new functionality

for the new generation. The original syslogd allows messages only to be sorted based

on priority/facility pairs; syslog-ng adds the possibility to filter based on message

contents using regular expressions. The new configuration scheme is intuitive and

powerful. Forwarding logs over TCP and remembering all forwarding hops makes it

ideal for firewall environments.
Syslog-ng

is

available

free

over

the

internet

(http://www.balabit.hu/en/downloads/syslog-ng/) which may be redistributed or

modified under the tenns ofthe GNU General Public License as published by the Free
Software Foundation.

Syslog-ng consists of message paths of one or more sources and also one or more

destinations. Syslog-ng can be configured for logging on a remote location as well

which can be useful in having a backup of logs. This method is very useful for
establishment of honeypots as it allows storing the logs on a remote secure location

other than storing on the Honeynet itself (which may get compromised).
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In a honeypot, remote data storage is every essential to preserve the data from any

fabrication or deletion. For the purpose of this research, Syslog-ng proved to be an
excellent utility for transferring and storing the data generated in log files, while the

honeynet was probed and attacked, to a remotely connected system. This provided a

layer ofsecurity for preserving the data for this research.

4.6 Ethereal
Ethereal is a packet analyser (http://www.ethereal.com) released as Open Source

under the GNU General Pubiic Licence. Ethereal is available for almost every
platfonn. For capturing the network traffic, libpcap is used which is available for
nearly every known platfonn.

Ethereal has the feature of capturing live network traffic or to use a file as network

traffic source (which has to be in tcpdump file fonnat). All packet data is displayed in

a readable fonnat which makes it easy to analyse and is much simpler. It supports

more than 50 types of protocols. Ethereal does decode known protocols as much as
possible. For example, telnet traffic is shown in plain text.

Ethereal does also provide a feature of "Follow TCP Stream" which will present a

special view to the user, where a chosen TCP stream is decoded and displayed. It does
also provide the feature of filters both for display and capture packets. Limiting

complex capturing to interesting packets is possible and flexible.

Ethereal does also provide a feature of"Protocol Hierarchy Statistic" which generates

a hierarchical view of different packets captured. This provide a detail analysis of

packets in tenns of total percentage of each packet and also provides infonnation of
their start and end bytes.

Ethereal consumes a great amount of memory and affects the CPU perfonnance.

Depending on the packet sizes, it is a utility to decode and analyse packets which

went over the wire.
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The reason researcher decided in choosing the utility for the purpose ofthis research
was purely because ofits ability ofanalysing each individual packet separately. It was

also capable of generating a protocol hierarchy statistic of the packets sniffed while
the honeynet was probed. Ethereal was an excellent utility for analysing the malicious

packets captured from the honeynet. For screenshot see appendix A.4

4.7 TCPDump
TCPDump (http://www.tcpdump.org) is a tool which can be used to capture and
analyse network traffic. Its primary use is to record network traffic from a network

device to a file. A Boolean expression may be used to identify certain packets with
specific protocols, certain flags or packets destined to certain IP address. It also has

the capability to get the packet stream out ofa file. It is possible to simulate incoming

packets by specifying a previously recorded session. This feature enables the user to

record all network traffic having the possibility to analyse the network flow at a later
time with the same tools which can be used in real time.

Snort is capable of writing the Jogs ofall traffic in TCPDump readable format. Snort

stores these logs in tcpdump.log.xxx file fonnat. These files then can be read and
analysed using Ethereal. These Jog files have been extensively analysed, in this

project, using Ethereal.

4.8 Nmap
Nmap ("Network Mapper") (Fyodor, n.d) is an open source utility for network

exploration or security auditirig. It was designed to rapidly scan large networks,

although it works equally well against single hosts. Nmap uses raw IP packets in

novel ways to detennine what hosts are available on the network, what services

(ports) they are offering, what operating system (and OS version) they are running,
what type of packet filters/firewalls are in use, and dozens of other characteristics.

Nmap runs on most types of computers, and both console and graphical versions arc
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available. Nmap is free software, available with full source code under the terms of

theGNU GPL.

Following scanning techniques can be chosen by the user (Fyodor, n.d):
• UDP

• TCP connect and TCP SYN (half open)
• FTP proxy (bounce attack)

• Reverse-ident, ICMP (ping sweep), FIN, ACK sweep, Xmas Tree, SYN
sweep, IP Protocol and Null scan.

After scanning one or more machines nmap shows a list of interesting ports on the
target machines. It always gives the port's open, filtered or unfiltered. Open means

that the target machine will accept a connection on that specific port number. Filtered

means that a firewall or filter is protecting the port and nmap is unable to determine

its state. Unfiltered means that the port is closed and there is no firewall or filter

protecting the port.

The reason why Nmap was chosen was primarily because ofits capability of scanning
large networks using various scanning techniques. The information provided by the

Nmap after the scan is completed is very useful in determining the features of the
scanned hosts or network, such as what Operating system is installed and which ports

are open with what services implemented on them. This allows more focused testing
on those hosts by only using related exploits on them. For screenshot see appendix

A.6.

4.9 GFI LANguard Network Security Scanner
GFI LANguard Network Security Scanner (N.S.S.) (http://www.gfi.com.languard) is

a tool that allows network administrators to quickly and easily perform a network
security audit. GFI LANguard N.S.S. combines the functions of a port scanner and a

security scanner. It also creates reports that can be used to fix security issues on a

network.
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Unlike other security scanners, GFI LANguard N.S.S. does not create a "barrage" of
information, which is virtually impossible to follow up. Rather, it helps highlight the

most important information. It also provides hyperlinks to security sites to find out
more about these vulnerabilities.

GFI LANguard N.S.S. is freeware for nonMcommercial use.

The researcher decided on using GFI LANguard as an other network scanning tool

along with Nmap because of its ability of generating detailed report with details about
various vulnerabilities outlined during network scan and also with the proposed
solutions. Secondly, this provided the chance oftriangulating the results generated by

the Nmap to have the results more reliable by using multiple network scanning tools.

For screenshot see appendix A.3.

4.10 Analyst Notebook 6
Analyst's Notebook 6, a commercial product

developed by i2 Group

(http://www.i2group.com), provides the optimum environment for effective link and

timeline analysis. It is the de facto standard for this type of analysis worldwide and is

an essential visualisation application. Analyst's Notebook helps in:

• Swiftly identify the common elements and links hidden within your data
• Easily explore and interpret complex information

• Apply a comprehensive range of analytical techniques to develop your
intelligence

• Present the results of your analysis graphically, making them more accessible
and easy to understand

• Produce dynamic briefing charts by including photos, video clips and
documents

• Generate the analytical input that focuses an investigation and facilitates
effective decision making and resource allocation.

The Analyst's Notebook produces charts in a range of formats, each applicable to a
different technique. These typically include:
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Link Analysis charts - present people, accounts, organisations and other entities

together with the relationships or flow of commodities between them, no matter how

complex the situation.

Network Analysis charts - extend the concept of link analysis to large datasets.

These are usually generated automatically and are especially useful for identifying the

key relations hips in telephone, account and internet transactions.

Sequence of Events charts - reveal how related events unfold over time.
Transaction Pattern Analysis charts - depict when exchanges occur or
commodities flow between entities.

Analyst proved to be excellent software for analysing the data generated in this
research. It has an ability of converting huge amount of data into simple graphical

pictures which are easy to understand and helps in analysing the various network

communications between the hosts. The honeynet generated enonnous amount of data
which would not have been possible to analyse without using such utility. For

screenshot see appendix A.2.

4.11 Conclusion
Honeypots gather a wide range of data from the environment and need a variety of
tools for effective analysis. Various specialist tools were required for the purpose of

the analysis of the collected data. An explanation of the various tools used for the
analysing different formats ofdata collected has been outlined in the chapter.

The use of the correct tools for analysis is important as it affects the richness and
reliability ofthe result.

In the next chapter, the researcher describes how the Operating System Fingerprinting

tests were conducted for the purpose of the research.
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5. Operating System (OS) Fingerprinting
5.1 Overview
There are various fonns of infonnation which a skilled hacker would like to gather

before attacking any remote network or machine. One of the most important pieces of
infonnation is the type and version of operating system. With knowledge of the

operating system, a hacker can look for any number of possible vulnerabilities that are

specific to that operating system. There are various techniques by which infonnation

about the remote system can be identified. Apart from the classical techniques,

discussed in Chapter 2, there are also various tools such as Nmap, Ettercap, Xprobe,

which can be used in detecting the information about the remote operating system.

Honeyd, the virtual honeypot, is accompanied by a set of TCP/IP signature file
(explained in section 2.2.6), provided by Nmap, of various operating systems, routers,

switches, firewall, etc. It uses this signature file for emulating various hosts on to the

network. Before implementing a honeypot on to the network, it was essential to

detennine how accurate each signature was. Therefore, an experiment was conducted

to detennine how many signatures specified in the Nmap fingerprint file (Fyodor, n.d)

were successful in deceiving the attacker and the typical tools of trade.

5.2 Methodology
The purpose of this study was to investigate how different TCP/IP fingerprints could

be detected by using network scanning tool, Nmap. A deceptive environment was
setup on a machine (assume M l ) using a freely available program called Honeyd.

Honeyd is a small daemon that creates virtual hosts on a network. It is implemented as

a Unix daemon that runs on a workstation and listens to network traffic. The hosts can

be configured to run arbitrary services, and their TCP personality can be adapted so

that they·appear to be running certain versions of operating systems. Honeyd enables

a single host to claim multiple addresses. It was tested by setting up 3 different hosts

(10.21.19.102-104).

It is possible to perform standard network diagnostics such as ping the virtual

machines, or to traceroute them. Any type of service on the virtual machine can be

potentially simulated. Instead of simulating a service, it is also possible to proxy it to
another machine. Honeyd supports asymmetric routes and the integration of physical

machines into the virtual network topology (Provos, 2002). Therefore, it is capable of
re-routing the network traffic to any physical machine present on the network rather

than simulating any service or operating system. The different TCP personalities are

learned from reading an nmap fingerprint file. The configured personality is the

operating system that nmap or xprobe will return. These personalities emulate the
related operating system or network service but they do not exist in real. These are

bogus services which can be emulated using their TCP/IP fingerprint. Personalities

can be annotati d to detennine if they allow FIN-scans for open ports or to select the

preference in which they reassemble fragmented IP packets.

Honeyd can be used to create a virtual honeynet or for general network monitoring. It
supports the creation of a virtual network topology including dedicated routes and

routers (routing configuration described earlier in section 2.3.4). The routes can be

attributed with latency (the amount of time it takes a packet to travel from source to

destination) and packet loss (packets which are lost or dropped in between while
travelling from source to destination) to make the topology seem more realistic (ibid,
2002).

After the initial setup of Honeyd, arpd was configured. The ARP daemon moves the

management of the ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) table from kernel to user

space. It allows honeyd to use IP addresses on the existing network. Arpd can detect

all the unallocated IP addresses on the existing network. It is useful for sites with
large network segments (256+ systems per segment), because the kernel hash tables

are not optimized to handle this situation (Provos, 2002). On successful configuration

of both Honeyd and Arpd, a small configuration file was created which was mainly
used to create multiple deceptive hosts running virtual operating systems.
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5.3

Honeyd Configuration

Below is an example configuration ofhoncyd. This example defines a template which
annotates a host running a web server.
annotate "AIX 4 . 0 - 4 . 2 " fragment old
# Example of a simple host template and its binding

create template

set template personality "AIX 4 . 0 - 4 . 2 "

add template tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web , sh"

add template tcp port 22 ''sh scripts/test . sh $ipsrc $dport"

add template tcp pore 23 proxy 1 0 . 23 , 1 . 2 : 2 3
set template default tcp action reset

bind 10 . 21 . 1 9 . 102 template

Virtual honeypots are configured via templates. A template is a reference for a
completely configured computer system. New templates are created with the create
command.
The set and add commands change the configuration of a template. Using set
command we assign a fingerprint personality to the template. This personality
determines the behaviour of the network as discussed earlier. The set command is also
used to define the default behaviour of the supported network protocols. This default
behaviour can be one of the following: block, reset, or open. Block means that all
packets for the specified protocol are blocked by defaull, reset means that all ports are
closed and open means that all ports arc open by default for the specified protocol
(Provos, 2003).
The add command is used to specify the services which can be accessed remotely.
Beside the template name, we need to specify the protocol, port and the command to
execute for each service. Honeyd also recognises the keyword proxy that allows us to
for.vard network connections to a different host. The daemon expands the following
four variables for both the service and the proxy statement: $ipsrc, $ipdst, $sport and
$dport. This allows services to adapt their behaviour depending on the particular
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nelwork connection they are handling. It is also possible to direct the network traffic
back to the host who is probing the honeypot (ibid, 2003).

The bind command is used to assign a template to an IP address. If no template has

been assigned to an IP address, the default template is used. The above mentioned
configuration example creates a template for a personality "AIX 4.0 -4.2" and adds
http, telnet and ssh ports. Finally it binds all this infonnation to a virtual IP address
10.21.19.102. Similarly there were 2 more hosts were created.

After creating the configuration file, arpd was processed this was followed by honeyd.
This allowed arpd lo respond to any incoming network traffic directed towards the

honeyd. If the incoming IP address request docs not exist in the configured honeyd

configuration file, arpd simply drops that packet and processes another request.

Thereafter, from a different machine (say M2), nmap was used to carry out the scan
on those virtual hosts created in the configuration file. About 458 operating systems

signatures were used to scan from the fingerprint database file called 11map.pri11ts.

Since the task was to find out the details of operating systems running on the virtual

daemon - honeyd, nmap was used to carry out SYN Stealth attack with fast scanning

option along with Don't ping and OS detection options. The representation was
nmap -sS -F -0 -PO <ip address>
Scan Types

-sS

TCP SYN scan: This technique is often referred to as "half-open" scanning. A SYN

packet is send as if it is going to open a real connection and waits for the response. A

SYNIACK indicates that the port is listening. The primary advantage of this scanning

technique is that fewer sites will log it.

-F

Fasl Scan Mode: This specifies that the user only wishes to scan for ports listed in the

services file which comes with nmap or the configuration file created. This is

obviously much faster than scanning all 65535 ports on a host.
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-PO

Don't Ping: Do not try and ping hosts at all before scanning them. This allows the
scanning of networks that don't allow ICMP echo requests ( or responses) through

their firewall.
-0

This option activates remote host identification via TCP/IP fingerprinting. In other

words, it uses a bunch of techniques to detect subtleties in the underlying operating
system network stack of the computers which are scanned. It uses this information to

create a fingerprint which it compares with its database of known OS fingerprints (the
nmap.prints file) to decide what type ofsystem is getting scanned.

The �O option also enables several other tests. One is the "Uptime" measurement,
which uses the TCP timestamp option to guess when a machine was last rebooted.

This is only reported for machines which provide this information.

5.4 Test Results
Total No. of Fine:emrints in nmap database
No. of Detected by nmap
No. ofUndetected by nmap
Percentaee Detected

458
231
227
50.43%

No. of Routers/Switches/Hubs signatures in nmap fingerprint database

70 (annrox.
39 (aonrox.
55. 71 % (annx,)

No. ofParsing Error Configuration
No. of'NO' results (i.e. nmao ke�t scanning)

No. ofRouters/Switches/Hubs detected bv nmao
PercentafJ'e Detected

No. ofPrinters/PrintServers signatures in nrnan fingemrint database
No. ofPrinters/Print Servers detected by nmap
Percentaee Detected

No. of Firewalls siJ,:natures in namp fin_gerprint database
No. ofFirewalls detected bv nmap
Pereenta�e Detected

Table 5.1: Nmap Scanning Results

5
9

25 (annrox.)
14 (annrox.)
56.0% (annx.)

14 (,nnrox.)
6 (annrox.)
42.85% <aonx.)
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5.5 Discussion
The purpose of this investigation was to detennine how many signatures of operating

systems, routers, switches, hubs or printers listed in nmap signature file can be

actually detected by nmap scanner. There were 458 signatures listed in the nmap

signature file. As the above results indicate only 231 signatures out of 458 were

actually detected by the nmap scanner. Only 50.43 percent signatures can be traced by
nmap scanner. There were 5 signatures in the signature database which were wrongly

parsed and about 9 signatures did not give any results. Nmap scanner just continued
scanning those 9 signatures for a long time and there were no results.

TCP/IP fingerprinting
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Figure 5.1: TCP/IP Fingerprinting Results using Nmap
The signature database file had approximately 70 signatures of Routers/switches/hubs

out of which only 39 were actually detected by nmap scanner. There were also

approximately 25 signatures of Printers/Print servers from which only 14 signatures
were detected. Out of approximately 1 4 signatures of firewalls, only 6 signatures were

detected by the nmap scanner. As only 42.85 per cent of the firewall signatures were
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detected by nmap, it may be justified to say that nmap is not very effective m
determining the Firewalls on the network.

5.6 Conclusion
Honeyd as a defensive tool has a wide application, due to the fact that over 50% of the

signatures are usable in deploying a virtual honeypot network. By using the tested

and validated signatures it will allow any competent systems administrator to provide

front-line defensive deception honeypot network that will provide valuable attack
intelligence. Using these results the reliability of deception has increased as only

validated signatures can only be used for honeynet implementation. This provides an

advantage of maintaining a higher level of deception as we can now eliminate the use

of bogus signatures which otherwise could have identified the presence of deception
and made the attacker suspicious about the nature ofthe network.

Based on the deception created in the experiment, it can be classified as Mimicry. The

researcher created the replica ofdifferent types of hosts using the features ofreal-time

hosts using Honeyd. These hosts did not exist in reality but were virtually created
using their fingerprint features provided with Honeyd. Therefore, these hosts were

mimicked to pretend as real hosts with few characteristics of real hosts such as
running web severs, services like telnet, ftp, etc.

All the unsuccessful fingerprints could now be filtered from the signature file and

hence only the accurate signatures could be used for creating a successful deception

using Honeyd.

The next phase of this research was developing honeypot systems based on the
validated signatures and testing these configurations for the ability to deceive

operating system fingerprinting scanners and other network attack tools.
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6. The Honeypot Implementation
After discussing what a honeypot is, its value and advantages & disadvantages in

chapter 2, the next step is to identify which honeypot will be effective for our

purpose. Incorrectly selected or implemented honeypots can be dangerous as they
may be compromised easily by attackers. These compromised honeypots then may be
used by attackers to carry out attacks on other hosts on different networks.

Before selecting any honeypot it is important to identify the goals for which the

honeypot is required and then selecting the appropriate honeypot to be implemented.

6.1 Goals
Honeypot solutions can be implemented for various purposes such as Spitzner (2002)
states:
•

Preventing attacks through deception or deterrence.

•

Responding to attacks, collecting data and evidence of attacker's activities.

•

•

Detecting attacks.

Researching attackers' tools, tactics and moves.

To detennine which of the above purpose would fulfil our requirement, the honeypots

can be categorised into two categories: production and research. The production

honeypots are used for the protection of any resource or organisation. On the other
hand, research honeypots are used for gathering infonnation on attackers.

Production honeypots help secure organizations in one of three ways- preventing,

detecting, or helping them respond to attacks while research honeypots helps in
learning about various attackers and their tools and tactics. Production honeypots are

generally highly secured in compare to research honeypots. They are normally used

by organisations as a layer of security architecture to protect their real legitimate

network. They are used for providing deterrence. On the other hand, research
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honeypots are used as a learning tool. They are used to gather maximum amount of
attack infonnation, to understand and learn from various tools and tactics used by

attackers while probing and attacking the network. This attack intelligence is used to
harden the actual legitimate networks.

A research honeypot provides extensive value by information gathering {Spitzner,
2003). They can be used to capture automated threats, malicious programs or scripts

run by malicious attackers. By analysing this captured data it helps in by improving

the security of other legitimate networks. It allows us to learn more about advance
attacks.

The significance of this research was to improve the defensive capability ofHoneynet
networks. This research is significant to:

1. Universities, government organisations, educational institutions who will be

able to use the data generated from this research as a platfonn to continue with

further research into computer and network security.

2. Private organisations or individuals can use this research for deploying this
network architecture into their networks with the aim of making it more

secure.

Therefore, the main purpose of carrying out this research was:
I . To improve the level ofDeception presented to attackers i n Honeypot design.

2. To harden a deceptive honeypot and test its effectiveness using an empirical
learning approach.

3. To improve the ability ofa deceptive honeypot to gather attack intelligence.
On the basis of above mentioned significance and purpose of research, the

researcher's purpose was to gather information about the attack intelligence in a

Honeynet environment. Therefore, a research honeypot was appropriate for this

research. Once the goal of the honeypot was identified, to gather attack infonnation,

the next step was to detennine which honeypot was to be used for infonnation

gathering (Spitzner, 2003).
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6.2 Selecting a Honeypot
Once the goal is clearly defined, next step is to select the honeypot solution. Every
honeypot has its own strengths and weaknesses. When selecting any honeypot,
following criteria may be considered (ibid, 2002):

• Level of interaction. The level of interaction defines the type of functionality
the honeypot provides. The greater the interaction, the more can be learned

from the honeypot but it too increases the complexity of design and risk of
corporate network.

• Commercial versus homemade or freeware. Commercial honeypots are easy to

configure, manage and support but some of them cost more for such
functionality. Homemade or freeware can be customised solutions but may not

be effective a permanent basis on the organisational network.

• Platform. It is important to detennine on which platfonn the honeypot should
run. The baseline operating system impacts the perfonnance of the honeypot
and also how the organisation can manage it.

6.2.1 Interaction Level
Defining the level of interaction is a very critical issue when selecting the honeypot

type. The greater the interaction, the more an attacker can do and the higher

probability that more can be learned from it. However, the greater the interaction, the

more functionality is provided to the attacker, the greater the complexity of
configuration. With the high interaction honeypots attacker have more functionality in

tenns of real time operating systems, real services to probe and carry out attacks. But
the more the attacker is allowed to do, the more is the risk of honeypot becoming
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compromised and used to attack other systems. There are 3 main type of level of

interactions as defined by Spitzner (2003), these are:
Low-Interaction Honeypots

These are typically easy to install, configure, deploy and manage because they are

simple in design and have basic functionality such as they may simulate simple logins

but nothing more which an attacker could do. In a low-level interaction, the attacker is

limited to interact with the predesignated services such as FTP, Telnet etc.. For

example, a low level interaction honeypot can emulate a standard UNIX server with

simple service like Telnet. Attackers could Telnet to the honeypot, and probably

obtain a login prompt. They could carry out a passwords brute force attack to gain
unauthorised login but there may not be a real operating system for them to log on to.

The primary value of low-level interaction honeypots is detection ofany unauthorised
activity. Low-interaction honeypots has the limited functionality that they can only
emulate some services. Because they are simple in nature, they have the lowest level

ofrisk. These are easy to deploy and maintain because they have limited interaction

capabilities, which also reduces risk.
Medium-Interaction Honeypots

Medium-interaction honeypots offer attackers a greater ability to interact with the

honeypot. They are expected to give higher perfonnance than the low-interaction

honeypots. For example, in a real operating system, a partition may be created to
create a virtual operating system within the real operating system. The virtual

operating system can be controlled by the real operating system but will give the feel

of a real operating system to the attacker. Continuing with the Telnet example, in a

medium interaction honeypot, when an attacker tries to connect to the real network
using telnet, they would be allowed a successful login with a basic level ofinteraction

with the emulated file system. This will allow an attacker to interact with the file
system functionality as ifit is a real file system. This level of interaction is greater

than the low level honeypot, which would have most likely presented a successful
login banner and nothing else.
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High-Interaction Honeypots

High-interaction honeypots are at the highest level of honeypot technology. They

provide the user with a vast amount of information about attackers but also they are

highly time consuming and often difficult to maintain. High-interaction honeypots
does not emulate any operating system or service they instead present a real system to

the attackers. A high-interaction honeypot does not emulate FTP or Web services
instead, it installs and uses a real FTP (such as wu-ftpd) or Web server (such as

Microsoft's US).

High-interaction honeypots are placed in a very highly controlled network

environment such as behind the firewalls and other security perimeters. The ability to

control the attacker's movement is not controlled directly by the honeypot but is done

through the use of perimeter countermeasures such as a firewall. The firewall allows

the attacker to probe or attack the honeypot but does not allow them to carry out

attacks using that honeypot once it is compromised. Such network architectures are

difficult to maintain, monitor and manage therefore, high-interaction honeypots are

difficult to configure and maintain.
Conclusion

With regard to this research, low interaction honeypots would have not been very

useful for data collection. Low interaction honeypots do not allow high level of

interaction between the emulated services and attackers. They are also not capable of

emulating enough services. For research based honeypots, the more the interaction the

better, to enable the gathering of attack intelligence. Therefore, low-interaction
honeypots do not provide much support for the purpose ofthis research.

However, medium-interaction honeypots are increasingly complex and so start to

possess a higher risk profile for compromise or discovery. The more realistic an

emulated service or operating system is given to the attacker, the more easier it may

become for an attacker to break the virtual environment and take control of the real

operating system. The higher functionality and complexity may make it easier for an

attacker to compromise it. These honeypots are more time consuming to install and

configure than low level honeypots. Deploying and maintaining medium-interaction
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honeypots are more complicated than low-level honeypots therefore require higher

level of security. However these honeypots can gather a higher amount ofinformation

than low-level and thus provides us with higher level ofintelligence.

Since the purpose of this honeypot was to gather information about the attackers

movements and their activities onto the network, a medium-level of interaction

honeypot was a viable solution. It provided the basic functionality required by the

researcher such as emulated services, extensive data collection and high performance
in compare to low-interaction honeypots. High interaction honeypots were not

feasible for the purpose of this research. As the researcher had to deploy a research

honeypot and high interaction honeypots are more suitable for production honeypots,

therefore medium-level interaction honeypots were more suitable for the purpose of
this research.

Table 6.1 summarises the above mentioned level ofinteractions (Adopted from
Spitzner, 2003, p77):

Level of
Interaction
Low
Medium
High

To Install
and
Confieure
Easy
Involved
Difficult

To deploy
and
Maintain
Easy
Involved
Difficult

Information
Gathering

Limited
Variable
Extensive

Level
of Risk

Performance

Low
Low
Medium Medium
High
MediumHigh

Table 6.1: Honeypot Level of Interaction

6,2,2 Commercial versus Homemade or freeware Solutions
A commercial honeypot is easier to install, configure, deploy and maintain. Most of

the commercial honeypots have a GUI interface, making it easier for the user to

understand the technology. Commercial honeypots also provide vendor based support

services to the end user. There is often a considerable amount ofdocumentation and

training available from the developer of commercial honeypots which assists the
installation, configuration and maintenance of the honeypot.
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Homemade honeypots arc developed by the users according to their need. It depends
on the resources and technology the user possess. Homemade honeypots can be used
for various purposes. They can be designed and developed according to the level of
interaction required. For example, if the user wants to detect the certain types of port
scans then he/she need nothing more than a simple program that emulates that
particular port or different ports and captures all the activity to that port.
Alternatively, homemade honeypots can be developed to emulate the whole operating
system, which may allow the attackers to attack the host using various tools and
tactics. This will provide a higher level of interaction and will help in gathering more
attack intelligence. Therefore, development of these types of honeypots purely
depends on the requirements and technical knowledge of the user (ibid, 2003).
Homemade or freeware honeypots are cheaper when compared to commercial
honeypots. Homemade honeypots may be customised according to the users'
requirements and thus provides better flexibility in use. Homemade honeypots can be
updated frequently while with commercial honeypots, the user has to wait for the
developer to provide with the update feature (ibid, 2003).
For the purpose of this research, developing a homemade honeypot from ground up
was not a viable solution as it would have taken lot of time and resources to develop.
As the honeypot suppose to be a research honeypot a commercial honeypot was also
not the best solution because of financial restriction to the researcher and the lack of
customisation. Therefore, a freeware honeypot was best suited to the task. Moreover,
an open source honeypot was more ideal for the research as it allowed the researcher
to configure the honeypot according to the need and requirement of the research.
Open source honeypot was more flexible to deploy as the researcher did not had to
depend on vendor for support and maintenance.

6.2.3 Operating/System Platform
The third criterion is selecting a platfonn for the honeypot. Several commercial
honeypots are based on Windows operating system which generally makes them
easier to install, configure and maintain when compared to command-line based
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operating systems such as UNIX. UNIX being an open source operating system,

allows the user to configure and modiry the files according to the requirements or the

honeypot. Windows is a ·commercial operating system so a limited level or

modification and customisation is possible.
Conclusion

Since the researcher decided to choose a freewarc and open source honcypot, so there

was little choice in detem1ining the platfom1. Open source programs arc mainly

available in UNIX platfom1, so the researcher decided to implement the honeypot on a
UNIX platfonn.

On reviewing the above options, Honeyd (Provos, 2002) was the only honeypot which

suited the requirements for this research. Honeyd, an open source honeypot, is a

medium level honeypot which is implemented on UNIX platfom1. Also according to
the Figure 2.13, p57, honeyd has medium level complexity and high perforrnance in

detecting and gathering attack intelligence.

6.3 Determining the number and location of Honeypots
It is essential to determine the location or the deployment or a honeypot on any

network. Most of the production honeypots arc placed behind the organisation's

security perimeter. Production honeypots arc mainly used for protection and

detection; therefore if any malicious attack has passed through the initial security

perimeter of the organisation such as firewall then it is necessary to detect such

attacks within the network before they do anything malicious within the network.

Such honeypots are placed where there is high degree of risks involved such as
internal network, DMZ. These honeypots are always behind the firewall perimeter

thus helps in determining if anything has passed the .firewall security (Spitzner, 2003).

Research honeypots arc used to gain infonnation on threats. If the researcher is

concerned with the internal threats then the honeypot may be deployed in the internal

network of the organisation. Research honeypots may also be deployed outside the
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firewall perimeter as well. This will ensure that honeypot is open to potential attacks.

But this possesses a great risk too. If the honcypot is compromised at this location

then it may be easier for the attacker to attack various systems using the organisation

as a launching platfonn to carry out the various attacks

This research was artificial in nature as it was conducted in a controlled laboratory
environment. The honcypot was implemented inside a controlled laboratory network

which did not have any connection lo any other network.

After detcm1ining the location and type of honeypot required, it was important to

know how many of those honeypots were required to implement in the network

architecture. The number of honcypots depends on the size of the network as well as

on the available resources. For large organisations with various networks, one or two
honeypots may not be sufficient for effective deployment.

The goals specified for the honeypots plays an important role in determining the

number of honeypols. For production honeypots, several honeypots may be required
to secure the environment. For research honeypots, one or two honeypots may be

deployed on different location ofthe network (Spitzner, 2002). Deploying numerous
research honeypots has limited value as it is more likely to gain same information

with only one or two honeypots, while having various production honeypots provides

with greater value. For example, if the honeypot has been deployed on the

organisation external network to detect attacks, it will not be able to detect any
internal attacks. Therefore, for full network attack detection purpose, the honeypots

should be deployed on various location ofthe network.

However, it should be noted that honcypots do not solve any security problem; they

only contribute to the overall security architecture. Therefore, enough honeypots
should be selected which could contribute to organisation security but should not

consume lot of extra resources which could have been used by other security

mechanism.

After deciding on the type of honcypot required for data gathering, the next step was

to identify the number ofhoneypots required and the location for deploying it. Since it
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was a closed laboratory experiment for research purpose therefore a single honeypot
was sufficient to gather attack information within a closed laboratory perimeter. The
figure 6.1 below illustrates the laboratory network structure with the honeypot and a

sniffer deployment for data gathering purpose:
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lnlml<l
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Notse<02

IIONEYl'OT G11p1t1.n11

0
N<lsoc4

Ncacc6

Nol.Soo I

Figure 6.1: Deployment of Honeypot in a Laboratory Network Structure

In the above network, there are 8 hosts (named Netsecl . . .8) which are connected to a
hub. A hub was used because it was possible to sniff the network traffic as all the
ports were on the same collision domain whereas on switch sniffing is not possible as

each port is on a different collision domain. The hub is connected to a bastion host

which connects to the Internet. The bastion host acts as a server for the network
connected to the hub and also acts as a firewall to protect the network from external

attacks. Host Netsec2 was used to deploy a Honeyd honeypot, Gupta.au, and NetsecB

was used to install a sniffer Snort to gather attack infonnation over the network.

Gupta.au consisted of RedHat Linux 7.3 running on a computer with following

configuration:
CPU

Memorv
Hard disk
OneratinP Svstem
Installed Softwares

Pentium 3, 450MHz
256Mb
6 GB
RedHat Linux 7 .3
HonevD 0.4, Sys\og-ne

Table 6.2: The Honeypot System Configuration
112

In the above configuration, only one interface card was used for the honeypot

implementation.

The Honeyd honeypot was configured with unused IP address to create a virtual
Honeynet network. The figure 6.2 below illustrates the virtual network structure
created within the Honeyd honeypot
Windows 2000
10.11.69.1

AIX 3.2
10.11.69.2

·= -=-

isco Routcr/Switc
10.1 1.68. 18

Solaris
10. 1 1 .69.J

FreeBSD
10. 1 1 .69.4

Novell Netware
10.1 1.68.10

·= -=-

Cisco 760 Series
10.11.68.19

Windows 98
10.11.68. 1 1

Figure 6.2: The Virtual Honeynet

Honeyd has a feature of creating virtual IP addresses and services. There were two

internal networks created (10.11 .68.0/24 and 10.1 1.69.0/24) both connected to each

other using Cisco routers. The table 6.3 below summarises the allocated IP addresses
and services on the Honeyd virtual network:
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I P ..\ddrl'SSl'S

10. 1 1 .69.1

Signat

Windows 2000 Professional, Build 2218

10. 1 1 .69.2

A1X 3.2

10. 1 1 .69.4

FrccBSD 3.2 - 4.0

10.1 1 .69.3

Http - port 80

Http - port 80

Solaris 2.3 - 2.4

Http - port 80

10.1 1.68.10

Novell Netware 3.12 or 386 TCP/IP

Http - port 80

10. 1 1 .68.18

Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 1 1 .2

Http - port 80

10.11.68.11

10.11.68.19

Defim!t

Windows 98

Http - port 80

Http - port 80

Cisco 760 Series (non !OS) or IBM Stackable Http - port RO

Hub

Windows 98

Http - port 80

Netbios - port 139

Table 6.3: Summary of IP addresses allocated on corporate network

The I 0.1 1 .69.0/24 network was running Windows 2000 Professional server

(10.11 .69.1 ), AlX 3.2 server (10. 1 1 .69.2), Solaris 2.3-2.4 server (10. 1 1 .69.4), Free
BSD 3.2 - 4.0 server (10.11 .69.4) and Windows 98 (as default) on rest of the

remaining hosts of the I 0. 11 .69.0/24 network. Hosts with IP address from I0.1 1 .69. l

- 10.1 1.69.4 were running only http (port 80) service with a default script (filename
web.sh). The http service was emulated on the network because it has been always an

attractive target for the hackers. Using the http port, hackers may be able to

compromise the web-servers which may eventually give them access to the operating

system and also if the http port is compromised then the attackers can defaced the

websites which may have a lot ofimpact on the organisation depending on the nature

of the organisation. All the other remaining hosts ofthe 10. 1 1 .69.0/24 network were

running Windows 98 as default with services open on port 80 (http) and port 139

(netbios). The reason Windows 98 was setup as a default operating system on the

network was to resemble the network as much as possible close to the architecture of

corporate network.

The 10.11 .68.0/24 network was connected to the I 0. 1 1 .69.0/24 network using Cisco
Router/Switch with IOS 1 1 .2 (IP address 10. 1 1 .68.18) which inturn is connected to

another Cisco 760 Series (non !OS) or IBM Stackable Hub (IP address 10.1 1.68.19).
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The 10. 1 1 .68.0/24 network was running Novell Netware 3.12 or 386 TCP/IP server
(IP address 10.11.68.10), Windows 98 (IP address 10.1 1 .68.11). Also Windows 98
was implemented as default on all the other remaining clients ofthe network.

This complete network structure was configured over the RedHat Linux 7.3 using
Honeyd 0.4. For configuration file (honeyd.conf) refer to Appendix C. I .

Data Collection was the main aspect o f a honeypot and to store the data collected
securely. Therefore, a separate machine was setup for sniffing and storing the data.
This machine consisted of a RedHat Linux 7.3 running with following configuration:
Pentium 3, 450MHz

CPU

256Mb

Memory

Hard disk

Operating System

Installed Softwares

6 GB

RedHat Linux 7.3

MySql, ACID, Apache, Webmin, Snort, Syslog-ng

Table 6.4: Data Collection Machine Specification

Snort IDS was used as a sniffer to collect information about all inbound and outbound

traffic over the network. Snort seemed to be a good and cheap solution for this

purpose as it is freely available over the internet. Snort also has the capability of

connecting to a MySql database. All the data collected by snort was transferred to the
MySql database. The data stored in the database was used by ACID (Analysis Control

of Intrusion Databases) for making a complete analysis by generating graphs and

charts using the data stored in the database using Snort.

115

Corporate
Network

Monitored
by

• •

SNORT
IDS

Logs

MySql
Database

ACID

Connected

to

r· · · · o:I;�· · · · ·1

I...................................iI
Storage

,................Y...............

Data
Analysis
,..................................

I

Figure 6.3: Architecture of Data Collection Machine
Another set of data was also logged using syslog-ng. This data was also stored
remotely on a different machine, so that in the event that the data collection machine

were to be compromised then there is another set of data available as a backup.

Webrnin was used for administering the honeypot remotely. As the researcher was

more interested in the tools and programs or scripts used by the attackers during the

network penetration exercise, therefore collecting the hardware information of the

attackers' machines was irrelevant for the purpose of this research.

6.4 Conclusion
A Honeypot is implemented based on the goals and level of interaction required for

the purpose of the research. This chapter described the various issues such as goals,

level of interaction, the operating platfonn which is necessary to consider before

implementing the honeypot.

Due to restrictions imposed by resourcing and the research model and addressing

these issues relating to honeypot design, it was determined that only single honeypot

would be deployed for the research. The design though singular fulfilled research

requirements and was able to accomplish with existing resources. The honeypot

design was constructed to allow complete and accurate collection of attack

intelligence that could be gathered from attackers' activities. While the use of

multiple honeypots would be an ideal situation it is beyond the scope and resources of
this thesis.
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7. First Test results on Honeyd 0.4a
7.1 Overview
During the initial testing phase, a group of students were asked to probe the designed

network (10. 1 1 .68.0/24 and 10.11 .69.0/24, Figure 6.2, pi I 0). These students were

asked to take their places in one single laboratory. This was mainly done because only

one laboratory was available. All the selected students brought their own laptops and

used their own choice ofprograms and tools for conducting the exercise. This testing

phase existed between the time window of 17-02-2003 [ 1 1 :0028] to 18-02-2003

[17:58:01]. There were various attacks attempted by students which generated a

substantial amount of data on the machines monitoring the network. The intrusion
data generated during this period was stored on a database which was used by ACID

(Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases) for the analysis purpose. There were also

various log files such as syslog - Jogs generated by Linux operating system for all the
activity associated with the machine was analysed manually, tcpdump log file which

is a raw dump of network traffic was analysed using ethereal, and temporary system

Jogs. A few of the attackers also provided feedback and reports which assisted in

analysing the data.

7.2 ACID Analysis
From the initial testing the Snort IDS logged and recorded 19451 alerts into an SQL

database. The format of the SQL database (see Appendix C.7 for sql database script)
confinns that there are 498 unique alerts which were divided into 1 1 different
categories.

Total Alerts
19451

Out ofwhich Unique Alerts
498

Divided into

1 1 Categories

Figure 7.1 Acid Analysis
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assification
Unclassified

Total Alerts
1032 (5%)

Signatures
285

Misc-activity

494 (3%)

3

Bad-unknown

5764 (30%)

2

Attempted-recon

8369 (43%)

79

Web-application activity

2957 (15%)

90

Web-application attack

748 (4%)

30

Misc-attack

7 (0%)

1

Attempted-dos

56 (0%)

5

Protocol-command-decode

16 (0%)

1

Attempted users

3 (0%)

1

Successful admin

5 (0%)

1

Table 7.1: 11 Alert categories

The above classified alerts mentioned in table are described in detail below:
Unclassified

There were 285 signatures recorded under this classification. These signatures were

different port scans on various hosts and servers of the network. To identify various
exploits and in an attempt to fingerprint the network, attackers would perfonn

portscans. This would have provided them with details of various open and closed

TCP and UDP ports e.g. 21-FTP, 22-SSH, 23-Telnet, 25-SMTP, 80-HTTP. This

activity would indicate that the attackers tried retrieving information about various

hosts and servers like what operating system they are operating on and what port
numbers are available for remote access to gain access into the network.

Misc-activity

There were only 3 signatures which were identified under misc-activity. These
signatures were:
•

Bad traffic udp port O traffic (Nessus). (CVE 1999-0675)

This is associated with Checkpoint Firewall-I vulnerability. CheckPoint
Firewall-I can be subjected to denial of service (DoS) via UDP packets that

are sent through VPN-1 to port O of a host. It seems that Nessus (a network

probing tool) tried to send large amount of udp traffic at port O to attempt a

denial of service attack. This attack would have disabled the CheckPoint
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Firewall· l (ifexist on the network) and all the incoming and outgoing network

traffic would have passed through without any check. Such attack could

facilitate full access to the network and could be extremely dangerous for the
entire network. It was identified that this attack originated from 2 source IP

addresses and was destined to 135 different hosts on the network. Out of the 2

source IP address, one ofthem was ofthe hacker (172.16.1.200) and the other

IP address was of a host (10.21.19.5) within the network. This could have

been as a result of traffic being redirected using the victim host to hide the
origin ofthe real attack.

This attack attempt indicates that the attacker tried causing a Denial ofService
attack on the CheckPoint firewall by sending large amount of UDP packets.

This could have disabled the firewall and all network traffic would have
entered into the network without any rule check specified by firewall.
• BAD TRAFFIC bad/rag bits

This is similar to the previously discussed signature. The attacker sends large

amount of UDP packets to flood the hosts or servers to attempt a denial of

service attack. This indicates that the attackers tried to disable the servers and

hosts from processing any network request and disrupt the normal services of

those hosts and servers.

• EXPERIMENTAL MISC AFS access (tlessus)

AFS is a distributed file system that enables sharing files across both local area

and wide area networks. There were miscellaneous attempts ofaccessing AFS
by attackers using Nessus. If such attempt is successful, then the attacker can

have full access to the filesystem of the hosts and can easily cause damage to

the system. It was identified that this attack originated from 2 sources and was

destined to 21 different hosts. The source IP addresses were the same as one of

them was of the attacker's (172.16.1 .200) and the other was of the victim

(10.21.19.5) on the network. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that host
10.21.19.5 was one of the compromised host which the attacker was using to

attempt his or her attacks.
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The above discussed attack indicates that the attacker tried gaining access of
the file system to have access on the system. He or she also used one ofthe

compromised hosts to achieve its goal. Ifthe attacker would have succeeded in

gaining the full access to the file system then it may have compromised the

whole honeynet and probably the system could be used as the launching pad

for att&cks on other networks.
Bad-unknown

There were 2 signatures which were identified under this category. They were:

• ICMP Redirect host

This comprised of 30% of the total number of alerts recorded over the
network. This may have occurred because all the network traffic was routed

through a gateway machine within the laboratory which further forwarded the

network traffic to their respective destinations. However it cannot be denied

that some of the attackers would have used this method as part of their

attacking tactics too. This type ofattack is capable of crashing or locking up a

host machine.

Since the total number of ICMP alerts was very high, it appears that the

attackers tried flooding few hosts with ICMP messages using ICMP redirect.

This could have caused the hosts over flooded with ICMP requests and
therefore those hosts may not be able to respond to other network requests.

But since the researcher was routing all the network traffic through a gateway
machine it was not possible for him to block or drop such ICMP requests on

the network.

• MISC Large UDP packets

Large UDP packets were used by the attackers to flood some of the hosts with
UDP request to attempt a DoS type of attack on the particular hosts and

servers. This could be mainly to bring down the various servers and hosts on
the network which eventually would have collapsed the whole network.
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Attempted-recon

There were 79 different signatures which were identified in this category. Some of the
most prominent were:
•

SCAN SOCKS Proxy attempt

SOCKS is an IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) approved standard

(RFC 1928) generic, proxy protocol for TCP/IP-based networking

applications. The SOCKS protocol provides a flexible framework for

developing secure communications by easily integrating other security

technologies. When an application client needs to connect to an application
server, the client connects to a SOCKS proxy server. The proxy server

connects to the application server on behalf of the client, and relays data

between the client and the application server. For the application server, the
proxy server is the client.

It was identified that there were SCAN SOCKS Proxy attempt on 183

destination hosts. It appears that some of the attackers tried to probe the
SOCKS proxy to connect to various servers available on the network.

•

SNMP Request UDP (CAN 2002-0012)

Vulnerabilities in a large number of SNMP (Simple Network Management

Protocol) implementations allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service
or gain privileges via SNMPvl trap handling.

From the collected data it is believed that there were large amount of SNMP

requests (8% of alerts) were broadcasted on various hosts with the intention of
flooding those hosts with SNMP Request. It was identified that about 156

hosts were subject to this attack by various attackers. This could have caused
DoS attack on those hosts and would have made them unavailable for other

requests.
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• ICMP Ping NMAP

It appears that Nmap (a network mapping tool) was used in sending ping

requests to the network to check whether a host is responsive or alive. This is

one of the basic starting strategies used before attempting any attacks on any

host or network.

• Large number of WEB-CGJ and WEB-MISC signatures. This illustrates that lot
of attempts were made on web based services and ports. This indicates that

web-based attacks were more common among attackers to exploit. Also the

network configuration too contained large number of hosts with only http port

80 active on them, so web-based attacks were expected by the research in high

number.

Web-application activity and Web-application attack

There were 90 and 30 unique signatures in both categories respectively. These
signatures were focused on either IIS Script access based attacks or CGI and MISC

web based attacks. On the basis ofthe data collected, it appears that web based attacks

were the most common fonn of attacks used by attackers. There were more than 120

signatures identified which were used for attacking web based services and port

numbers. Therefore, the researcher believes that the web based services are prone to

malicious attacks and hence have a high rate of scanning.
Misc-attack

There was only one signature identified under this category which was subject to
WEB-PHP directory.php access (CAN 2002-0434). It allows remote attackers to

execute arbitrary commands via shell meta characters in the dir parameter. It indicates

that the PHP based attacks were not so attractive for the attackers to probe. There was

hardly any type ofprobe or activity which tried to exploit any PHP vulnerability.
Attempted-dos

This category included 5 alert signatures each related to distributed denial of service

attack. These attacks were classified under CAN 2000-0138 for CVE. It states that "a
system has DDOS attack master, agent or zombie installed such as 1) TrinOO, 2) Tribe
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Flood Network (TFN), 3) TFN2K, 4) stacheldraft 5) mstream, and 6) shaft." This

attack was destined to I O different hosts. It indicates that the attackers were very keen

on implementing distributed denial of service attacks on the network as previously
there were other occasions too where attackers tried to carry out DoS attacks on

various hosts and servers. If these attacks were successful, they may have brought

down the whole network and would have made it inaccessible for any user.

Protocol command decode

This was a single MISC IPSEC PGPNet connection attempt to connect to IPSec. It

indicates that attacks associated with the PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) were not too

popular among the attackers or they probably lagged the skills of conducting such

attacks.

Attempted users

This was a single alert to access the WEB CGI webspeed. The webspeed
configuration program does not properly disable access to the WSMAdmin utility,
which allow remote attackers to gain privileges.

Successful admin

This was a single attempt of retrieving Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) GET
password. It uses the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and provides no security
features. It is often used by servers to boot diskless workstations, X-terminals, and

routers. This indicates that there was an attempt to gain administrative access to the
host or server by retrieving its password using TFTP GET command and thereafter

booting the tenninals to gain full access.
Conclusion

From the above discussion it is clear that attackers tried various types of attacks. Of

these attacks the most prominent were Web based attacks and probes. It seems that
the attackers were more inclined towards attempting web-based vulnerabilities. There
were also large numbers of port scans on various hosts. There was also evidence

which shows that the attackers tried to conduct some DDoS attacks on the network.

Some of the attackers tried flooding the hosts with large number of SNMP requests to

carry out the DoS attacks on the servers. From the analysed data, it appears that the
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attackers were more curious to attempt either DoS based attacks or exploit web based

vulnerabilities. Out or all the above discussed alerts, the most frequent 5 alerts were:
Signaturl'
ICMP redirect host

( "lassifo.•:tt ion

Bad-unknown

5743 (30%)

SNMP request udp

Attcmptcd-recon

1639 (8%)

SCAN Squid Proxy attempt

Attcmptcd-rccon

1412 (7%)

SCAN Proxy (8080) attempt

Attemptcd-recon

940 (5%)

WEB-IIS scripts access

Web-application activity

775 (4%)

Tot:11

'

Table 7.2: Most 5 frequent alerts

ICMP redirect host attack constituted about 30% of the total number of alerts (i.e
1945 1 . The other most frequently occurred alert was SNMP request udp (8%) which

is classified under attempted recon. Vulnerabilities in the SNMPvl request handling

of a large number of SNMP implementations allow remote attackers to cause a denial

of service or gain privileges via (I) GetRequcst, (2) GetNextRequest, and (3)
SetRequest messages. This indicates that the attackers tried flooding the hosts and

servers with SNMP requests which could made them unavailable to response to other
requests prompted by various other hosts and servers on the network. It also appears
that the attackers tried to gain access to the hosts and servers by sending SNMP

requests to various clients on the network. This would have given them full privileges,
if the request is accepted by the particular client, over that particular host or server.

On profiling the network traffic based on each individual protocol, following results

were conclusive:
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Traffic Profile by Protocol
TCP (50%)

Portscan Traffic (0%)

Figure 7.2: Traffic Profile by Protocol using ACID
As illustrated in figure 7. l that majority of the network traffic was targeted to TCP
(50%) and then ICMP (32%) and UDP (1 8%). There were also large numbers of port
scans on various hosts. These port numbers can be further detailed on the basis of the
occurrences of total alerts and unique alerts on them.
Porf T� pe

80 ltcp
161 /tcp
3128 ltcp
8080 ltcp
1080 ltcp
162 ltcp
1 ltcp
O ludp
22 ltco
ludo

7001 ludo
10080 ludp
10081 ludp
3 1 337 ludp
101 4 ltcp

0ct'U1Tl'lll'l'S

5421
2465
1412
943
519
517
345
295
256
112
93
81
73
68
67

Unique Alerts

195
4
1
3
1
3
3
5
10
1
1
1
1
1
7

Table 7.3: List of port numbers with occurrence of alerts
From the above table it appears that there were 3 ports which reported the maximum
number of unique alerts. Those were:
• 80 /tcp: It is an http port which reported the maximum number of alerts (5421 )
as well 195 unique alerts. These unique alerts were mainly attack attempt of
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exploiting WEB-MISC, WEB-CGI and WEB-US. These alerts occurred on 26
different hosts connected on the network.

• 22 ltcp: This is an SSH port used for secure and encrypted transmission of
data. This port reported the second most unique alerts i.e. 10. Those alerts

were mainly port scans and Nmap scans. These attack attempts were targeted

on 191 hosts on the network running port 22. It appears that the attacker tried

to exploit this port for gathering any infonnation travelling between the hosts.

• 1014 ltcp: This is a kernel port which is used to implement Ethernet. There

were 7 unique alerts reported on this port which were destined to 67 hosts on

the network. These alerts were mainly port scans.

7.3

Ethereal Analysis

A tcpdump log file tcpdump.log. /045547976 was generated during the first testing

phase, which was analysed using Ethereal Packet sniffer. Figure 7.2 shows the

Protocol Hierarchy statistic generated by Ethereal
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Figure 7.3: Protocol Hierarchy Statistic of tcpdump.log.1045547976
As shown in the above figure 7 .2, there were 8717 packets reported in the tcpdump
log file out of which nearly 45% were JCMP packets and 37.26 % TCP packets. On
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further analysing the log file, it was found that there were some frequent occurrences

ofpackets over some of the ports. Those results are listed below;

• Frequent occurrences of packets of TCP SYN from port 1060 to 8080
webcache

• Packets with ACK, FIN, PSH and URG flags to tcpmux
• ACK packets to port 22 of ssh
On co-relating the data using ACID on port 22 ofssh it was found that there were

total 256 alerts on this port out ofwhich there were 1 0 unique alerts which can be
further broken down as below:
4 Alerts
I Alert

:- Portscans

:- NMAP Fingerprint (stateful) detection

I Alert

:- Stealth Activity (FIN Scan)

I Alert

:- Stealth Activity (SYN FIN)

I Alert

:-SCAN nmap TCP. This indicates that a remote user has used

I Alert
I Alert

:- Stealth Activity (NULL Scan)

:- Stealth Activity (Vecna Scan)

NMAP port scanning tool to probe the server. An NMAP TCP
Ping was sent to detennine if the host is reachable.

• SYN packets at port 705 for DNM

There were total 62 alerts on port 705 from which there was only one unique
alert. It is an SNMP AgentXI tcp request attack (CVE: CAN-2002-0012)

• SYN packets at port 162 for Solaris. It is a binding port for Solaris systems.

There were total 104 alerts on this port from which only 1 unique alert. This
alert was SNMP TRAP tcp which is mainly used for causing DoS attacks.

(CVE: CAN-2002-001 3).
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• There were some error messages too.

Error: Could11 't parse message header: wrong type for that item

• There were some UDP packets at TFTP whose infonnation was unknown.
From the above collected data it appears that the attackers tried to make TCP

connections with various hosts through number of port numbers. There were attempt

ofaccessing the webcache which, if successful, would have given information about

the accessed websites or information about any other web based services to the

attackers. Using this infonnation the attacker may be able to attempt few brute force

attacks on the network. There were also few attempts on exploiting ssh service. It

appears that the attackers tried to capture the encrypted data transferred between the

hosts on the network.

There were also attempt o fexploiting the SNMP services. These were mainly to cause
denial of service attacks on various hosts.

7.4 Nessus Analysis
From the data files recovered from Nessus security tool (used by the attacker) various

outcomes were noticed. The Nessus Security Scanner was used to assess the security
of21 hosts

• 21 security hole� we.re found

• 0 security warning were found
• 79 security notes were found

From the scan of there 2 1 hosts it was identified that the most dangerous service on

the network was http (80/tcp).
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Figure 7.4: Most dangerous services on the network
Services that are most presented on the network:

There were 5 main services noticed on to the network based on the scans of2 1 hosts

by nessus. These services are graphically shown in the below figure on the basis of

their occurrences.
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Figure 7.5: Services that are the mo!ic present on the network
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On co-relating the above results with ACID following results were noticed:
general/udp -: Total number of alerts occurred on this p011 were 1 1 2 out of which

there was only one unique alert, which was Datum length > packet length This

means that the data length transferred with the packet was more than the capacity of
the packet. This could result in flooding the servers with the large amount of data to
cause DoS attacks.

http (80/tcp) -: This port reported a very high number of alerts i.e. 5421 from which

195 were unique alerts. These unique alerts were mainly WEB-CGI and WEB IIS

based probes on to the network.

Netbios-ssn (139/tcp) -: There were only 7 alerts reported on this port from which 4

were reportedly unique alerts. These alerts were merely portscans only.

ssh (22/tcp) -: SSH reported a reasonable number of alerts, which were only 256 out
of which only I O alerts were unique. These alerts comprised of various types of port
scans and Nmap scans.

general/tcp -: This port just reported few Nmap based scans.
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Most dangerous host on to the network:
Host dangerous host weight in the global insecurity

Others<9�:t>

Figure 7.6: Most dangerous host on to the network
The above pie chart shows that host I 0.11 .68.94 was being reported the most
dangerous host among the whole network.

There were also various hosts who reported a common security hole to the attacker.
These hosts IP addresses are listed in the table 7.4 below:
10.11.68.94

10.11.68.136

10.11.69.81

10.11.68.103

10.11.68.157

10.11.68.91

10.11.69.83

10.11.68.116

10.11.68.192

10.11.68.90

10.11.69.174

10.11.68.253
10.11.68.18

10.11.68.92

10.11.68.19

10.11.68.59

10.11.69.117

10.11.68.117

10.11.68.95

10.11.68.238

10.11.68.89

Table 7.4: List of Hosts with common security hole on Port 80

The above mentioned hosts reported one common security hole. The vulnerability
reported by Nessus to the attacker was reported for http port 80:
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The d/1 'l_vti_binl_vti_autldvwssr.d/1' seems to be present.
This dll contains a bug which allows anyone with authoring web permissions on this
system to alter thefiles of other users.
In addition to this, thisfile is subject to a buffer overflow which allows anyone to
execute arbitrary commands on the server and/or disable it
Solution : delete l_vti_binl vti autldvwssr.dll
Riskfactor : High
See also : http://www.wiretrip.net/rfplpldoc.asp?id=45&iface=J
CVE : CVE-2000-0260

7.5 Feedback from attackers
At the end of the network penetration exercise, participants were requested to

voluntarily provide their feedback about their experiences while probing the network.

Those feedbacks are summarised below:

HackerI : "A basic network with majority of the hosts based on windows operating

system. The network structure seemed confusing as the network traffic was redirected

using a gateway, so there was no direct access to the routers."

Hacker2 : "A big network with large number of hosts but majority of the hosts
(which I scanned) were Windows 98 based. Seems like the organisation is lacking

behind the operating system upgrades as latest windows operating systems are
available which are more secure and reliable than Windows 98. No access of FTP and
Telnet."

Hacker 3: "Basic network architecture with Windows 98 as the primary operating

system on various hosts. On the AIX server, port 25 was prone to SPAM. Could not
find much detail about various other services on other hosts as hardly any open ports
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Windows 98 hosts were only running http service while few other hosts had ssh and
netbios."

7.6 Implications
The initial network design was tested successfully by various attackers. There were

various types ofattack attempts tried by these attackers on the hosts and servers ofthe

network. Web-based attacks were very prominent than any other type of attack. There

was also evidence oflarge number of port scans carried out on various hosts. After the
successful completion of the penetration exercise few of the attackers voluntarily

provided the feedback about their personal experience while doing the exercise.

According to these attackers, the network architecture appeared too simple as it
lacked any server architecture and they also suggested few changes to improve the

network architecture.

On the basis of above test results there were various implications identified which

needed to be changed or improved in order to enhance the deception. These

implications were based on the analysis of the above results and also on the general
feedback received from the attackers. These implications were:

• From the feedback report received from the attackers, it was identified that
on host 10.1 1.69.2, AIX 3.2, port 25 was not blocked. It was advised in the

report that this could be serious security concern as port 25 is mainly used
for SPAM.

• The network architecture lacked the server based architecture as the
network was mainly based on Windows 2000 Professional and Windows
98.

• There was no proper access provided to any host or network device. The
network architecture lacked access to services like FTP or Telnet.

133

Changes suggested in the feedback of the attackers as well various issues

identified after analysing the test data would assist in improving the created
deception and would create a much better network architecture for the attackers

for the purpose of second testing. Since this research is empirical in nature, the

data collected after each phase ofthe testing will assist in improving the network

for next phase of testing and analysing data.

7.7 Conclusion
On the basis ofthe analysis ofthe data obtained during the first testing and also from

the feedback received from the attackers, it was concluded the initial network required
various changes.

The level of deception appeared to be very low which raised suspicion among the
attackers. It was a very low level interaction network which provided very few

opportunities to the attackers. Also there were no remote login services available on

the network, which are typically expected on any corporate network.

There were issues which needed to be addressed for implementing a successful and
improved deception for the attackers. On the basis of the feedback of attackers

received and also according to the analysis ofthe results, it was found that the Cisco

routers did not have any remotely based console access. Also it was required to

provide a server type network architecture to the network. Therefore, Windows 2000
operating system was replaced with Windows NT operating system. Remote access
services like FTP and Telnet needed to be implemented in order to present a improved

deception to the attackers on the network by offering them more support for attack.
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8. Second Test results on Honeyd 0.5
8.1 Overview from first test results
After the first testing phase, there were few security holes and alerts that potentially
were identified. Also on the basis of the general feedback received from the hackers

regarding the network architecture, it was found that it was a very low interaction

network which did not give many opportunities for interaction to attackers to interact
with. From the hackers' point of view, it was a secure network with limited level of
interaction. Therefore, the network configuration was improved based on the previous

data analysis. Following changes were made before the second test phase began:
•

Honeyd0.4a was upgraded to Honeyd-0.5. This was mainly done because the
latest version of honeyd had some extra features such as separate logging
facility and also is capable of using fingerprint signatures of Xprobe
fingerprinting tool.

• ArpdO. l was upgraded to Arpd0.2
•

Honeyd configuration file (Appendix C.2) was amended. Following changes
were made in the configuration file:
o Change in IP addresses from 1 O.x.x.x to 192.168.x.x. This was mainly
done because the existing 10.x.x.x network configuration was not
compatible with the new improved version of the Honeyd-0.5.
o Host with ..Windows 2000 Professional, Build 2128" was replaced by
"Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6". This was mainly done to provide
a server type of architecture to the network, which was previously
missing. Additionally, a per! script that emulated IIS server was
implemented on http port 80. There was also various ports left open on
this particular host, such as, tcp port 137, 139 and udp ports 137, 135.
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These ports are used by Net-bias on the servers for network
connections for input-output services.
o Over the "AIX 3.2" host, port 25 was blocked. This is a standard
practice by various organisations and ISPs to block port 25 as this is
used to send emails. This helps in cutting down the SPAM emails. This
too enhanced the network architecture which resembles to a corporate
network. Alsn port 21 for FTP was opened with a shell script (flp.sh,
see Appendix C.6) running on this port. This script provided the
anonymous log in on the ftp server with restricted access as 'guest'.
FTP is an attractive service for the attackers as using ftp would allow
them to upload their programs and tools from remote locations on to
the network.
o Both a Cisco router and a switch were provided with telnet
connections. On telnet port 23, a "router-telnet.pl" script (see
Appendix C.8) was implemented which provided a telnet access to the
router. This would provide a console based access to the router using
telnet for the attackers.
a "Novell Netware 3.12 or 386 TCP/IP" was replaced with the latest
signature of"Novell Netware 5.0 SP5".
The above mentioned changes provided more realistic appearance to the network and
assisted in eliminating any type of suspicion, regarding the presence of deception,
which could arise in the minds of attackers while probing and attacking the network.
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Windows NT4
192.168.2.101

AIX 3.2
192.168.2.102

·- -

Novell Netware 5.0
192.168,1.115

·= -==Cisco 760 Switch
192.168.1.101

Cisco Router/Switc
192.169.1.100

Solaris 2.3
192. 168.2.103

FreeBSD 3.2
192.168.2.104

Windows 98
192.168.1 . 1 16

Figure 8.1: Improved Honeynet Architecture

The table 8.1 below summarises the allocated IP addresses and services on the new
improved Honeyd virtual network:
JI' AddrrsSrs
192.168.2.101

. Signatures ...
Windows NT 4.0 Server SP5-SP6

192.168.2.102
I 92. 168.2.103
192.168.2.104
192.168. 1.100
192.168.1.101
192.168.1.115
192.168. 1 . 1 1 6
Default

AIX 3.2
Solaris 2.3 - 2.4
FreeBSD 3.2 - 4.0
Cisco IOS 1 1 .3 - 12.0(1 1 )
Cisco Router/Switch with 108 1 1 .2
Novell Netware 5.0 SPS
Windows 98
Windows 98

Ser{ices
TCP - port 80,
137, 139
port 135,
UDP
137
TCP -port 2 1 , 80
TCP - port 80
TCP - port 80
TCP - port 23
TCP - port 23
TCP -port 80
TCP - oort 80
TCP - port 80, 22,
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Table 8.1: Summary of IP addresses allocated on corporate network

The telnet service was only available on the Cisco routers (192.168. 1.100-101). This

was due to the fact that Cisco routers are accessible via console through telnet. This
may provide an opportunity for the attackers to exploit the telnet service to gain
access to the routers. The Default Windows 98 systems had port 22 open for ssh, to
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communicate between other hosts and servers in a secure manner. The reason
researcher decided to have port 22 open on the network was mainly due to the fact
that the attackers may try to sniff the encrypted data (such as passwords)
communicating between the various hosts and servers of the network.

8.2 Second Test Results
During the second testing phase, a group of students (see section 3.4) were asked to
probe the improved network designed (192.168.1.0/24 and 192.1 68.2.0/24, Figure
8.1) using the honcyd 0.5. Similar to previous testing, the attackers were asked to take
their places in one single laboratory and also they had their own laptops with their
own choice of programs and tools required for the penetration exercise. This testing
phase existed between the time window of 21-03-2003 (00:54:29] to 22-03-2003
[12:21 :55]. There were various mechanisms tried by students which generated a
substantial amount of data in the Jog files. The logs generated during this period were
also stored on a database which was used by ACID (Analysis Console for Intrusion
Databases) for the analysis purpose. There were also few tcpdump logs which were
analysed using Ethereal. The honeyd Jog files were analysed using Analyst, but the
charts generated by Analyst were too big to fit on paper therefore they have been
included on the provided CD.

ACID Analysis
From the initial testing the Snort IDS recorded 23500 alerts, out of which there were
554 unique alerts which were divided into 14 different categories.
Total Alerts
23500

out of which Unique Alerts
554
.

divided into

14 Categories

Figure 8.2 Acid Analysis

These 1 4 categories are given below:
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Signatures
266

Attempted-recon

Total Alerts
1486 (6%)
9466(40%)
5615 (24%)

Web-application activity

3914 (17%)

112

Web-application attack

2641 ( 1 1 %)

60

Misc-activity

125 (1%)

2

Misc-attack

14 (0%)

1

Attempted-dos

106 (0%)

6

Protocol-command-decode

23 (0%)

1

Attempted users

21 (0%)

2

Successful admin

44(0%)

1

Attemptcd-admin

20 (0%)

3

Unknown
Rpc-portmap-decode

5 (0%)

1

20 (0%)

4

Classifir:1tion
Unclassified
Bad-unknown

5
89

Table 8.2: 14 Alert Categories

The above classified alerts mentioned in table are described in detail below:
Unclassified

There were 266 signatures recorded under this classification. These signatures were
different port scans on various hosts and servers of the network. As described earlier

in the chapter 7, these scans can assist attackers in exploiting and probing the most

vulnerable ports and services which may provide them with access to the whole
network.

Bad-unknown

There were 5 signatures which were identified under this category. They were:

• !CMP Redirect host

This comprised of 36% of the total number of alerts recorded over the

network. This may have occurred because all the network traffic was routed

through a gateway machine within the laboratory which further forwarded the
network traffic to their respective destinations (explained in chapter 7).
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•

Attack Responses http dir listing
It is a type of snort alert which indicates that a web server is responding to the
probes with a reply. From the collected data, it is found that there were 6
source IP addresses which responded back to the single attacking IP
(1 72.16.255.253). Therefore, it seems that these hosts were responding back to
the attacker's machine about them being active on the network.

•

Attack Responses id check retur11ed root
It is also a type of snort alert which is triggered when someone use a root as it
check the payload for word "root" from any network and that packet has the
ACK flag set. There was just a single attempt of this attack from one source
address to one destination address.

•

MISC Tiny Fragments
There were few tiny fragments of packets transmitted from one source address
to 3 different destination addresses. This indicates that one of the attackers
tried to carry out a DoS attack by sending small fragments of packets to
different hosts. This could have made these hosts unavailable, if the attack was
successful, for any further network requests.

•

MISC Large UDP packets
Large UDP packets were used by the attackers to flood some of the hosts with
UDP request to attempt a DoS type of attack on the particular hosts and
servers. This could be mainly to bring down the various servers and hosts on
the network which eventually would have collapsed the whole network.

Attempted-recon

There were 89 different signatures which were identified in this category. Some of the
most prominent were (discussed in detail in chapter 7):

140

• SNMP request UDP (CAN 2002-0012)

As explained in chapter 7, a large number of SNMP implementations allow

remote attackers to cause denial of service or gain privileges via SNMPvl trap

handling.

It was identified that about 17 hosts were subject to this attack by one single

attacker. It appears that the attacker made an attempt of implementing a DoS

&ttack on those hosts which would have made them unavailable for other
network requests.

• Large number of WEB-CG! and WEB-MISC alerts.
•

SCAN Socks Proxy a/lempl

As described in chapter 7, SOCKS protocol provides a support for developing

secure communication using different security technologies. It acts like a

medium when a client tries to connect to any application server.

It was identified that there were SCAN SOCKS Proxy attempt on 17

destination hosts. It appears that the attackers tried to probe the SOCKS proxy

to connect to various servers available on the network.
Web-application activity and Web-application attacks

There were 1 12 and 60 unique signatures in both categories respectively. These

signatures were focused on either IIS Script access based attacks or CGI and MISC

web based attacks. On the basis of the data collected, it appears that web based attacks

were the most common form of attacks used by attackers. More than 180 signatures
were identified which were used or attacking or probing the web based services and
port numbers.

Misc-activity

There were only 2 signatures reported under this category:
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• Experimental MISC AFS access
There were miscellaneous attempts of acc essing AFS by attackers using
Nessus scanning tool. This type of attempt, if successful, can provide full
acc ess to the filesystem of the hosts and can cause any damage to the system.
According to ACID, this attack was carried on 1 7 different destination hosts
from one single attacking IP.

• BAD traffic tcp port O tr1iffic (CVE 1999-0675)
This attack attempt is associated with Checkpoint Firewall-1 . It is an attempt
to carry out a Denial ofService (DoS) attack on the firewall via UDP packets.

This attack attempt was implemented using Nesssus scanning tool. This attack

was just attempted on 2 destination addresses in compare to 135 hosts in
previous testing.

Misc-attack

There was a single Experimental Web-PHP directory.php access attempt (CAN 2002-

0434) under this category. It allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands
via shell meta characters in the dir parameter. This attack was destined to 13 different

hosts on the network. This is also a type of attack which Nessus tries to execute on the
systems connected to the network.

Attempted-dos

There were a total of 6 signatures reported under this category from which 5

signatures were identified as DDoS attack signatures (explained in chapter 7). It was

identified that this distributed denial of service attack was attempted on 1 8 different
hosts on the network by 2 different source addresses. The remaining 61h signature was:

• DOS Bay/Nortel Nautica Marlin (CVE: 2000-0221)
The Nautica Marlin Bridge allows remote attackers to cause a DoS via a zero
length UDP packet to the SNMP zero. A DoS attack is attempted by
transmitting UDP packets to the systems.
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Protocol command decode

There was a single Experimental MISC IPSec PGPNet connection attempt destined to

1 8 different hosts on the network. This attack is associated with Pretty Good Privacy

(PGP) program that provides electronic mails with Privacy by encrypting the contents

of the e-mails. From the above attack it appears that the attacker tried to connect to

the PGPNet to sniff the encrypted emails which may have provided him or her with
some infonnation. This is one of the probes which Nessus scanning tool explores
while scanning the network in order to exploit the PGPNet, ifit exist on the network.

Attempted users

There was 2 attack signatures reported under this category. They were:

• WEB-CGI webspeed access (CVE: 2000-0127)
The webspeed configuration program does not properly disable access to the

WSMAdmin (WebSpeed Messenger Administration tool) utility, which allow

remote attackers to gain privileges. It was identified that this attack attempt

was destined to 15 different hosts on the network.

• RSER VICES rsh bin
This event indicates that an attempt was made to login to an rshd server
(remote shell) using the bin account. This evr;nt occurred from 2 different
attacking IP addresses towards a single host IP 192.168.1. l

Successful admin

This category included only a single alert related to TFTP GET passwd. It uses UDP
which provides no security features (explained in chapter 7). It was reported from 2

source addresses to 17 other destination hosts on the network. It appears that the

attackers tried to retrieve the system passwords by connecting to TFTP using UDP

packets with GET command.
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Attempted admin
There were 3 alert signatures reported under this category. These were:
•

RSER VICES rsh root
This event indicates that an attempt was made to login to an rshd server
(remote shell) using the root account.

•

RSERVICES rlogin root
This event is similar to the previous event which i f successful, could indicate a
root compromise.

•

RSERVICESrsh froot
This event may provide root access to any AIX 3.2.x system. Since there was
one AIX 3.2 server in the network architecture, it appears that the attackers
tried to probe the AIX system to gain root access on it.

Unknown

There was only one unknown signature based on Xl 1 xopen. This event indicates that
an external user has attempted to launch an Xl 1 application on an internal X server.

RPC portmap-decode
There was 4 signatures reported each related to different type ofRPC requests, which
are:
• RPC portmap listing
This event indicates that a query was sent to the rpcbind/portmap daemon on a
solaris machine, requesting port infonnation for rpc·services.

•

RPC portmap request yppasswdd
The rpc.yppasswdd server is used to handle password changes request from
yppasswdd and modify the NIS (Network Information Service) password file.
A Buffer flow vulnerability exists in the rpc.yppasswdd utility. The problem
occurs due to insufficient bounds checking before copying remotely·supplied
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user infonnation into a static memory buffer. As a result, a malicious user may
be capable of exploiting this issue to ovenvrite sensitive locations in memory
and thus execute arbitrary code with super user privileges.

•

RPC portmap request rstatd

A query was sent to the portmap daemon, requesting port infonnation for the
rstatd service. The rstatd daemon can give detailed information about the host.

• RPC portmap request mountd

This event indicates that a query was sent to the portmap daemon, requesting
port inforn1ation for the rpc.mountd service. This query usually precedes

attempts to access mountd, access NFS, or to attack the rpc.mountd service

with protocol or buffer overflow conditions.
Conclusion

From the above discussions, it appears that the attackers tried various attacking

methods to attack the network. Similar to previous testing, there were high amount of

portscans as welI as lot web based attacks using CGI scripts and US access attempts.

There were also few occasions when remote login attempts were also noticed. There

was evidence which illustrates that the attackers tried gaining root access on some of
the hosts on the network. There was an event which indicated that a query was sent to

the rpcbind/portmap daemon on a solaris machine, requesting port information for rpc

services using RPC portmap listing. Most of the attacks were very similar to those

that were attempted in previous testing which indicates that the most of the attacks

were consistent on the network. Therefore, from the above discussion the most
frequent 5 alerts were:
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Port Type
80 ltcp
161 ltcp
ltco
162 ltcp
10080 ludp
177/udo
7001 ludo
10081 ludo
31337 ludp
22 /tco
1 /tco
69/tco
800/udp
3 128/tco
8080/tco

Occurrences
8633
2950
960
250
114
1 14
114
1 14
96
84
62
47
39
33
24

Uni<rue Alerts
255
5
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
26
4
2
1
1
1

Table 8.4: List of popular destination port numbers with occurrence of alerts

From the above table 8.4 it appears that there were 2 ports which reported the

maximum number of unique alerts. Those were:
•

80 /tcp: It is an http port which reported the maximum number of alerts (8633)

as well as 255 unique alerts. These unique alerts were mainly attack attempt of

exploiting WEB-MISC, WEB-CGI and WEB-IIS. These alerts occurred on 24

different hosts connected on the network from various attacking IP
•

22 /tcp: This is an SSH port used for secure and encrypted transmission of

data. This port reported the second most unique alerts i.e. 26. Those alerts

were mainly port scans and Nmap scans. These attack attempts were targeted
on 36 hosts on the network running port 22. It appears that thi attacker tried to
exploit this port for gathering any information travelling between the hosts.

8.3 Findings from log files
From the study of log files, it was identified that most of the attackers used Nessus
(http://www.nessus.org) as the network scanning tool to identify the vulnerabilities in

the network. On the findings of the vulnerabilities most of them tried to conduct brute
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force attack over the network. There were various probes for exploiting the

vulnerabilities in web based services and ports. Various CGI and perl scripts were

attempted in order to gain entry into web based services.

There were various attempts of exploiting vulnerabilities of SSH using Nessus and

Putty·Release·0.53b. PuTTY is a free SSH, Telnet and Rlogin client for 32·bit
Windows systems

8.4 Ethereal Analysis
There were two tcpdump log files generated during the second testing phase
(tcpdump.log.1048208266 [created on 21103/03} and tcpdump.log. 1048298249

{created on 22/03/03] ), which was analysed using Ethereal Packet sniffer. Below are

the Protocol Hierarchy statistics generated by the Ethereal:
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Figure 8.4: Protocol Hierarchy Statistics oftcpdump.log.1048208266

148

As shown in the above figure, there were 22146 packets reported in the tcpdump log

file tcpdump.log.1048208266 out of which nearly 37.78% were lCMP packets and

45.90 % TCP packets. Majority of the TCP packets were http packets i.e. 36.65% of
the total TCP packets. There was also evidence of Remote Shell and Rlogin protocol

packets. About 16.33% of total packets consist of UDP packets from which 1 3.84%

were SNMP packets. On further analysing the log file, it was found that there were
some frequent occurrences of packets over some of the ports. Those results are listed

below:

• There was an attempt of remote login as root from 172.16.253.253 (attacker's
or source IP address) to 192.168.1.1 (destination IP address)

• There was queries related to TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol) from IP

address 172.16.253.253 to 192.168.1.1. There was also a read request from

TFTP for file !etc/passwd.

• Frequent occurrences of packets of TCP FIN, PSH and URG from port 42778
of 172.16.253.253 to various ports of 192.168.1.1
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Figure 8.5: Protocol Hierarchy Statistics of tcpdump.log.1048298249
As shown in the above figure 8.4, there were 746 packets reported in the tcpdurnp log
file tcpdump.log.1048298249 out of which nearly 14.61 % were ICMP packets and

76.94% TCP packets. Majority of the TCP packets were http packets i.e. 69. 71 % of
the total TCP packets. There was also evidence ofRemote Shell and Rlogin protocol

packets in this log file too. About 8.45% of total packets consist of UDP packets. On

further analysing the log file, it was found that there were some frequent occum::nces

ofpackets over some of the ports. Those results are listed below:

• There was evidence of using program Portmap Version 2 with procedure
DUMP from source IP address 172.16.1.120 towards destination IP address

192.168. 1.1. These packets were sent from source port 624 towards

destination port sunrpc (port 1 1 1 ).

• There were few UDP packets from 172.16.0.1 source port nfsd towards
172.16.1.120 port 800 with large amount ofdata (around 4216 bytes).
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• There were also few packets of Yellow Pages Password (YPPASSWD) of
program version 32803 using Remote Procedure Call (RPC) version 2

• There was an attempt of remote login as root from 172.16.1.120 (attacker's or
source IP address) to 192.168.1 . 1 (destination IP address)

• There were queries related to TFTP (Trivial File Transfer Protocol) from IP

address 172.16.1. 120 to 192.168. 1.1. There was also a read request from TFTP
for file /etc/passwd.

From the above results it appears that the attackers repeatedly tried to remotely login

on to the network to gain root access on the host machines. There were multiple

attempts for gaining passwords from the network as the attackers tried using Yellow

pages password programs and also tried TFTP which is not connection oriented and
uses UDP packets for sending packets. The attackers tried connecting to the password

files on the host machines to retrieve them. It appeared that host 192.168. 1.1 was the
prime target for the attackers as there were multiple attacks noticed on this particular

host. There were also evidence of one ofthe attackers connecting to 192.168.1.1 host

on to the network but could not gain much access on it. This particular attacker tried

to exploit Network File System (NFS) of the host to connect to the host.

8.5 Analyst Notebook 6 graphs
The log files generated by honeyd were imported into the Analyst Notebook 6 to

generate the graph of relationship between various hosts on the network. The graph

displays various source hosts connecting t? destination hosts with linking them

according to their occurrences on the network. Since the generated graphs were large

in size therefore, they are included on the provided CD along with the chart viewer

program. See appendix E for chart file details
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8.6 Feedback from Attackers
Similar to the previous penetration exercise, participants were asked to voluntarily

provide their personal feedback about the network and their findings. Below are the
feedback received from some of the attackers:

Hacker] : ''Created a footprint of the network and located few prime targets using

traceroute and pings. It appeared to be a very big network with large number of hosts

and few servers. There were lot of MAC address request on the network. From the
results of traceroute, it appeared that host 192.168. 1 . 1 was connecting to the subnet.

Therefore, I targeted my attacks mainly on host 192.168. 1 . 1 as it appeared to be in
good position to be a router. It was also sharing some NFS paths on to the subnet.

After some deep probing on host 192.168. 1 . 1 , the situation became a bit confusing. It

appeared that there were 2 hosts on same IP address 192.168.1.1 which put me on a

backfoot while probing the network. I also discovered a Cisco router on the network
which was vulnerable to DOS attacks."

Hacker2 -: "Large number ofhosts with Windows 98 operating system which were

running SSH servers. It appeared that a vulnerable SSH versions were running on the
network. The entry point to the network was through the Cisco Router running on

192. 168.1.100. But when conducted few traceroutes on various other hosts, it

appeared to trace over 192.168.1.1. It appeared that 192. 1 68.1.1 was acting as a

gateway machine which was redirecting the network traffic to the subnets. Overall it
appeared to be a large network with limited vulnerabilities to exploit."

8.7 Implications
After the improvisation ofthe network, it presented various services to the attackers.

The data collected from the testing was ofmuch higher value than the previous testing
as evidences of some new types of attack attempts made by the attackers were

recovered. Most of the attack attempts were similar to what was attempted in the
previous testing. There were again a high number of attempts on web-based services

and ports such as http port 80. It appears that the http port 80 is one of the most
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prominent targets for the attackers. Also in the previous testing, Nessus reported that

http port 80 was the most dangerous service on the network therefore there was
slightly an increase of attack attempts on port 80 in the second tests. There were also

evidences of attempting remote login on the improved network which was hardly

attempted in the previous tests. The second tests were more focused on selected hosts

rather than the whole of network as was the case in the initial tests. During the second
tests, host 192.168.1.1 was one of the prime targets for the attackers as there was
various attack attempts noticed and alerted on this host.

Also during the second tests there were evidences of using third party programs such

as PuTTy and Portmap. PuTTy was mainly used in exploiting the SSH service at port

22 and Portrnap was used for mapping solaris system for requesting port information.
Use ofthird party programs was not noticed during the initial testing of the network.

Although the new network configuration provided a better network architecture and

higher level of deception as the attackers were successfully disguised with the

emulated services of fered on the network, so there was limited changes required in the

network for improving the level of deception. During the penetration exercise one of

the attacker (who did not provided any feedback) seemed to be growing suspicious

about one of the service offered on the network. It was noticed that hosts which were

operating on Windows 98 were running Microsoft IIS v.5, which is not possible.

Therefore it created some doubts among the attackers. Hence, the shell script which

was emulating IIS v.5 was needed to be changed to emulate IIS v.4 for more realistic
appearance of the hosts.

153

9. Third Test results on Honeyd 0.5
9.1

Overview from second test results

After the second testing phase, there were potential security holes and alerts that were
identified. On the basis of the general feedback received from the hackers regarding

the network architecture, it was found that the network defences were well in place

and did not provided much opportunity for an attacker to do over the network.

Therefore, it may not be wrong to assume that the created deception has been so far

successful in deceiving the attackers as they seemed to believe it to be a legitimate

organisational network. One important point noted by an attacker was that on
Windows 98 he found that Microsoft US v.5 was running which is not possible.

Therefore the only change made to the configuration file was changing the script for

Windows 98 operating system for Microsoft IIS v.4. (See Appendix C.4 for script)

9.2 Third Test Results
During the third testing phase, a group of students were asked to probe the improved

network designed (192.168.1.0/24 and 192.168.2.0/24) using the honeyd 0.5. This

testing phase existed during the time window from 26-05-2003 [14:09:16] to 27-05-

2003 [18: 14:50]. There were various mechanisms tried by students which generated a
substantial amount of data in the log files. The logs generated during this period were

also stored on a database which was used by ACID (Analysis Console for Intrusion
Databases) for the analysis purpose. There were also few tcpdump log files which

were analysed using Ethereal. Syslogs and temporary log files were analysed
manually while honeyd Jog fi 1 e was analysed using Analyst Notebook 6.
From the initial testing the Snort IDS recorded 19036 alerts, out of which there were

453 unique alerts which were divided into 12 different categories.
Total Alerts
19036

out of which Unique Alerts
453

divided into

Figure 9.1 Acid Analysis

12 Categories
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These 12 categories are given below:
Classifiration
Unclassified

Total Alrrts
342 (2%)

Signatures
211

Bad-unknown

1 1 737(62%)

4

Attempted-recon

4814 (25%)

81

Web-application activity

1299 (7%)

104

Web-application attack

664 (3%)

40

Misc-activity

151 (1%)

3

Misc-attack

1 (0%)

1

Attempted-dos

15 (0%)

5

Protocol-command-decode

3 (0%)

1

Successful admin

6(0%)

1

Attempted-user

1 (0%)

1

Rpc-portmap-decode

3 (0%)

1

Table 9.1: 12 Alert Categories

The above classified alerts mentioned in table are described in detail below:
Unclassified

There were 211 signatures recorded under this category. These signatures were
mainly port scans on various ports of different hosts on the network. As described

previously in chapter 7 and 8, attackers perfonn port scans to identify various exploits

and fingerprint the network.
Bad-unknown

There were 4 alert signatures reported under this category. These signatures were:
•

JCMP Redirect host

This comprised of 34% of the total number of alerts recorded over the
network. Since all the network traffic was routed through a gateway machine,
the total number of redirect alerts was high.
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•

TFTP Get

This event indicates that the attackers tried using TFTP to retrieve information

such as passwords using the GET command. Since TFTP uses UDP based

connections, it does not provide any security feature.

• MISC Large UDP packets

Large numbers of UDP packets were transmitted from one single host

(192.168.1 .28). This UDP traffic constituted about 28% of the total alerts

recorded on the network. Such attack was mainly attempted for a DoS attack

on that particular host. This may have resulted in the network traffic flow
delay or complete halt of the network traffic to this particular host.

• Attack Responses http dir listing

It is a type of snort alert which indicates that web server is responding to the

probes with a reply. From the collected data,

it

is found that there were 2

sources IP addresses which responded back to the 2 other destination IP
addresses.

Attempted·recon

This category consisted of 81 different signatures from which the most prominent
were:
•

SNMP request udp (CAN 2002-0012)

Vulnerabilities in large number of SNMP implementations allow remote

attackers to cause denial ofservice attacks or gain privileges via SNMPvl trap

handling. This attack attempt consisted of4% ofthe total number ofalerts and

was destined to 219 dif ferent hosts on the network. There were large numbers

of SNMP requests which were flooded on these hosts which could have

caused DoS attack on these hosts and would have made them unavailable for

other requests.
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• SCAN SOCKS Proxy attempt

As described in previous chapters 7 and 8, SOCKS provides support for
developing secure communications by integrating other security technologies.

It is a medium between the client and the application servers. It was identified

that there were SCAN SOCKS Proxy attempt on 129 different hosts from 3

different source

IP

addresses. It appears that the attackers tried to probe the

SOCKS proxy to connect to various servers available on the network.

• SCAN Squid Proxy attempt

Squid is full-featured Web proxy cache designed to run on UNIX systems.

About 6% of the total alerts were Squid proxy scans which were destined to
125 different hosts from 5 different source IP addresses. It indicates that the

attackers tried to gain access to the web cache in order to gain some valuable
information such as passwords stored in cache for gaining privileges over the

hosts.

• WEB-MISC and WEB-CGI alerts
A large number of alerts were reported based on web-based services and port
numbers.

Misc-activity

There were 3 signatures under this category:

• BAD TRAFFIC badfrag bits

The attacker tried to send large amount ofUDP packets to flood the hosts and
servers to attempt a denial of service attack. This indicates that the attackers

tried to flood the servers and hosts to disrupt the network services and make

them unavailable for any further network service requests.

• BAD Traffic udp port O traffic (CVE 1999-0675)
As mentioned in chapter 7 and 8, this alert is associated with Checkpoint

Firewall-I vulnerability. It is subjected to DoS types of attacks via UDP
packets. This vulnerability is exploited using Nessus by sending large number
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of UDP packets on the hosts. This alert originated from 3 different source
addresses and was destined to 68 different hosts on the network.

• EXPERIMENTAL MISC AFS access

As described in chapter 7 and 81 miscellaneous attempts of accessing AFS, a

distributed file system, was made using Nesssus. This would provide the
attacker full access to the file system of the host machine and can cause any

level of damage to the system. But in the 3rd testing it was not attempted
extensively on the network as it was just reported to one destination address

whereas in the first testing it was reported to 21 different hosts on the network.
Web-application activity and web application attacks

There were 104 and 40 unique signatures in both categories respectively. These
signatures were focused on either IIS Script access based attacks or CGI and MISC

web based attacks.
Attempted-dos

This category had 5 signatures associated with the attempt of DDoS attacks using
mstream, shaft or TrinOO. These attacks are classified under CAN 2000-0138 of CVE

which states that "a system has DDOS attack master, agent or zombie installed such

as I) TrinOO, 2) Tribe Flood Network (TFN), TFN2K, 4) stacheldraft 5) mstream and

6) shaft. If this attack was successful, it would have collapsed the whole network and

would have made it inaccessible for any user.
Protocol-command-decode

There was only one alert reported under this category which was Experimental MISC

IPSec PGPNet connection attempt.
Successful-admin

There was only one alert reported under this category which was TFTP GET passswd.

As described in chapter 7 and 8, it uses UDP connections to retrieve password files
from the servers or remotely boot the workstations.
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Misc-attack
There was only one alert reported under this category which was Experimental WEB

PHP directory.php access (CAN 2002-0434). It allows remote attackers to execute
arbitrary commands via shell meta characters in the dir parameter.

Attempted-user

There was only one alert reported under this category which was WEB-CGI webspeed
access. This attack does not disable the WebSpeed Messenger Administration

(WSMAdmin) utility properly thus allows remote attackers to gain privileges.
Conclusion

Similar to previous testings, there were high amount ofport scans as well as lot web

based attacks using CGI scripts and IIS access attempts. From the above table we can

see that there were 104 signatures under web-application-activity and 40 signatures

under web-application-attack. Most of the attacks were very similar to previous

attacks conducted in last 2 network penetration exercise. There was large number of

UDP packets flooded on host 192. 1 68.1.28. This was mainly conducted to carry a

DoS attack on the host and make it unavailable for other network requests. One
another important point to note from the above data is that 62% of the total alerts were

under Bad-unknown classification. This means that most of the attack attempts were
either ICMP redirect request of Misc large UDP packets to carry out denial ofservice

attacks. Therefore, out of the total alerts, the most frequent 5 alerts were:
Signature
ICMP redirect host

Classification

Bad-unknown

'

Total

6478 (34%)

MISC large UDP packets

Bad-unknown

5242 (28%)

Scan Proxy (8080) attempt

Attempted-recon

730 (4%)

Scan Squid Proxy Attempt
SNMP request udp

Attempted-recon

Attempted-recon

1061 (6%)

690 (4%)

Table 9.2: Most 5 frequent alerts
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ICMP redirect host attack constituted about 34% of the total number of alerts. This

type of attack is capable of crashing or locking up a host machine. The other most

frequently occurred alert was 'Misc Large UDP packets' which is also classified

under bad-unknown. This event indicates that an abnonnally large UDP packet was

sent to your server. This may indicate a denial of service attack or the use of a covert

channel. Since this event was caused by a UDP packet, the source IP address could be
easily forged. Also, it has been noted that the due to the nature of this event the

attacker does not nonnally require response traffic. In most cases this means that the
event should be analysed along with other supporting data before acting on the event.

The other three alerts were classified under attempted-recon. On comparing the

results of Table 12. l and 12.2, it can be noted that the majority of the network traffic

was classified under bad-unknown and attempted- recon.

On profiling the network traffic based on each individual protocol, following results

were conclusive:

Traffic Profile by Protoi;:ol
TCP (29%)

; ; -._ _.'

. , ,:

UDP (37%)

.

ICMP (34%)

Portscan Traffic (0%)
Figure 9.2: Traffic Profile by Protocol using ACID
As illustrated in the figure 9.1 that majority of the network traffic was targeted to

UDP (37%) and then ICMP (34%) and TCP (29%). There was also large number of

port scans reported on the network. These port numbers can be further detailed on the
basis of the occurrences of total alerts and unique alerts on them
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Port T) pc

80 ltco
161 ltcp
3128 ltcp
8080 ltco
1080 ltco
162 /tcp
705 ltco
O ludo
137 ludo
177 ludp
10080 ludo
10081 ludo
7001 ludo
22 ltcp
69 ludo

Ocr111Tl'IICCS

7777
1375
1062
731
463
407
169
139
81
18
17
16
16
14
13

lJnit111r Alerts
217
4
2
2
I

•

3

I
7
77
I
I
I
I
8
2

Table 9.3: List of popular destination port numbers with occurrence of alerts

From the above table 9.3 it appears that there were 3 ports which reported the

maximum number of unique alerts. Those were:

• 80 /tcp: It is an http port which reported the maximum number of alerts (7777)

as wcll 217 unique alerts. These unique alerts were mainly attack attempt of

exploiting WEB-MISC, WEB-CGI and WEB-IIS. These alerts occurred on 64
different hosts connected on the network.

• 137 ludp: This port number is associated with NetBIOS Name Service. There

were 77 unique alerts reported on this port which were mainly different port
scans. These attack attempts were targeted on 58 different hosts on the

network from 2 different attacking or source hosts. NetBIOS is mainly
associated with input and output services, therefore it appears that the

attackers tried to exploit such services using NetBIOS based vulnerabilities.

• 22 /tcp: This is an SSH port used for secure and encrypted transmission of
data. This port reported the second most unique alerts i.e. 10. Those alerts

were mainly port scans and Nmap scans. These attack attempts were targeted

on 191 hosts on the network running port 22. It appears that the attacker tried

to exploit this port for gathering any information travelling between the hosts.
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9.3 Findings from log files
From the study of log file,

it

was identified that most of the attackers used Nessus

(http://www.nessus.org) as the network scanning tool to identify the vulnerabilities in

the network. On the findings of the vulnerabilities most of them tried to conduct brute
force attacks over the network. There were various probes for exploiting the

vulnerabilities in web based services and ports. There were evidence in the log files

which shows that the attackers tried to connect few machines to gain access to C: \>
drive:

GET /scripts/ . . t255c . , /winnt/system32/cmd. exe?/c+dir+c : HTTP/1 . 0
GET /scripts/ . . t255c . . /winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c : +/s HTTP/1 . 0
http ://192 . 16 8 . l , 28/scripts/ . . t255c . . /winnt/system32/cmd. exe?/c+dir+c
: +/ s
bttp ://192 . 168 . 0 . 1/scripts/ . . %255c . . /winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c :
+I•
http : //192 . 168 . 1 . 2 8 /scripts/ . . %255c . . /winnt/system32/cmd. exe?/c+dir+c
: +/s
GET /scripts/ . . %255c . . /winnt/system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+ c : +/s HTTP/1 . 0
GET /scripts/ . . %255c . . /winnt/system32/cmd. exe?/c+dir+c :wwwroot+/s
HTTP/1 . 0
GET /scripts/ . . %255c . . /winnt/system32/cmd. exe?/c+dir+c : wwwroot+/s
HTTP/1 . 0

The above log file entry indicates that the attackers tried to access the file system of

IIS server by executing scripts through console based commands. This attack attempt,

if successful, could have resulted in providing full access to the web-server to the

attackers. This may have resulted in complete compromise of the web-server as the

attackers could halt or disable all the web-based services which may have had a big
impact on the complete network.

9.4 Ethereal Analysis
There were two tcpdump log files generated during the second testing phase

(tcpdump.log.1053944062 ond tcpdump.log.1054023963), which was analysed using
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Ethereal Packet sniffer. Below is the Protocol Hierarchy statistic generated by the
Ethereal:

�(g]�

© Ethereal: Protocol Hierarchy Statistics
1Pmtocol Hiera�hy S\alislics
jl Protocol

'

End Bytes!,
0;
0;

I % Packets! Packets! Bytes! End Packets
0
100.00% 14419 41435094
l'El Frame
0
100.00% 14419 41435094
El Ethernet
0
100.00% 14419 41435094
El Internet Protocol
4400 463069
4400
30.52%
Internet Control Message Protocol
1922
3656 267869
25.36%
El Transmission Control Protocol
1734
1734 148705
12.03%
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
0
6363 40704156
44.13%
El User Datagram Protocol
1014
7.03%
1014
72236
Simple
Network
Management
Protocol
!
5349
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Data

·I

Close

QI
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oi

72236
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I

.

Figure 9.3: Protocol Hierarchy Statistics of tcpdump.log.1053944062
As shown in the figure 9.2, there were 14419 packets reported in the tcpdump log file

tcpdump./og.1053944062 out of which nearly 30.52% were ICMP packets and 25.36

% TCP packets. Majority of the TCP packets were http packets i.e. 12.03% of the
total TCP packets. About 44.13% of total packets consist of UDP packets from which

37. 10% were Data packets. This suggests that there was huge amount of data flooded
over the network in terms of UDP packets. On further analysing the log file, it was

found that there were some frequent occurrences of packets over some of the ports.

Those results are listed below:

a A very large amount of UDP Data packets were transmitted on host
192.168.1.28 from source port number 3074 towards port 80 (http port).
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Figure 9.4: UDP Packet
This resulted in the complete delay of the network traffic flow on this particular host
which as a whole degraded the perfonnance of network traffic flow on the entire
network.
o As mentioned in earlier section 9.3, Ethereal captured the following packet
which shows that the attacker ran a script command to retrieve the
directory level information:
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Figure 9.5: Packet Captured showing script command used to retrieve
information
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As shown in the figure 9.5, there were 4082 packets reported in the tcpdurnp log file

tcpdump.log. 1054023963 out of which nearly 49.73% were ICMP packets and

35.96% TCP packets. Majority of the TCP packets were http packets i.e. 19.79% of
the total TCP packets. About 14.31 % of total packets consist o fUDP packets out of

which 12.47% packets were ofSimple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).

The above collected data confinns the findings of ACID as Ethereal was able to

capture the packets which clearly show the use ofUDP Flooder to attempt a Denial of
Service (DoS) type of attack. It also captured the packets which illustrate the use of

command based script using GET method for retrieving directory level information
on the hosts. There were also a reduced number of any other kinds of probes or

network scans as in compared to the previous two testings conducted by the
participants. There was also no evidence of attempting any remote login access to the

network as compared to the previous testing.
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9.5 Analyst Notebook 6 graphs
The log files generated by honeyd were imported into the Analyst Notebook 6 to

generate the graph of relationship between various hosts on the network. The graph
displays various source hosts connecting to destination hosts with linking them

according to their occurrences on the network. Since the generated graphs were large

in size therefore, they are included on the provided CD along with the chart viewer

program. See appendix E for chart file details.

9.6 Implications
After the improvisation of the network, it appears that the level of deception was
improved greatly as the level of attack attempts were reduced, especially the TCP
network traffic reduced to a considerable extent as compared to the first test results.

But one of the prominent attack attempt noticed during the final testing was the
attempt of flooding a host with UDP packets to cause DoS based attacks. Other than

UDP attack, web-based and ssh based attacks have been consistent on the network.

Therefore, it can be assume that the web-based attack attempts are more in use by

attackers to exploit vulnerabilities. This may be due to the reason that most of the

organisations these days are using web-based services for their day to day work

within the organisation.

The current network architecture was greatly improved since the previous 2 network

configurations. The only issue which needed attention for improvement was how to

tackle UDP based attacks which may be done by dropping the UDP packet requests

on the network. There was evidence in the results that one of the attackers tried to
carry out a Denial of Service attack by flooding the host with large amount of UDP

packets. Otherwise the network traffic behaviour was nonnal and no more major
improvements were required.

On the basis ofthe results obtained in the final testing, the research believes that the

level of deception has improved to the furthest extent as compared to the initial

network configuration. There was very little evidence found during the testing which
would have created any suspicion within the attackers while perfonning the
penetration exercise.
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10. Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of this research was to enhance the level of deception presented to
attackers in honeynet network architecture. Hardening of deceptive honeypots was

required to test its effectiveness in gathering attack intelligence using empirical
learning approach. The hacking exercise conducted in this research was carried out by

6 out of 10 selected students of School of Computer and Information Science, Edith
Cowan University, Western Australia. These students were selected using a Computer

Security Literacy Test, a questionnaire with 20 questions related to computer security.

The network penetration exercise was conducted at three different occasions. Data
collected from each exercise was initially first analysed and the network configuration

was improved before the start ofnext penetration exercise for data collection purpose.

After the completion of each exercise, the participants voluntarily provided their
feedback report detailing their understanding of the designed network. This process

helped in determining the improvement in the level of deception presented to the
attackers which obviously was unknown to them.

This research can be divided into 3 different phases: Initial set-up phase, data

collection phase and data analysing and summarising phase. There were various

challenges and problems encountered during each ofthese phases.

During the start-up phase of this research, the researcher possessed little knowledge

about the honeypots and honeynet. Extensive literature review was conducted to

understand the underlying concept ofdeception and honeypots in today's computer

security environment. This research was started just 2 months after the Honeyd was
first released in April 2002. There was very little supportive literature available during

that period. Therefore, the researcher had to make an attempt to personally

communicate with the Honeyd developer, Neil Provos, through emails. Supportive

literature, provided by Provos, assisted in understanding the concept of Honeyd and

also suggestions made by him helped in installing and maintaining the program which

was another tedious task. There were various challenges faced while installing and
configuring the honeypot using honeyd in the laboratory network. Various file

dependencies were encountered while installing the programs and setting up the
167

network. Once the installation of honeyd was complete, the implementation of the

program using the signature file of various operating systems and network devices

(described in detail in Chapters 2 & 5) was required. This NMAP signature file was
provided with more than 400 TCP/IP stack fingerprints. There was no valid proof to

support that these fingerprints would definitely work with honeyd in emulating the
fingerprinted systems. Therefore, Operating system fingerprinting testing was

conducted by the researcher by scanning each individual signature, configured in

Honeyd, with a network scanning program called Nmap. The results from this testing

were that 50% of the total signatures were only valid and successful in emulating the

operating systems and network devices. These valid signatures were used as the
benchmark for the research. lf the researcher had simply assumed that the signatures

provided with the honeyd to be 100% valid than there could have been various
instances in which the designed honcypol may not have proved to be a success. A lot

of time and effort was invested before the actual data collection phase started in

establishing and testing the honcypol. Aside from all these obstacles faced during the
initial phase of the research, it was a continuous learning experience. By the time data

collection stage started, the researcher was well equipped with the greater

understanding and knowledge about honeypots and their implementations than had

previously been the case.

Data collection was conducted in 3 different stages. Vast amount of data were

collected from each stage and was securely stored on a database and also backup

stored on a remote machine. The amount of data was enom10us therefore it was
compressed and stored remotely.

From the data collected from first network penetration exercise it was found that 50%

of the network traffic was TCP traffic while UDP and ICMP constituted 18% and

32% respectively. The majority ofattacks were targeted at TCP/IP based protocols for

example, on http port 80 or 8080 for web based attacks. There were lot of

miscellaneous web based attacks on the network out which the most prominent were
Proxy scan and WEB�IIS script access. These attacks were among the top 5 alerts

identified after the penetration exercise. Out of the 32% network traffic of JCMP,

30% of its traffic was based on ICMP redirect host attack. This was the topmost alert

among all the attacks. This type ofattack can be very dangerous as it is capable of
1 68

bringing down a host machine. Although from the general feedback received from the
participants it was suggested that it was a very basic network architecture which
lacked the services like FTP or telnet for providing any remote access to the network.
According to the participants, remote access for organisational networks is sometime
essential as sometime any member of the organisation may not be physically present
at organisation but need to access the data remotely. Also according to them the
network lacked any server type architecture. Therefore, taking their recommendations
into consideration network architecture was improved with the emulated Windows
NT server architecture and also by providing remote access to hosts using ftp and
telnet scripts to emulate the respective services. These scripts were provided with the
honeyd.
Once the network was improved after amending the configuration scripts and
upgrading the honeyd with the latest version, the second round of penetration was
conducted. It was found that TCP traffic over the network dropped by 5% to 45%.
This suggested that the honeypot was more hardened than previous setting and
configuration as it allowed less and only legitimate TCP/IP traffic. There was also a
minor reduction in UDP traffic too. But the ICMP traffic rose by 4% to 38%. The
second network penetration test was more intensive than the previous testing as it
provided lot of opportunity for the attackers to explore. The implementation of
emulated remote access services like ftp and telnet proved to be successful as there
was evidence of attempt of login remotely on to the network. This network
penetration testing provided with much more data than before to analyse. There were
evidence of use of various tools such as Putty- Release-0.53b (SSH client). Among the
top 5 alerts, other than ICMP redirect host and SNMP request udp, there was alert
which illustrate that there were attempts of launching web based attacks at the
emulated Cisco IOS Router configuration. From the general feedback received from
the participants it was believed that other than a few small security risks, the network
was quite well designed and properly secured as it did not provide much of
opportunity for the attackers to do. According to them, there were only those services
running on the network which arc common on any network. The file access
permissions were properly allocated as the attackers had only read access but did not
have any write access to the file systems. The use or a second router provided a better
security architecture to the subnet of the network as it allowed only the legitimate
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network traffic to the subnet. This router, in addition to its basic functionality of
routing the network traffic also did the job of a firewall by blocking malicious traffic.

However, from the researcher's point of view it provided large amount of;valuable

data to study and learn about various types of attacks. From the feedback reports there

was evidence that the attackers were confused within the network configuration. As
mentioned in one of the report, the attacker got confused with the network entry point

believing into that there were 2 hosts sharing the same IP address both located on

either side of the network gateway. Therefore, from all these evidences it may be

believed that the deceptive honeynet architecture was well appropriate and successful
in deceiving the attackers and was also successful in data collection and attack

intelligence gathering. Hence, to further verify these results the network configuration
was improved and a third and final network penetration exercise was conducted. From

the feedback of one of the attacker it was identified that hosts which were operating

on windows98 were running IISv5. This is not possible as IISv5 only works on

windows 2000, XP or NT platforms. Therefore the script which was emulating the
11Sv5 was modified to emulate IISv4 on Windows98. This was the only minor change

required in the honeypot configuration before the third and final network penetration
exercise began.

In the third network penetration test, the amount of TCP traffic was considerably
reduced. From the total network traffic, TCP only constituted 29% of the traffic,

dropped by 16%, while the UDP traffic increased by 20% to 37%. On analysing these

results it was found that this time the attackers tried to launch Denial of Service (DoS)

attack by using a Trojan called UDP Flooder to flood the host with large amount of

UDP packets. There was not much change in the ICMP traffic. There were also

attempts to connect to the emulated Microsoft IIS server using some GET script
commands. Such attempts illustrate that the attackers were forced to believe that they

were examining a legitimate network with legitimate real services. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the attempt to create network deception using Honeyd was

a successful attempt and was able to provide with lot of interesting facts and results

which assisted in improving the deception.

After the completion of data collection stage, all the data was securely stored on
backup devices like zip disks, eds, and was also stored remotely on a different server.
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This data was then analysed using various tools such as ACID, Ethereal and Analyst.

There were quite a few problems faced by the researcher during the analysis process

of the data. The amount ofdata collected by honeyd was large. It would not have been

possible to analysing that data without the use of software tools such as Analyst.

Although Analyst did find it difficult to import that data into its allocated memory in

order to visualise the log files. There were several occasions when the machine
running Analyst crashed while handling the log files. Therefore, the system memory

was upgraded before carrying out any further analysis using Analyst. ACID was a
very effective analysing utility. It categorised all the data according to their identity

and sources. ACID proved to be a big time saver to researcher while analysing the

data.

However, there were few limitations with this honeynet implementation. Due to the
restricted nature of this research, it was not possible for the researcher to place this

honeynet live onto the internet for the purpose of being getting probed or attacked.

This would have provided with more legitimate data about various attacking

techniques and tools. This may have also allowed the researcher to explore some new

fronts in the honeynet implementation, such as more about data control and data
capture, which may be unknown to the researcher. Therefore, this could be one ofthe

tasks which can be carried forward for further research in future.

The configured honeynet was a well implemented network which was able to show
various things which a honeypot is capable of doing. With the use of various

analysing tools such as ACID, Ethereal and Snort it was possible to visualise this
huge amount of data and control the systems. Configuring and implementing a

honeynet is a very time consuming and risky task. A small mistake while configuring

and implementing a honeynet may cause a serious concern over the network. All the

data need to be analysed carefully and proper backup mechanism should be in place.
Therefore, a honeynet should be configured with proper guidance and supervision.

However, the honeynet configured for this research can be considered as a successful
honeynet as it was possible to successfully deceive the attackers and collect the useful
attack intelligence.
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Appendix B
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE

Version 2, June 1991
Copyright

675

(C)

Mass

1989,

Ave,

1991

Free

Cambridge,

Software
MA

Foundation,
02139,

Inc.

USA

Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license

document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble

The licenses for most software are designed to take away your freedom to share and
change it. By contrast, the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your

freedom to share and change free software--to make sure the software is free for all its
users. This General Public License applies to most of the Free Software Foundation's

software and to any other program whose authors commit to using it. (Some other

Free Software Foundation software is covered by the GNU Library General Public
License instead.) You can apply it to your programs, too.

When we speak offree software, we are referring to freedom, not price. Our General

Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the freedom to distribute
copies of free software (and charge for this service if you wish), that you receive

source code or can get it ifyou want it, that you can change the software or use pieces

ofit in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things.

To protect your rights, we need to make restrictions that forbid anyone to deny you
these rights or to ask you to surrender the rights. These restrictions translate to certain

responsibilities for you if you distribute copies ofthe software, or ifyou modify it.

For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for a fee,
you must give the recipients all the rights that you have. You must make sure that

they, too, receive or can get the source code. And you must show them these tenns so

they know their rights.
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We protect your rights with two steps: (1) copyright the software, and (2) offer you
this license which gives you legal pennission to copy, distribute and/or modify the

software.

Also, for each author1s protection and ours, we want to make certain that e�ryone

understands that there is no warranty for this free software. If the software is modified

by someone else and passed on, we want its recipients to know that what they have is
not the original, so that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the

original authors• reputations.

Finally, any free program is threatened constantly by software patents. We wish to
avoid the danger that redistributors of a free program will individually obtain patent
licenses, in effect making the program proprietary. To prevent this, we have made it

clear that any patent must be licensed for everyone's free use or not licensed at all.

The precise tenns and conditions for copying, distribution and modification follow.

GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR

COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION

0. This License applies to any program or other work which contains a notice placed

by the copyright holder saying it may be distributed under the tenns of this General

Public License. The Program", below, refers to any such program or work, and a
11

work based on the Program11 means either the Program or any derivative work under

11

copyright law: that is to say, a work containing the Program or a portion of it, either

verbatim or with modifications and/or translated into another language. (Hereinafter,
translation is included without limitation in the tenn "modification".) Each licensee is

addressed as "you".

Activities other than copying, distribution and modification are not covered by this

License; they are outside its scope. The act of running the Program is not restricted,
and the output from the Program is covered only if its contents constitute a work

based on the Program (independent of having been made by running the Program).
Whether that is true depends on what the Program does.
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I. You may copy and distribute verbatim copies ofthe Program's source code as you

receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and appropriately publish

on each copy an appropriate copyright notice and disclaimer of warranty; keep intact
all the notices that refer to this License and to the absence of any warranty; and give

any other recipients ofthe Program a copy of this License along with the Program.

You may charge a fee for the physical act oftransfening a copy, and you may at your
option offer warranty protection in exchange for a fee.

2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion of it, thus

fanning a work based on the Program, and copy and distribute such modifications or

work under the terms of Section I above, provided that you also meet all of these
conditions:

a) You must cause the modified files to carry prominent notices stating that you
changed the files and the date ofany change.

b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, that in whole or in part

contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, to be licensed as a whole
at no charge to all third parties under the terms ofthis License.

c) If the modified program nonnally reads commands interactively when run, you

must cause it, when started running for such interactive use in the most ordinary way,

to print or display an announcement including an appropriate copyright notice and a

notice that there is no warranty (or else, saying that you provide a warranty) and that
users may redistribute the program under these conditions, and telling the user how to

view a copy of this License. (Exci:ption: if the Program itself is interactive but does

not nonnally print such an announcement, your work based on the Program is not

required to print an announcement.)

These requirements apply to the modified work as a whole. If identifiable sections of

that work are not derived from the Program, and can be reasonably considered

independent and separate works in themselves, then this License, and its tenns, do not
apply to those sections when you distribute them as separate works, But when you

distribute the same sections as part of a whole which is a work based on the Program,
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the distribution of the whole must be on the terms of this License, whose permissions
for other licensees extend to the entire whole, and thus to each and every part

regardless of who wrote it. Thus, it is not the intent of this section to claim rights or
contest your rights to work written entirely by you; rather, the intent is to exercise the

right to control the distribution of derivative or collective works based on the
Program.

In addition, mere aggregation of another work not based on the Program with the

Program (or with a work based on the Program) on a volume of a storage or
distribution medium does not bring the other work under the scope of this License.

3. You may copy and distribute the Program (or a work based on it, under Section 2)

in object code or executable form under the terms ofSections 1 and 2 above provided
that you also do one ofLhe following:

a) Accompany it with the complete corresponding machine-readable source code,

which must be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium

customarily used for software interchange; or,

b) Accompany it with a written offer, valid for at least three years, to give any third

party, for a charge no more than your cost of physically performing source
distribution, a complete machine-readable copy of the corresponding source code, to

be distributed under the terms of Sections 1 and 2 above on a medium customarily
used for software interchange; or,

c) Accompany it with the infonnation you received as to the offer to distribute

corresponding source code. (This alternative is allowed only for noncommercial

distribution and only if you received the program in object code or executable form
with such an offer, in accord with Subsection b above.)

The source code for a work means the preferred fonn of the work for making
modifications to it. For an executable work, complete source code means all the

source code for all modules it contains, plus any associated interface definition files,

plus the scripts used to control compilation and installation of the executable.

However, as a special exception, the source code distributed need not include
188

anything that is normally distributed (in either source or binary form) with the major

components (compiler, kernel, and so on) of the operating system on which the
executable runs, unless that component itselfaccompanies the executable.

Ifdistribution ofexecutable or object code is made by offering access to copy from a

designated place, then offering equivalent access to copy the source code from the
same place counts as distribution ofthe source code, even though third parties are not

compelled to copy the source along with the object code.

4. You may not copy, modify, sublicense, or distribute the Program except as

expressly provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to copy, modify,

sublicense or distribute the Program is void, and will automatically terminate your

rights under this License. However, parties who have received copies, or rights, from

you under this License will not have their licenses'terminated so long as such parties

remain in full compliance.

5. You are not required to accept this License, since you have not signed it. However,

nothing else grants you permission to modify or distribute the Program or its

derivative works. These actions are prohibited by law if you do not accept this

License. Therefore, by modifying or distributing the Program (or any work based on

the Program), you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so, and all its tenns

and conditions for co�ying, distributing or modifying the Program or works based on
it.

6. Each time you redistribute the Program (or any work based on the Program), the

recipient automatically receives a license from the original licensor to copy, distribute
or modify the Program subject to these terms and conditions. You may not impose
any further restrictions on the recipients' exercise ofthe rights granted herein. You are

not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties to this License.

7. l f, as a consequence ofa court judgment or allegation of patent infringement or for

any other reason (not limited to patent issues), conditions are imposed on you

(whether by court order, agreement or otherwise) that contradict the conditions ofthis
License, they do not excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot

distribute so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this License and any
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other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you may not distribute the Program

at all. For example, if a patent license would not pennit royally�free redistribution of

the Program by all those who receive copies directly or indirectly through you, then
the only way you could satisfy both it and this License would be to refrain entirely

from distribution ofthe Program.

If any portion of this section is held invalid or unenforceable tmder any particular

circumstance, the balance of the section is intended to apply and the section as a

whole is intended to apply in other circumstances.

It is not the purpose of this section to induce you to infringe any patents or other

property right claims or to contest validity ofany such claims; this section has the sole

purpose ofprotecting the integrity of the free software distribution system, which is
implemented by public license practices. Many people have made generous

contributions to the wide range of software distributed through that system in reliance
on consistent application of that system; it is up to the author/donor to decide if he or

she is willing to distribute software through any other system and a licensee cannot
impose that choice.

This section is intended to make thoroughly clear what 1s believed to be a
consequence ofthe rest of this License.

8. If the distribution and/or use of the Program is restricted in certain countries either

by patents or by copyrighted interfaces, the original copyright holder who places the
Program under this License may add an explicit geographical distribution limitation

excluding those countries, so that distribution is pennitted only in or among countries
not thus excluded. In such cr1se, this License incorporates the limitation as if written in
the body of this License.

9. The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of the

General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit
to the present version, but may differ in detail to address new problems or concerns.

Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program specifies a

version number of this License which applies to it and "any later version", you have
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the option of following the tenns and conditions either of that version or of any later
version published by the Free Software Foundation. Ifthe Program does not specify a
version numbe;- of this License, you may choose any version e:ver published by the
Free Software Foundation.

10. If you wish to incorporate parts of the Program into other free programs whose

distribution conditions are different, write to the author to ask for pennission. For
software which is copyrighted by the Free Software Foundation, write to the Free

Software Foundation; we sometimes make exceptions for this. Our decision will be
guided by the two goals of preserving the free status of all derivatives of our free
software and of promoting the sharing and reuse of software generally.
NO WARRANTY
1 1 . BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS

NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE
COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM
"AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE
ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE
PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE,
YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR
CORRECTION.
12. IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED
TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY
WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS
PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING
ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM
(INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING
RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD
PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY
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OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS

BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.

END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS

Appendix: How to Apply These Tenns to Your New Programs

If you develop a new program, and you want it to be ofthe greatest possible use to the

public, the best way to achieve this is to make it free software which everyone can

redistribute and change under these tenns.

To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest to attach them to the
start of each source file to most effectively convey the exclusion of warranty; and

each file should have at least the "copyright" line and a pointer to where the full

notice is found.

<one line to give the program's name and a briefidea ofwhat it does.> Copyright (C)
1 9yy <name of author>

This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms
of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation;
either version 2 ofthe License, or (at your option) any later version.

This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY

WARRANTY; without ev�n the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or

FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
for more details.

You should have received a copy ofthe GNU General Public License along with this

program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave,
Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.

Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.

If the program is interactive, make it output a short notice like this when it starts in an
interactive mode:
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Gnomovision version 69, Copyright (C) 19yy name of author Gnomovision comes

with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type 'show w'. This is free

software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions; type 'show

c' for details.

The hypothetical commands 'show w t and 'show et should show the appropriate parts
of the General Public License. Of course, the commands you use may be called
something other than 'show w' and 'show c1; they could even be mouse-clicks or

menu itemsN-whatever suits your program.

You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or your school, if

any, to sign a 11copyright disclaimer11 for the program, if necessary. Here is a sample;
alter the names:

Yoyodyne, Inc., hereby disclaims all copyright interest in the program 'Gnomovision1
(which makes passes at compilers) written by James Hacker.

<signature of Ty Coon>,
1 April 1989

Ty Coon, President ofVice

This General Public License does not pe1mit incorporating your program into

proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may consider it

more useful to pennit linking proprietary applications with the library. If this is what

you want to do, use the GNU Library General Public License instead ofthis License.
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Appendix C
Scripts
C.1

honeyd.conf(version Honeyd0.4a, used for 1'1 Test)

route
route
route
0.1
route

entry 10 . 11 . 6 8 . 18
1 0 . 1 1 . 68 . 18 link 10 . 1 1 , 6 8 . 0/24
10 . 11 . 68 . 18 add net 10 . 11 . 6 9 . 0/24 10 . 1 1 . 6 8 . 1 latency SSms loss
10 . 1 1 . 6 8 . 1 link 10 . 11 . 69 . 0/24

create mars
set mars personality "Windows 2000 Professional, Build 2128"
add mars tcp port 80 "sh scripts/web . sh"
set mars default tcp action reset
bind 10 . 1 1 . 6 9 . l mars
create mercury
set mercury personality "AIX 3 . 2 "
add mercury tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web . sh "
set mercury default tcp action reset
bind 10 . 11 . 69 . 2 mercury
create earth
set earth personality "Solaria 2 . 3 - 2 . 4 "
add earth tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web . sh"
set earth default tcp action reset
bind 1 0 . 1 1 . 6 9 . 3 earth
create venus
set venus personality "FreeBSD 3 . 2 - 4 . 0 "
add venus tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web . sh"
set venus default tcp action reset
bind 10 . 1 1 . 6 9 . 4 venus
create jupiter
set jupiter personality "Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 1 1 . 2 "
add jupiter tcp port 8 0 " s h scripts/web . ah "
set jupiter default tcp action reset
bind 1 0 . 1 1 . 6 8 . 18 jupiter
create sun
set sun personality "Cisco 760 Series {non IOS) or IBM Stackable Hub"
add sun tcp port BO "sh scripts/web . sh 11
set sun default tcp action reset
bind 10 . 1 1 . 6 8 . 19 sun
create pluto
set pluto personality '1 Novell NetWare 3 .12 or 386 TCP/IP"
add pluto tcp port 80 "sh scripts/web .sh"
set pluto default tcp action reset
bind 1 0 . 1 1 . 6 8 . 10 pluto
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·create moon
set moon personality "Windows 98"
add moon tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web . ah"
set moon default tcp act.ion reset
bind 10 . 1 1 . 68 .11 moon
create default
set default peraonali ty "Windows 98"
set default default tcp action reset
add default tcp port 8 0 "ah scripts/web. ah"
add default tcp port 22 "sh scripts/test.ah"
add default tcp port 139 open

C.2

honeyd.conf (version honeydOSa, used for 2nd and 3rd Tests)

## Honeyd configuration file ##
#######################################11#############################
#
############ ROUTING CONFIGURATION
###################################
########################################,t############################
#
route entry 192 . 16 8 . 1 . 100
route 192 , 168 . 1 . 100 link 192 . 168 . 1 . 0/24
route 192 . 168 . 1 . 100 add net 192 . 168 . 2 . 0/24 192 . 168 . 1 . l latency ssms
loss 0 . 1
route 192 . 168 . 1 . 1 link 192 . 16 8 . 2 . 0/24
#####################################################################
#
########### SYSTEM CONFIGURATION
#####################################
#####################################################################
#
### Windows computers
create windows
set windows personality "Windows NT 4 . 0 Server SPS-SP6"
set windows default tcp action reset
set windows default udp action reset
add windows tcp port 8 0 "perl scripts/iis-0 . 95/iisemul 8 . p l "
add windows tcp port 139 open
add windows tcp port 137 open
add windows udp port 137 open
add windows udp port 135 open
set windows uptime 3284460
bind 192 . 16 8 . 2 . 101 windows
### AIX computer
create aix
set aix personality "AIX 3 . 2 '1
set aix default tcp action reset
add aix tcp port 25 block
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add aix tcp port 80 sh scripts/web . sh"
add aix tcp port 21 "sh scripts/ftp.ah"
set aix uptime 3284460
bind 192 . 168 . 2 . 102 aix
11

### Solaria computers
create solaris
set solaris personality "Solaris 2 . 3 � 2 . 4 "
add solaria tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web . ah"
set solaria default tcp action reset
bind 192 . 16 8 . 2 . 103 solaria
### FreeBSD computers
create bsd
set bsd personality "FreeBSD 3 . 2-4 . O "
add bsd tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web . ah"
set bsd default tcp action reset
bind 192 . 168 . 2 . 104 bsd
### Cisco router
create router
set router personality ''Cisco IOS 1 1 . 3 - 12 . 0 { 1 1 ) "
set router default tcp action reset
set router default udp action reset
add router tcp port 23 "/usr/bin/perl scripts/router-telnet . pl "
set router uid 32767 gid 32767
set router uptime 1327650
bind 192 . 16 8 . 1 . 100 router
### Cisco hub
create hub
set hub personality "Cisco Router/Switch with IOS 1 1 . 2 "
set hub default tcp action reset
set hub default udp action reset
add hub tcp port 23 " /usr/bin/perl scripts/router-telne t . p l "
set hub uptime 1327650
bind 192 . 1 68 . 1 . 101 hub
### Novell Computers
create novel l
set novell personality "Novell Netware 5 . O SP5"
add novel! tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web . ah"
set novel! default tcp action reset
bind 192 . 16 8 . 1 . 115 novel!
### Windows 98 computers
create win98
set win98 personality "Windows 9 8 "
add win98 tcp port 8 0 "sh scripts/web98 . sh"
set win98 default tcp action reset
bind 192 . 16 8 . 1 . 1 16 win98
### Default computers
create default
set default personality "Windows 98"
set default default tcp action reset
add default tcp port 8 0 " ah scripte/web98 . eh"
add default tcp port 22 "sh acripts/test . sh"
add default tcp port 139 open
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C.3

web.sh

# ! /bin/sh
REQUEST= " "
while read name
do
LINE=�echo " $name" I egrep - i " [a - z : J ,,
if [ - z "$LINE"
then
break
fi
echo " $name" >> /tmp/log
NEWREQUEST= -echo " $name" I grep "GET . scripts . *cmd. exe. *dir. *
HTTP/ 1 . 0 " if [ ! - z "$NEWREQUEST" ] ; then
REQUEST=$NEWREQUEST
fi
done
if { - z "$REQUEST" l
then
cat << eof
HTTP/1 . 1 404 NOT FOUND
serve r : Microsoft-IIS/5 . 0
P3P: CP= ' ALL IND DSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo
OUR SAMO CNT COM INT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI '
Content - Location: http : / / cpmsftwbw27/defaul t . htm
Date: Thu, 04 Apr 2002 0 6 : 4 2 : 1 8 GMT

Content -Type : text/html
Accept - Ranges : bytes

<html><title>You are in Error</title>
<body>
<hl>You are in Error</hl>
O strang� and inconceivable thing! We did not really die, we were not
really buried, we were not really crucified and raised again, but our
imitation was but a figure, while our salvation is in reality. Christ
was actually crucified, and actually buried, and truly rose again;
and a l l these things have been vouchsafed to u s , that we, by
imitation communicating in His sufferings, might gain salvation in
reality. O surpassing loving-kindness! Christ received the nails in
His undefiled hands and feet, and endured anguish; while to me
without suffering or toil , by the fellowship of His pain He
vouchsafed salvation .
<P>
S t . Cyril of Jerusalem, On the Christian Sacraments .
o::/body>
</html>
eof
exit O
fi
DATE='date•
cat << _eof_
HTTP/1 . 0 200 OK
Date : $DATE
Serve r : Microsoft -IIS/ 5 . 0
Connection: close
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Content - Type: text/plain
Volume in drive C is Webserver
Volume Serial Number is 3 4 21-07FS
Directory of C : \inetpub
0 1 - 2 0 - 02
08-21-01
0 8 - 2 1 -0 1
0 8 - 2 1 -0 1
07- 0 9 - 0 0
0 7 - 03 - 00
07 - 1 6 -0 0
0 7 - 0 9 - 00
07- 16-00

-eof
C.4

3 :ssa
<DIR>
9 : 12a
<DIR>
1 1 : 2S a
<DIR>
AdminScripts
6 :43p
<DIR>
ftp root
.::DIR>
12 : 04 a
iissamples
2 : 0 9a
<DIR>
mailroot
3 : 4 9p
<:DIR>
Scripts
3: lOp
<DIR>
webpub
4 :43p
<:DIR>
wwwroot
0 file ( s )
0 bytes
20 dir{s)
290, 8 9 7 , 920 bytes free

web98.sh

# ! /bin/sh
REQUEST= " "
while read name
do
LINE='echo "$name" I egrep - i " [a-z : ]
if [ -z "$LINE" ]
then
break
fi
echo "$name" >> /tmp/log
NEWREQUEST='echo "$name" I grep "GET . scripts . *cmd . exe . *di r . *
HTTP/1. 0 ° '
if [ l - z " $NEWREQUEST J ; then
REQUEST=$NEWREQUEST
11

'

II

done

fi

then
if ( - z " $REQUEST" J
cat << eof_
HTTP/1 . 1 4 0 4 NOT FOUND
Server: Microso f t - IIS/4 . 0
P3P : CP= ' ALL IND OSP COR ADM CONo CUR CUSo IVAo IVDo PSA PSD TAI TELo
OUR SAMo CNT COM !NT NAV ONL PHY PRE PUR UNI '
Content-Location : http : //cpmsftwbw27/default . htm
Date : Thu, 04 Apr 2002 0 6 : 4 2 : 1 8 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Accept -Ranges: bytes
<:html><title> Error.::/title>
.::body>
The parameter i s incorrect .
.::/body>
</html>
eof
exit o
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fi
DATE=�date�
cat << eof
HTTP/1 . Q 200 OK

Date : $DATE
server: Microsoft-IIS/4 . 0
Connection: close
Content-Type : text/plain
Volume in drive C is Webserver
Volume Serial Number is 2A24 -150C
Directory of C : \inetpub
01-20-02

08-21-01
08-21-01

08-21-01

08-21-01

08-21-01
eof

C.5

1 : ooa
11 : lSa

<:DIR:,
<DIR>

wwwroot
iissamples
scripts
11 : 56a
webpub
.:::DIR>
11 : 56a
0 bytes
0 file (s)
3 11 , 6 7 1 , 296 bytes free
6 dir(s)

11 : ssa
11 : 56a

<:DIR>
<:DIR>
<:DIR:,

snort.conf

# - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ·· - - -

http: //www. snort. org
Snort 1 . 9 . 0 Ruleset
#
Contact : snort-sigs@lists. sourceforg � . net
#
#------------ -------------------------------------# NOTE :This ruleset only works for 1 . 9 . 0 and later
#-------------------------------------------------# $Id: snort . conf , v 1 , 11 0 2002/08/14 0 3 : 1 7 : 5 8 chrisgreen Exp $
#
###################################################
# This file contains a sample snort configuration .
# You can take the following steps to create your
# own custom configuration:
#
# 1) Set the network variables for your network
# 2) Configure preprocessors
# 3) Configure output plugins
# 4 ) Customize your rule set
#
###################################################
# Step #1 : Set the network variables :
#
# You must change the following variables to reflect
# your local network. The variable is currently
# setup for an RFC 1918 address space .
#
# You can specify i t explicitly as :
#
# var HOME_NET 10 . 1 . 1 . 0/24
#
# or use global variable $cinterfacename>_ADDRESS
# which will be always initialized to IP address and
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#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

netmask of the network interface which you �un
snort a t .
var HOME NET $eth0_ADDRESS
You can specify lists of IP addresses for HOME_NET
by separating the IPs with commas like this:
var HOME_NET [10 . l , l . 0/24 , 1 92 . 168 . 1 , 0/24]
MAKE SURE YOU DON' T PLACE ANY SPACES IN YOUR LIST!
or you can specify the variable to be any IP address
like this :

var HOME_NET any
# Set up the external network addresses as well .
# A good start may be "any"
var EXTERNAL NET any
# Configure your server lists , This allows snort to only look for
attacks
# to systnms that have a service up. Why look for HTTP attacks if
you are
# not running a web server? This allows quick filtering based on IP
addresses
# These configurations MUST follow the same configuration scheme as
defined
# above for $HOME_NET.
# List of DNS servers on your network
var DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of SMTP servers on your network
var SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of web servers on your network
var HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of sql servers on your network
var SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of telnet servers on your network
var TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# Configure your service ports. This allows snort to look for
a-ctacks
# destined to a specific application only on the ports that
application
# runs on. For example, if you run a web server on port 8081, set
your
# HTTP PORTS variable like this:
#
# var HTTP_PORTS 8081
#
# Port lists must either be continuous [eg 8 0 : 8080] , or a single port
(eg 80] .
# We will adding support for a real list of ports in the future .
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# Ports you run web servers on
var HTTP PORTS 8 0
# Ports you want to look for SHELLCODE on.
var SHELLCODE_PORTS ! 80
# Ports you do oracle attacks on
var ORACLE PORTS 1521
# other variables
#
# AIM servers . AOL has a habit of adding new AIM servers, so instead
of
# modifying the signatures when they do, we add them to this list of
# servers.
var AIM SERVERS
[64 . 12 . 24 . 0/24 , 64 . 12 . 2 5 . 0/24 , 64 . 12 . 2 6 . 14/24 , 64 . 12 . 2 8 . 0/24 , 64 . 12 . 29 . 0/
24 , 64 . 12 , 16 1 . 0/24 , 64 . 12 , 163 . 0/24 , 205 . lB B . S . 0/24 , 20 5 . 188 . 9 . 0/24)
# Path to your rules files (this can be a relative path)
var RULE_PATH /etc/snort
######################################,!############
# Step # 2 : Configure preprocessors
#
# General configuration for preprocessors is of
# the form
# preprocessor <name_of_processor> : �configuration_options>
# frag2 : IP defragmentation support
# ------------------------------# This preprocessor performs I P defragmentation. This plugin will
also detect
# people launching fragmentation attacks (usually DoS) against hosts.
No
# arguments loads the default configuration of the preprocessor,
which is a
# 60 second timeout and a 4MB fragment buffer.
# The following (comma delimited) options are available for frag2
sets the number of [seconds] than an
timeout [seconds)
#
unfinished
fragment will be kept around waiting for
#
completion,
if this time expires the fragment will be
#
flushed
memcap [bytes] � limit frag2 memory usage to [number) bytes
#
(defaul t : 4194304)
#
#
minimum ttl to accept
min_tt l [number)
#
#
ttl_limit [number)
difference of ttl to accept without
#
alerting
will cause false positves with router flap
#
#
# Frag2 uses Generator ID 113 and uses the following SIDS
# for that GID:
Event description
# SID
#
Oversized fragment (reassembled frag > 64k bytes)
1
#
Teardrop-type attack
2
#
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preprocessor frag2
# stream4 : stateful inspection/stream reassembly for Snort
#------------------------------------------------------------- ------# Use i n concert with the - z [all l est] command line switch to defeat
# stick/snot against TCP rules. Also performs full TCP stream
# reassembly, stateful inspection of TCP streams, etc . Can
statefully
# detect various portscan types, fingerprinting, ECN, etc .
# stateful inspection directive
# no arguments loads the defaults ( timeout 3 0 , memcap 8388608)
# options (options are comma delimited) :
detect scans
stream4 will detect stealth portscans and generate
#
alerts
when it sees them when this option is set
#
detect TCP state problems, this tends to
detect_state_problems
#
be very
noisy because there are a lot of crappy
#
ip stack
implementations out there
#
#
turn off the possibly noisy mitigation
disable evasion_alerts
#
of
overlapping sequences.
#
#
#
set a minium ttl that snort will accept
min ttl [number]
#
to
stream reassembly
#
#
differential of the initial ttl on a
ttl_limit [number]
#
session versus
the normal that someone may be playing
#
games .
Routing flap may cause lots of false
#
positives.
#
keepstats [machinel binary] - keep session statistics, add
#
"machine" to
get them in a flat format for machine
#
reading, add
"binary" to get them in a unified binary
#
output
format
#
noinspect - turn off stateful inspection only
#
oet the session timeout counter to [number]
timeout [number]
#
seconds,
default is 30 seconds
#
memcap [number) - limit stream4 memory usage to [number] bytes
#
if an event is detected on a stream this
log_ flushed_streams
#
option will
cause all packets that are stored in the
#
stream4
packet buffers to be flushed to disk. This
#
only
works when logging in pcap mode 1
#
#
# Stream4 uses Generator ID 111 and uses the following SIDS
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# for that GID:
Event description
# SID
#
1
Stealth activity
#
2
Evasive RST packet
#
3
Evasive TCP packet retransmission
#
4
TCP Window violation
#
5
Data on SYN packet
#
6
Stealth scan: full XMAS
#
7
stealth scan: SYN-ACK-PSH- URG
#
Stealth scan: FIN scan
#
Stealth scan: NULL scan
#
10
Stealth scan: NMAP XMAS scan
#
Stealth scan: Vecna scan
11
#
12
Stealth scan: NMAP fingerprint scan stateful detect
#
13
Stealth scan: SYN - FIN scan
#
14
TCP forward overlap
#

•'

preprocessor stream4 : detect_scans, disable evasion alerts
# tcp stream reassembly directive
# no arguments loads the default configuration
Only reassemble the client,
#
Only reassemble the default list of parts (See below) ,
#
Give alerts for "bad" streams
#
#

# Available options (comma delimited) :
#
clientonly - reassemble traffic for the client aide of a
connection only
#
serveronly - reassemble traffic for the server side of a
connection only
#
both - reassemble both sides of a session
noalerts - turn off alerts from the stream reassembly stage of
fl
stream4
#
ports [list] - use the space separated list of ports in [list] ,
"all"
will turn on reassembly for all ports, "default"
#
will turn
on reassembly for ports 2 1 , 2 3 , 2 5 , 5 3 , B O , 14 3,
#
110, 111
and 513
#
preprocessor stream4 reassemble
# http_decode : normalize HTTP requests

#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

http_ decode normalizes HTTP requests from remote
machines by converting any txx character
substitutions to their ASCII equivalent. This is
very useful for doing things like defeating hostile
attackers trying to stealth themselves from IDSs by
mixing these substitutions in with the reques t .
Specify the port numbers you want it to analyze as arguments.
Major code cleanups thanks ta rfp
unicode
iia alt unicode
double_encode
iis_flip_ slaah
full_whitespace

normalize unicode
tu encoding from iis
alert on possible douole encodings
normalize \ as I
treat \t as whitespace ( for apache
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#
# for that GID :
# SID
Event description
#
1
UNICODE attack
#
2
NULL byte attack
#

preprocessor http_decode: 80 unicode 11s_alt unicode double_encode
iis_flip_slash full_whitespace
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

rpc_decode : normalize RPC traffic
- -- - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - RPC may be sent in alternate encodings besides the usual
4 -byte encoding that is used by defaul t . This preprocessor
normalized RPC traffic in much the same way as the http_decode
preprocessor. This plugin takes the ports numbers that RPC
services are running on as arguments .
The RPC decode preprocessor uses generator ID 106 and does not
generate any SIDS at this time.

preprocessor rpc_decode : 111 32771
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

bo: Back Orifice detector
Detects Back Orifice traffic on the network. This preprocessor
uses th-e Back Orifice "encryption" algorithm to search for
traffic conforming to the Back Orifice protocol (not B02K) .
This preprocessor can take two arguments . The first is " -nobrute"
which turns off the plugin ' s brute forcing routine (brute forces
the key space of the protocol to find BO traffic) . The second
argument that can be passed to the routine is a number to use
as the default key when trying to decrypt the traffic. The
default value is 31337 (just like 80) . Be aware that turning on
the brute forcing option runs the risk of impacting the overall
performance of Snort, you 've been warned . . .
The Back Orifice detector uses Generator ID 105 and uses the
following SIDS for that GID:
SID
Event description
1

Back Orifice traffic detected

preprocessor bo : -nobrute
# telnet_decode : Telnet negotiation string normalizer
# - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - # This preprocessor "normalizes" telnet negotiation strings from
# telnet and ftp traffi c . It works in much the same way as the
# http_decode preprocessor, searching for traffic that breaks up
# the normal data stream of a protocol and replacing it with
# a normalized representation of that traffic so that the "content"
# pattern matching keyword can work without requiring modifications.
# This preprocessor requires no arguments.
# Portscan uses Generator ID 109 and does not generate any SID
currently.
preprocessor telnet_decode
# Portscan : detect a variety of portscans
# --------------------------------------# portscan preprocessor b y Patrick Mullen <p_mullen@linuxrc . net>
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# This preprocessor detects UDP packets or TCP SYN packets going to
# four different ports in less than three seconds . "Stealth" TCP
# packets are always detected, regardless of these settings.
# Portscan uses Generator ID 100 and uses the following SIDS for that
GID:
Event description
# SID
#
Portscan detect
1
#
Inter - scan info
2
#
Portscan End
3
#
# preprocessor portscan: $HOME_NET 4 3 portscan . log
# Use portscan-ignorehosts to ignore TCP SYN and UDP "scans" from
# specific networks or hosts to reduce false alerts. It is typical
# to see many false alerts from ONS servers so you may want to
# add your ONS servers here. You can all multiple hosts/networks
# in a whitespace-delimited list .
#
#preprocessor portscan-ignorehosts: 0 . 0 . 0 . 0
# arpspoof
#- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - # Experimental ARP detection code from Jeff Nathan, detects ARP
attacks,
# unicast ARP requests, and specific ARP mapping monitoring. To make
use
# of this preprocessor you must specify the IP and hardware address
of hosts on # the same layer 2 segment as you . Specify one host IP
MAC combo per line.
# Also takes a "-unicast" option to turn on unicast ARP request
detection .
# Arpspoof uses Generator ID 112 and uses the following SIDS for that
GID:
Event description
# SID
#
Unicast ARP request
1
#
Etherframe ARP mismatch (srcl
2
#
Etherframe ARP mismatch (dst)
3
#
ARP cache overwrite attack
4
#
#preprocessor arpspoof
#preprocessor arpspoof_detect_host : 192 . 16 8 . 4 0 . 1 f O : O f : O O : fO : O f : 00
# ASNl Decode
#----------------------------------------# This i s an experimental preprocessor. ASN . l decoder and analysis
plugin
# from Andrew R . Baker. This preprocessor will detect abuses of the
ASN . 1
# protocol that higher level protocols (like SSL, SNMP, x . 509, etc)
rely on.
# The ASN. 1 decoder uses Generator ID 115 and uses the following SIDS
for
# that GID:
Event description
# SID
#
Indefinite length
1
#
Invalid length
2
#
oversized item
3
#
ASN. 1 specification violation
4
#
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#

5

Dataum bad length

preprocessor asnl_decode
# Fnord
# - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - # This is an experimental preprocessor. Polymorphic shellcode
analyzer and
# detector by Dragos Ruiu. This preprocessor will watch traffic for
# polymorphic NOP-type sleds to defeat tools like ADMutate. The
Fnord detector
# uses Generator ID 114 and the following SIDS:
Event description
# SID
#
------------------1
#
NOP - sled detected
# preprocessor fnord
# Conversation
#-----------------------------------------# This preprocessor tracks conversations for tcp, udp and icmp
traffic. It
# is a prerequisite for running portscan2.
#
# allowed_ip_protcols 1 6 17
list of allowed ip protcols ( defaults to any
#
#
# timeout [num]
conversation timeout ( defaults to 60 )
#
#
#
# max_conversations [num)
number of conversations to support at once (defaults to 65335)
#
#
#
# a lert_odd_protocols
alert on protocols not listed in allowed_ip_protocols
#
preprocessor conversation: allowed_ip_protocols all, timeout 6 0 ,
max_conversations 32000
# Portscan2
#------------------------------------------# Portscan 2 1 detect portscans in a new and exciting way.
#
# Available options :
scanners_max [num]
#
targets_max [num]
#
target limit [num]
#
port limit [num]
#
timeout [num]
#
log [logdir]
#
preprocessor portscan2: scanners_max 3200, targets_max 5000,
target_limit 5 , port_limit 20, timeout 60
#
#
#
#
#

Experimental Perf stats
----------------------No docs . Highly subject to change.
preprocessor perfmonitor: console flow events time 10
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####################################################################
# Step # 3 : Configure output plugins
#
# Uncomment and configure the output plugins you decide to use.
# General configuration for output plugins is of the form:
#

# output <name_of_plugin>: <configuration_options>
#
#alert_syslog: log alerts to syslog
# ---------------------------------# Use one or more syslog facilities as arguments
#

output alert_syslog: LOG_AUTH LOG_ALERT

# log_tcpdump : log packets in binary tcpdump format
# ------------------------------------------------# The only argument is the output file name .
#

output log_tcpdump : tcpdump . l og

#
#
#
#

#

databas e : log to a variety of databases
-------------------- ------------------See the README . database file for more information about configuring
and using this plugin .

output database : alert, mysgl , user=snort password=03piggy03
dbname=snort host=localhost detail=full
# output database : alert, postgresql , user=snort dbname=snort
# output databas e : log, unixodbc, user=snort dbname=snort
# output databas e : log, mssql , dbname=snort user=snort password=test
#
#
#
#

#

xml : xml logging
---------------see the README .xml file for more information about configuring
and using this plugin.

# output xml : log, file=/var/log/snortxml
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

unified: Snort unified binary format alerting and logging
------------------------------------------------------------The unified output plugin provides two new formats for logging
and generating alerts from Snort, the "unified" format . The
unified format is a straight binary format for logging data
out of Snort that is designed to be fast and efficient. Used
with barnyard (the new alert/log processor) , most of the overhead
for logging and alerting to various slow storage mechanisms
such as databases or the network can now be avoided.

# Check out the spo_unified . h file for the data formats.
#

# Two arguments are supported.
filename
base filename to write to (current time_t is
#
appended)
maximum size of spool file in MB (defaul t : 128)
limit
#

#

# output alert unified: filename snort .alert, limit 128
# output log_ullified: filename snort . log, limit 128
# trap_snmp : SNMP alerting for snort
# -------------------------------------------------------------
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# Read the README . SNMP file for more information on enabling and
using this
# plug-in.
#
#
#The trap snmp plugin accepts the following notification options
# [c] , [p !in l s l ]
# where,
c : Generate compact notifications. (Saves on bandwidth by
#
not reporting MOs for which values are unknown, not
#
available or, not applicable) . By default this option is
#
reset.
p
Generate a print of the invariant part of the offending
#
packe t .
This can be used to track the packet across the Interne t .
#
By default this option is reset .
#
m
Use the MOS algorithm to generate the packet print.
#
By default this algorithm is used.
#
Use the SHAl algorithm to generate the packet print.
#
#
# The trap_snmp plugin requires several parameters
# The parameters depend on the Snmpversion that is used (specified)
# For the SNMPv2c case the parameters will be as follows
# alert, <sensorID>, [Notificat ionOptions]
{trapl inform} -v <SnmpVersion:. -p <portNumber> <hostName>
#
<community:,
#
# For SNMPv2c traps with MOS digest based packetPrint generation
#
# output trap_snmp : alert, 7 , cpm, trap -v 2c myTrapListener
myCommu11i ty
#
# For SNMPv2c informs with the ' compact ' notification option
#
#output trap_snmp: alert, 7 , c , inform -v 2c myTrapListener
myCommunity
#
#
# For SNMPvJ traps with
# security name = snortUser
# security level = authentication and privacy
# authentication parameters :
authentication protocol = SHA ,
#
authentication pass phrase = SnortAuthPassword
#
# privacy (encryption) parameters
privacy protocol = DES,
#
privacy pass phrase = SnortPrivPassword
#
#
#output trap_snmp: alert, 7 , trap -v 3 -u snortUser - 1 authPriv - a
SHA -A SnortAuthPassword -x DES - X SnortPrivPassword myTrapListener
#For SNMPv3 informs with authentication and encryption
#output trap_snmp: alert, 7 , inform -v 3 ·u snortUser - 1 authPriv -a
SHA -A SnortAuthPassword -x DES -X SnortPrivPassword myTrapListener

'

#
#
#
#
#
#

You can optionally define new rule types and associate one or
more output plugins specifically to that type .
This example will create a type that will log to just tcpdump .
ruletype suspicious
{
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••
••

type log
output log_tcpdump: suspicious . log

# EXAMPLE RULE fOR SUSPICIOUS RULETYPE:
# suspicious $HOME_NET any · > $HOME_NET 6667 (msg : " Internal IRC
Server" ; )

•

# This example will create a rule type that will log to syslog
# and a mysql database.
# ruletype redalert
. {
#
type alert
#
output alert_syslog: LOG_AUTH LOG_ALERT
#
output database : log, mysql, user=snort dbname=snort
host=localhost

•• I

# EXAMPLE RULE POR REDALERT RULETYPE
# redalert $HOME_NET any · > $EXTERNAL_NET 31337 (msg: "Someone is
being LEET " ; \
flags : A+ ; l
#

•
•
•
•

# Include classification & priority settings
include classification. config

# Include reference systems

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
include reference.config

•
•
•

# Step #4 : Customize your rule set

# Up to date snort rules are available at http://www .snor t . org

II The snort web site has documentation about i,ow to write your own
# custom snort rules .
# The rules included with this distribution generate alerts based on
# on suspicious activity. Depending on your network environment , your
# security policies, and what you consider to be suspicious, some of
II these rules may either generate false positives ore may be
detecting
fl activity you consider to be acceptable; therefore, you are
II encouraged to comment out rules that are not applicable in your
# environment .

•
••
•

# Note that using all of the rules at the same time may lead to
serious packet loss on slower machines. YMMV, use with caution,
standard disclaimers apply. : }
# The following individuals contributed many of rules in this
# distribution .
#
fl Credits :
II
Ron Gula <rgula@securitywizards . com> of Network Security Wizards
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#
#
#
#

Max Vision <Vision@whitehat s . com>
Martin Markgraf <martin@mail . du .gtn. com>
Fyodor Yarochkin <fygrave@tigerteam .net>
Nick Rogness <nick@rapidnet . com>
Jim Forster <jforster@rapidnet . com>
Scott Mcintyre <scott@who i . edu>
Tom Vandepoel <Tom. Vandepoel@ubizen. com>
Brian Caswell <bmc@snort . org>
Zeno <admin@cgisecurity. com>
Ryan Russell < ryan@securityfocus . com>

#
#
#
#
#
#
#·········································
# Include all relevant rulesets here
#
# shellcode, policy, info, backdoor, and virus rulesets are
# disabled by default . These require tuning and maintance .
# Please read the included specific file for more information.
#·········································
include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/bad-traffic . rules
$RULE_PATH/exploit . rules
$RULE_PATH/scan. rules
$RULE_PATH/finger. rules
$RULE_PATH/ftp.rules
$RULE_PATH/telnet . rules
$RULE_PATH/rpc. rules
$RULE__PATH/rservices . rules
$RULE_PATH/dos. rules
$RULE_PATH/ddos . rules
$RULE_PATH/dns . rules
$RULE_PATP./tftp. rules

include
include
include
include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/web - cgi . rules
$RULE_PATH/web-coldfusion . rules
$RULE_PATH/web - i i s . rules
$RULE_PATH/web-frontpage. rules
$RULE_PATH/web-misc. rules
$RULE_PATH/web - client. rules
$RULE_PATH/web -php. rules

include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/sql. rules
$RULE_PATH/x11. rules
$RULE_PATH/icmp . rules
$RULE_PATH/netbios . rules
$RULE_PATH/misc. rules
$RULE_PATH/attack -responses. rules
$RULE_PATH/oracl e . rules
$RULE PATH/mysql . rules
$RULE-PATH/snmp . rules

include $RULE_PATH/smtp . rules
include $RULE_PATH/imap . rules
include $RULE_PATH/pop3 . rules
include $RULE_PATH/nntp. rules
include $RULE_PATH/other - ids . rules
# include $RULE PATH/web-attacks . rules
# include $RULE=PATH/backdoor. rules
# include $RULE_PATH/shellcode . rules
# include $RULE PATH/policy. rules
# include $RULE-PATH/porn . rules
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# include $RULE_PATH/info.rules
# include $RULE_PATH/icmp-info . rules
# include $RULE_PATH/virus .rules
# include $RULE_PATH/chat . rules
# include $RULE_PATH/multimedi a . rules
# include $RULE_PATH/p2p. rules
include $RULE_PATH/experimental . rules
include $RULE_PATH/local . rules

C.6

ftp.sh

# ! /bin/sh
#
# FTP (WU- FTPD) Honeypot-Script intended for use with
# Honeyd from Niels Proves
# - > http : //www . ci t i . umich. edu/u/provos/honeyd/
#
# Author: Maik Ellinger
# Last modified: 13/06/2002
# Version: o . o . e
#
# Changelog :
# 0 . 0 . 6 ; some ftp comamnds implemented (MKD)
#
# 0 . 0 . 4 ; some ftp comamnds implemented (CWD)
#
# 0 . 0 . 3 : some bugfixes/new commands implemented
#
# 0 . 0 . 1 : initial release
#
#set - x -v
DATE= ' date'
host='hostname'
domain='dnsdomainname'
log=/tmp/honeyd/ftp-$1. log
AUTH= "no"
PASS="no"
echo " $DATE : FTP started from $1 Port $2" >> $log
echo -e "220 $host . $domain FTP server (Version wu - 2 . 6 . 0 (5) $DATE)
ready . \r"
while read incmd parml parm2 parm3 parm4 parmS
do

# remove control-characters
incmd='echo $incmd I sed s/ [ [ : cntrl : ] ] //g'
parml= 'echo $parml I sed s/ [ [ :cntrl : ] ] //g'
parm2= ' echo $parm2 I sed s/ [ [ :cntrl : ] l //g'
parm3 ='echo $parm3 I sed a/ [ [ : cntrl : ] ] //g'
parm4 ='echo $parm4 I sed s/ [ [ : cntrl : J J //g'
parmS='echo $parm5 j sed a/ [ [ : cntrl : ] J //g'
# convert to upper-case
incmd_nocase='echo $incmd
#echo $ incrnd_nocase

I gawk ' {print toupper($0) ; } ' '

if [ "$AUTH" == "no"
then
if [ "$incmd_nocase" ! = "USER" ]
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fi

fi

then
if [ "$incmd_nocase" ! = "QUIT" l
then
echo - e "530 Please login with USER and PASS . \ r "
continue
fi

case $incmd_nocase in
QUIT* l
echo -e "221 Goodbye. \r"
exit O ; ;
SYST* )
echo -e "215 UNIX Type : LB\r"
;;

HELP* )
echo -e "214 ·The following commands are recognized ( •
=> ' S unimplemented) . \r"
echo - e
USER
PORT
STOR
MSAM*
RNTO
NLST
MKD
CDUP\r"
PASV
APPE
echo - e
PASS
MRSQ*
ABOR
SITE
XCUP\r"
XMKD
echo -e "
ACCT*
TYPE
MLFL*
DELE
MRCP*
SYST
RMD
STOU\r "
SMNT*
STRU
ALLO
CWD
STAT
echo -e "
MAIL*
SIZE\r"
XRMD
REIN*
echo - e "
MODE
REST
MSND*
XCWD
HELP
MDTM\r"
PWD
QUIT
RETR
echo - e "
MSOM*
RNFR
LIST
NOOP
XPWD\r"
echo -e "214 Direct comments to ftp@$domain . \r"
I;

USER* )
parml_nocase='echo $parml I gawk • {print toupper ( $ 0 ) 1 } ' '
if [ "$parml_nocase" == "ANONYMOUS" ]
then
echo - e "331 Guest login ok, send your complete e-mail
address as a password. \r"
AUTH="ANONYMOUS"
else
echo -e "331 Password required for $parml\r"
AUTH=$parml
fi

11
PASS*

PASS=$parml
if [ "$AUTH" == "ANONYMOUS"
then
echo -e "230 -Hello User at $ 1 , \r"
echo -e "230 -we have 911 users (max 1800) logged in
in your class at the moment. \r"
echo -e "230-Local time is : $DATE\r"
echo -e "230-All transfers are logged. If you don ' t
like this, disconnect now. \ r "
cc�n -e ''230-\r"
echo -e "230-tar-on-the-fly and gzip-on-the-fly are
implemented; to get a whole\r"
echo - e "230-directory \"foe\ " , \ "get foo. tar\" or
\ "get foo. tar. gz\" may be used. \r"
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echo -e "230-Please use gzip-on-the-fly only if you
need i t ; most files already\r "
echo -e "230 -are compressed, and I will kill your
processes i f you waste my\r"
echo -e "230-ressources . \r "
echo - e "230-\r"
echo -e "230 -The command \"site exec locate pattern\"
will create a list of all\r"
echo -e "230-path names containing \ "pattern\ " . \r"
echo -e "230-\r''
echo -e "230 Guest login ok, access restrictions
apply . \r"
else
echo -e "530 Login incorrect .\r"
fi
;;
MKD•

# choose
echo - e "257 \" $parml \ " new directory created.\r"
#echo -e "550 $parml : Permission denied . \r"
;;
CWD* )
# choose
echo - e "250 CWD command successful . \r "
# echo - e "550 $parml : No such file or directory, \r"
;;
NOOP* )
echo -e "200 NOOP command successful . \r"

"

PASV* )
echo -e "227 Entering Passive Mode
(134 , 76 , 11 , 10 0 , 165 , 53 ) \r"
Ii
ACCT* )
echo -e "502 $incmd command not implemented.\r"
;i
SMNT* )
echo -e "502 $incmd command not implemented . \r"
i;

REIN* )
echo -e "502 $incmd command not implemented.\r"

"

MLFL* )
echo -e
;;
MAIL* )
echo -e
;i
MSND* )
echo -e
;;
MSON* )
ec!-.o - e
Ii
MSAM* )
echo - e
Ii
MRSQ* )
echo -e
; ,·
MRCP* )

"502 $incmd command not implemented. \r"
"502 $incmd command not implemented.\r"
"502 $incmd command not implemented. \r"
"502 $incmd command not implemented. \r"
"502 $incmd command not implemented . \r"
"502 $incmd command not implemented .\r"
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echo -e "502 $incmd command not implemented. \r"
ii

MLFL* )
echo -e "502 $incmd command not implemented. \r"

•

"

echo -e "500 ' $incmd ' : command not understood. \r"
Ii

done

C.7

esac
echo -e "$incmd $parml $parm2 $parm3 $parm4 $parm5" » $log

create_db.sql

Copyright (CJ 2000-2002 Carnegie Mellon University
Maintainer: Roman Oanyliw <rdd@cer t . org>, <roman@danyliw. com>
Original Autho r ( s ) : Jed Pickel <jed@picke l . net>
Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert. org>
Todd Schrubb <tls@cert . org>

(2000-2001)

This program i s free software; you can redistribute it and/or
modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published

by

the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.

You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; i f not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc . , 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 021111307, USA.
CREATE TABLE schema ( vseq
ctime
PRIMARY KEY
INSERT INTO schema (vseq, ctime)

INT4
NOT NULL,
DATETIME NOT NULL,
(vseq) ) ;
VALUES ( ' 106 ' , now ( ) ) ;

CREATE TABLE signature ( sig_id
SERIAL NOT NULL,
TEXT NOT NULL,
sig_name
sig_class_id INTB,
sig_priority INTB,
INTB,
sig_rev
s ig _sid
INTB,
PRIMARY KEY (sig_id) ) ;
CREATE INDEX sig name idx ON signature (sig name) ;
CREATE INDEX sig=clas;_id ON signature ( sig=class_id) ;
CREATE TABLE sig_reference ( s ig_id INT4
ref_seq INT4
ref id INT4

NOT NULL,
NOT NULL,
NOT NULL,
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PRIMARY KEY ( sig_id, ref_seq) ) ;
CREATE TABLE reference (

SERIAL,
ref id
ref_system_id INT4 NOT NULL,
ref tag
TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (ref_id) ) ;

CREATE TABLE reference system

ref_system_id
SERIAL,
ref_system_name TEXT,
PRIMARY KEY (ref_system_id) ) ,·

CREATE TABLE sig_class

sig_class_id
SERIAL,
sig_class_name
TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY ( sig_class_id) ) ,·
CREATE INDEX sig_ class_name_idx ON s ig _c lass (sig_ class_name) ;

INT4 NOT NULL,
sid
INTB NOT NULL,
cid
INT4 NOT NULL,
signature
timestamp
DATETIME NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (sid, cid} ) ;
CREATE INDEX signature__idx ON event (signature) ;
CREATE INDEX timestamp_idx ON event (timestamp) ;
CREATE TABLE event

- - s tore info about the sensor supplying data
CREATE TABLE sensor ( sid
SERIAL,
hostname
TEXT,
TEXT,
interface
TEXT,
filter
INT2,
detail
INT2 ,
encoding
INTB NOT NULL,
last_cid
PRIMARY KEY (sid) ) ;
- - All of the fields of an ip header
INT4 NOT NULL,
CREATE TABLE iphdr ( sid
INTB NOT NULL,
cid
INTB NOT NULL,
ip_src
INTB NOT NULL,
ip_dst
INT2 ,
ip_ver
ip_hlen
INT2 ,
INT2 ,
ip_tos
ip_len
INT4 ,
INT4,
ip_ id
INT2 ,
ip_flags
INT4 ,
ip_off
INT2 ,
i p _t tl
INT2 NOT NULL,
ip_proto
ip_csum
INT4 ,
PRIMARY KEY (sid, cid) ) i
CREATE INDEX ip src idx ON iphdr ( ip_src) I
CREATE INDEX ip_dst_idx ON iphdr ( ip_dst) i
- - All of the fields of a tcp header
INT4 NOT
CREATE TABLE tcphdr( sid
INTB NOT
cid
INT4 NOT
tcp_sport
INT4 NOT
t c p _dport
INTB ,
tcp_seq
INTB,
tcp__ack
INT2 ,
tcp_off

NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL,
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INT2,
tcp_res
INT2 NOT NULL,
tcp_flags
tcp_win
INT4,
INT4,
tcp_csum
tcp_urp
INT4,
PRIMARY KEY (sid, cid ) } ;
CREATE INDEX tcp_sport_idx ON tcphdr ( t c p _sport ) ;
CREATE INDEX tcp_dport_idx ON tcphdr ( t c p _dport ) ;
CREATE INDEX tcp_flags_idx ON tcphdr (tcp_flags) ;

-- All of the fields of a udp header
CREATE TABLE udphdr ( sid
INT4 NOT NULL,
INTS NOT NULL,
cid
udp_sport
INT4 NOT NULL,
udp_dport
INT4 NOT NULL,
udp_len
INT4 ,
udp_csum
INT4 ,
PRIMARY KEY {sid, cid) ) ;
CREATE INDEX udp_sport_idx ON udphdr (udp_sport ) ;
CREATE INDEX udp_ dport_idA ON udphdr (udp_dport) ;
-- All of the fields of an icmp header
CREATE TABLE icmphdr ( sid
INT4 NOT NULL,
cid
INTS NOT NULL,
icmp_ type
INT2 NOT NULL,
icmp_code
INT2 NOT NULL,
icmp_csum
INT4,
INT4 ,
icmp_id
icmp_seq
INT4 ,
PRIMARY KEY (sid, cid) ) ;
CREATE INDEX icmp_type_idx ON icmphdr (icmp_type) ;

-- Protocol options
CREATE TABLE opt

- - Packet payload
CREATE TABLE data

sid
cid
optid
opt_proto
opt_code
opt_len
opt_data
PRIMARY KEY

INT4 NOT NULL,
INTS NOT NULL,
INT2 NOT NULL,
INT2 NOT NULL,
INT2 NOT NULL,
INT4,
TEXT,
(aid, cid, optidl } ;

sid
INT4 NOT NULL,
cid
INTB NOT NULL,
data_payload TEXT,
PRIMARY KEY (sid,cid) ) ;

- - encoding is a lookup table for storing encoding types
CREATE TABLE encoding (encoding_ type INT2 NOT NULL,
encoding_ text TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY {encoding_ type ) ) ;
INSERT INTO encoding (encoding_ type, encoding_text) VALUES ( 0 ,
'hex ' ) ;
INSERT INTO encoding (encoding_type, encoding_text) VALUES ( 1 ,
' base64 ' ) ;
INSERT INTO encoding (encoding_type, encoding_ text) VALUES ( 2 ,
' as ci i ' ) ;
- - detail is a lookup table for storing different detail levels
CREATE TABLE detail (detail_type INT2 NOT NULL,
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detail_text TEXT NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (detail_type) ) ;
INSERT INTO detail {detail_type , detail_text) VALUES ( O , ' fast ' ) ;
INSERT INTO detail (detail_type, detail_text) VALUES ( 1 , ' full ' ) ;
be sure to also use the snortdb�extra tables if you want
mappings for tcp flags , protocols, and ports

C.8

router-telnet.pl

# ! /usr/bin/perl
# Copyright 2002 Niels Proves <provos@cit i . umich. edu>
# All rights reserved.
#
# For the license refer to the main source code of Honeyd .
#
# Don ' t echo Will Echo Will Surpress Go Ahead
$return = pack ( 'ccccccccc ' , 2 5 5 , 254, 1 , 2 5 5 , 251, 1 , 2 5 5 , 251, 3 ) ,·
syswrite STDOUT, $return, 9 ;
$string ::
"Users (authorized or unauthorized) have no explicit or\r
implicit expectation of privacy. Any or all uses of this\r
system may be intercepted, monitored, recorded, copied, \r
audited, inspected, and disclosed to authorized site , \ r
and law enforcement personnel, as well as to authorized\r
officials of other agencies, both domestic and foreign. \ r
By using this system, the user consents to such\r
interception, monitoring, recording, copying, auditing,\r
inspection, and disclosure at the discretion of authorized\r
site . \r
\r
Unauthorized or improper use o f this system may result in\r
administrative disciplinary action and civil and criminal\r
penalties . By continuing to use this system you indicate\r
your awareness of and consent to these terms and conditions\r
of use. LOG OFF IMMEDIATELY if you do not agree to the\r
conditions stated in this warning . \ r
\r
\r
\r
User Access Verification\r

" '.

syswrite STDOUT, $string;
$count = O ;
while ( $count < 3 ) {
do {
$count++;
syswrite STDOUT, "\r\n" ;
$word = read word ( "Username: " , 1) ;
} while ( ! $word && $count < 3 ) ;
if ( $count >= 3 && ! $word) {
exit;
$password = read_word ( "Password: "
if ( ! $password} {

0) ;
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syswrite STDOUT, " -% Login invalid\r\n";
else {
syswrite STDERR, "Attempted login: $word/$password" ;
syswrite STDOUT, " -% Access denied\r\n " ;

exit;
sub read_word {
local $prompt = shift;
local $echo = shift;
local $word;
syswrite STDOUT, "$prompt " ;
$word = " " ;
$alarmed = O;
eval {
local $SIG{ALRM}
sub { $alarmed
1 ; die; } ;
alarm 30,·
$finished = O ;
do {
$nread = sysread STDIN, $buffer, 1 ;
die unless $nread;
if (ord($buffer) == O ) {
; #ignore
} elsif (ord($buffer) == 255) {
sysread STDIN, $buffer, 2 ;
} elsif (ord( $buffer) == 1 3 I I ord( $buffer) == 1 0 ) {
syswrite STDOUT, "\r\n" if $echo;
$finished = 1 ;
} else {
syswrite STDOUT, $buffer, l i f $echo;
$word = $word . $buffer;

I

I,

while ( ! $finished) ;
alarm 0 ;

syswrite STDOUT, \r\n" if $alarmed 1 1 l $echo;
if ($alarmed) {
syswrite STDOUT, " % $prompt timeout expired l \r\n";
return ( O ) ;
}
11

return ( $word) ;
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Appendix D
Paper Published
Gupta N (2002), Improving the Ef[(Jcliveness of Deceptive Honeynets through an

Empirical Learning Approach, Published in Proceedings of3 rd Australian Information

Warfare & Security Conference 2002, Perth, Australia
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Appendix E
Contents of CD
• Analyst Notebook 6 Chat viewer
• Chart Files:

o Second Test TCP Traffic

o Second Test TCP Traffic Cluster
o Second Test UDP Traffic

o Second Test UDP Traffic Cluster
o Second Test ICMP Traffic

o Second Test ICMP Traffic Cluster
o Third Test TCP Traffic

o Third Test TCP Traffic Cluster
o Third Test UDP Traffic

o Third Test UDP Traffic Cluster
o Third Test ICMP Traffic

o Third Test ICMP Traffic Cluster
How to Install Chart Reader 6
To install Chart Reader 6:
1 . Close all applications that you may have open.

2. Insert the CD containing Chart Reader 6 into your computer's CD drive.
3. Browse to the CD, open the Chart Reader folder and run Setup.exe.
The Setup.exe is located at:
CD Drive:\Chart Reader

4. Follow the prompts to complete the installation.

5. Run Chart Reader 6 from your Start menu: i2 > Chart Reader 6 > Chart Reader 6
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